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SOCIAL FORCES

A Scientific Medium of Social Study and Interpretation

DISTRIBUTION AND SUCCESSION IN SOCIAL ECOLOGY by Radhakamal Mukerjee
SAINT-SIMON AND AMERICA by J. F. Normano
THE CHANGING BACKGROUND OF SOUTHERN POLITICS by H. Clarence Nixon
THE OLD MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE MODERN SOCIAL SCIENCES by Gladys Bryson
SOCIOLOGY AS A SCIENCE by James W. Woodard
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RURAL PROBLEMS IN JAPAN by Edmund deS. Brunner
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SOCIAL FORCES

October, 1932

THE CONCEPTS OF DISTRIBUTION AND SUCCESSION IN SOCIAL ECOLOGY

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SOCIOLOGY will gain more in realism the more its methods approximate those of plant and animal ecology. Social phenomena and processes can be interpreted in concrete terms of the spatial and temporal distribution of the activities of individuals and associations which is one of the central ideas in ecology. Human geography, indeed, took up the idea of the spatial grouping and adaptation of institutions to the features of the landscape long before the ecological outlook came into prominence.

O. Schluter for instance defines the interrelation between population and landscape thus: "In human geography we shall discover that in the realm of human activities there is no lack of objects, which belong as properly into the landscape as do forests and meadows, rivers and mountains. Primarily we are concerned with visible corporeal objects. Man is considered in addition to his work, not as individual, but in his varying expressions of population density. Visibility and tangibility of the objects is, however, not sufficient. In addition they must have significance in the composition of the landscape. They must have, therefore, a certain areal extent or must be capable of being composed mentally in areal terms." The quantitative study of plant and animal associations and their spatial and food relations, pursued by modern ecologists is, however, much deeper and more precise than the anticipations of the landscape geography of the German School, and bids fair to throw unsuspected light on the biology of population growth. The study of plant and animal numbers gives us the fundamental laws governing the distribution of human populations, the conditions of maintaining population balance and optimum, and the biologic consequences of deviations from these. Besides the ecological treatment of human homes and occupations, and larger human hives, their industries, movements, and achievements aids towards a better understanding and conservation of nature and life in evolution, of decline development as well as survival, organic and human.

Man and his works form a part of the area, whose content and individuality it is the task of social ecology to investigate. The most striking fact that emerges in such investigation is the balance, though a shifting one, between man, his presence, the very fact of the existence of population and the rest of nature. To be sure, such

balance is a complex resultant of actions and interactions, which man only partially comprehends but which sweep through him, up and down and all around, bringing the various parts of inanimate and animate nature into one interconnected whole. Man's doings reverberating through nature, however, often produce, instead of harmonies, disturbances, which redound to insecurity and sometimes the ruin of his generations. Social ecology reveals how in crowded regions the unconscious or wilful disregard of regional balance, the result of population pressure may ultimately lead both man and his habitat to a common doom. The conditions of the maintenance or disturbance of regional balance in fact form a theme of great practical interest in social ecology. Social ecology, indeed, exhibits not merely nature's gifts but also her reprimands, which man himself invites by his own thoughtless disregard of the intertwining of the vital threads. Thus the quantitative study of plant communities and animal aggregations forming harmonic patterns in the web of life would show man the dangers of population pressure as it over-strains or snaps the vital threads. Plant and animal ecology indicates that if the numbers and claims of human associations are in discord with the system or organization into which the ecological community evolves through long established linkages, nature sets in motion certain processes found in common with most plant and animal associations which prevent an ecological calamity.

The Ganges Valley is a most interesting region from the standpoint of social ecology. It is the most heavily populated plain in the world. The plains of China, which are also exceedingly congested, are far more varied from the point of view of soil conditions and habitability, and the density there is accordingly very unequally distributed. On account of the heavy density as well as a uniform distribution of population over centuries in the past in the Ganges Valley there is no other region where we can study to the best advantage the spatial and food relations between man and his environment. Such uniform diffusion of population is chiefly the result of the more or less uniform course of the Ganges along its ancient channel through the centuries carving all the landscape into flat valleys for the aggregation of men. The main river and its tributaries, according to their youth, maturity, and advanced age, exhibit wide valleys and broad flood-plains subject to inundation or broken profiles and narrow valleys intersected by ravines, leading to marked differences in cropping and farming practices.

The Ganges itself though a very old river shows signs of advanced age in her lower course while in her middle course she is mature and in her upper course still youthful. In her upper and middle courses the work of soil erosion and transport is still going on. In the middle course the destruction of vegetation along the banks due to extension of cultivation and indiscriminate grazing has sometimes made more active the process of soil erosion. This affects both irrigation and cultivation in the riverine tract. In the lower course the level of the river bed and the banks is now above that of the surrounding countries as the result of the process of sedimentation. The flood waters thus overflow the banks in the active delta and cover the country by alluvial deposits. During the flood season the drainage is towards the inland depressions and marshes along successive terraces of rice fields which are irrigated in this manner. Indeed, with the exception of the narrow strip of higher land on either side of the river which is usually densely crowded with villages the country seems to be almost wholly sub-

merged. But such flooding is indispensable not only for the type of cultivation but also for scouring and drainage. When, however, the flood season is over and water falls, the movement of water is reversed. The immense volume of water contained by the lateral spill basins during the flood season now gradually flows through every *khal* or channel into the river after having deposited its silt and fertilized the land. All this has important effects upon both agricultural productivity and density of population. Sometimes, again, a river which has completed its cycle from youth to old age begins its activity over again owing to some earth movement. Such tributaries of the Ganges as the Tiesta and the Damodar, for instance, have changed their courses phenomenally with consequent effects upon land forms and through these upon agriculture and distribution of population. Thus location and the stage in the development of the rivers and their valleys govern materially the conditions of pressure and distribution of population.

The Ganges Plain, again, forms a tropical region having a mean annual temperature of over 20°C. that receives the monsoon rainfall. It is the vagaries of the monsoon which determine agricultural prosperity or adversity. The contrast between the dry upper plain where the rainfall is irregular and does not exceed 35 inches per annum and the delta, which exhibits the world's highest record of rainfall (100 to 120 inches), and never fails is one of the most vivid in the world's agriculture.

In the different agricultural regions into which the Ganges plain divides itself water (rainfall, irrigation or flood) operates as the chief limiting agent in agriculture and the growth of human numbers. Soil (old or new alluvium) through its effects on the nature and rotation of crops, is also an important factor determining aggregation of population. The subsoil water level (high in the old or low in a young region), too, determines the cropping (dry or wet) and methods of irrigation and cultivation and hence influences the density of human numbers. Along with land and river forms, extra-terrestrial phenomena like sunspot and weather cycles have an intimate bearing upon the vicissitudes of man and the distribution of population. Sunlight, soil, and water supply thus determine in the long run the concentration and dispersal of human communities. The sun-baked, well-watered plain, with its continuous and uniform cultivation favors the concentration of both peoples and habitations. The scattered distribution of holdings which tends to minimize the risks of agriculture and distribute soil opportunities equally among a dense population, the construction and maintenance of canals, wells, and ponds, and the cultivation of the wet variety of rice which demands collective management and distribution of water supply, all contribute to the concentration of rural dwellings.

Along the elevated and healthy sites fringing the big rivers, villages are established and thrive by mutual cooperation in agriculture and social life. In the low plains and flooded areas, the necessity of defending their homes against the waters also leads men to form close settlements wherever high places are available. But in the extensions of cultivation whether in the forested region or in the flood-swept *char* and marsh the habitations are scattered here and there, each among its fields and gardens. In the low lands of the delta, the thatched cottage separated from its neighbor with its vegetable garden or fish pond, its orchard of banana, palm, and nut trees, and its hedge of bamboo and

mādar, serving as a shade, a defense, and a dyke, is the prevailing type.

As contrasted with the organized, compact, and stable community life in the villages of the upper plains, the isolated hamlets in the lower delta exhibit strong elements of individualism, movement, and adventure. Like the shifting nature of the landscape, which is plastic in the hands of the mighty delta-building rivers, the population type is unstable. Man here combines fishing, transport, and trade with agriculture. Fearless, enterprising, and extravagant, his social habits and interests bear the indelible impress of the hurry and bustle which the regular sequence of floods and tides imports into the region. There is nothing here of that attachment of the peasant to his home and his fields characteristic of the upper plain which leads him to divide and sub-divide his holding and homestead, even his trees, among his children, none of that peasant solidarity, living sympathy, and closeness in ancient village settlements. In the delta, peasant and fisher communities mingle and clash, homesteads are early deserted, and "boom" markets arise with the tide and disappear at ebb. The marsh and the delta peasant lives a life of less economic uniformity. The ecological organization here is marked by constant and rapid change. Mobility measures the rate of change; social life in the lower delta is characterised by quick change of habitations, and occupations, quick transport and marketing, quick movement of population, of land values and wealth, and quick change of social "distances."

In the village communities of the upper plain the homesteads expand by mere aggregation and the people are stay-at-home and conservative. Social distances are relatively fixed. Occupations and castes are few, simple, and stereotyped. Economic changes are counteracted by barriers of custom and public opinion. The social position or status of the individual is determined by his social group or caste. It is the latter which largely limits and governs credit as well as the standards of consumption. Land-transfers are infrequent, and values of movable as well as immovable properties change slowly. The increase or decrease of wealth and change in social position proceed at a slow tempo. Where society moves at a rapid pace, individual misfits are more common, and crime, vice and other forms of anti-social behavior are more frequent. In the pioneer hamlets of the delta as well as in fast decaying village communities, crime is equally evident, symptomatic of quick change of social position and distances. Social ecology will indeed reveal a striking contrast in the position, distribution, and movements of individuals in the contrasted natural areas such as the upper plain and the lower delta. A description and analysis of social phenomena in terms of space and the elementary movements of individuals which social ecology has in view would make it possible for the fundamental logic of the physical sciences to be applied to human relations.

Human spatial and food relations as conditioned by the environment also migrate to appropriate natural areas. Plant and animal ecologists have made us familiar with the concepts of distribution, invasion, and succession. Crops, agricultural and irrigation practices, methods of field distribution and village settlement invade similar ecological areas; and a population group with more adaptive farming methods becomes more successful in areas inhabited by others with an inferior culture and standard of living. Succession thus involves a complete change in the form of exploitation and in the type of population group. Through the interplay of the

forces of competition, invasion, and succession there is a natural selection of varieties of crops and domesticated stocks, methods of cultivation, types of human settlement, dietaries and standards of living in particular ecological areas. These are active agents in the selection and distribution of population types.

The variety of food, plants and of animals and the manifold uses to which these may be put by man's growing intelligence and experience govern materially the economic method and the social life of the communities concerned. The cumulative effects of climate, food, and type of labor evolve the population type which can best utilize the resources of the region. The food and the standard of living are adapted to climate and ecological resources. There is established a sociophysiological balance between man's normal output and expenditure of energy and the natural store of energy he draws upon. Again, in the same region there is always a certain natural dependence upon one another of different economic types that may coexist, forestry, pastoral industry, agriculture, manufacture and trade. We are here introduced to the idea of social symbiosis. There is a certain amount of hostility among the various parts within the life community of a region, but a process of selection goes on till approximate reciprocal adjustment is attained, and the parts live in symbiosis.[1] The plants and animals of a life-community are similarly differentiated in time and space, and there are greater specialization and variety as we rise in the scale of evolution. In the region some members of the ecological organization provide the raw materials while others feed upon the surplus left over by the dominants or get their chance during parts of the year when the dominants are inactive. Then when the raw material has been lifted to the organic level, a new series of forms, the parasitic plants and animals play their part.[2] As in the human economic organization, there are the major groups of primary producers (agriculturists, pastoralists, manufacturers, miners, etc.), intermediaries and consumers, so in the ecological community there is a similar chain of animal associations, each playing a well-defined rôle in the exploitation of resources. The plan of vegetable, animal, and human communities tends to repeat itself even in many details of its arrangement. All these are embraced within the unity of life with mutually adapted and interdependent parts so that the balance and rhythm of the region are undisturbed.

The main course of plant and animal succession is similar in similar natural habitats. Generally speaking, one stage of plant and animal associations gives way to the next, until an equilibrium is reached which is called a climax of the region. We do not find nature working in separate plant or in separate animal associations. Clements used in this connection the concept of the *biome* or biotic community constituted by plants and animals. Similarly Shelford emphasizes the unity of the plant-animal community. According to him, because the large and more influential animals (mammals and birds) tend to range throughout units of largest (formational) size, the biome or biotic formation is the natural ecological unit with some properties which are well illustrated by comparison with an organism. He illustrates: "The often mentioned effect of the bison on grass land is a matter in point, for if the bison held some of the mixed prairie in a short grass stage, then short grass is the bio-ecological climax, and its proper

[1] Mukerjee, *Regional Sociology*, p. 32.

[2] Wells, Huxley and Wells, *The Science of Life*, pp. 583–584.

bio-sociological designation is *Stipa-bison*." John Phillips, who has recently examined the views of ecologists regarding the relations of plants and animals in natural communities, concludes that the most logical working concept is that of the biotic community. He suggests that as our knowledge increases we shall find that despite the linkage in certain instances of animals to plants which are relics of an earlier stage, despite the wide ranging predilections of certain forms, there are definitely forms that are peculiar to a stage, and that the ranging forms probably play a part in some special seasonal or other aspect of certain stages.[3] Man with his agricultural and industrial interference with the plant and animal associations, his modification of land-forms and natural sources of water supply, etc., is yet a part of the biotic community.

The region is in fact like an organism, plastic, growing, moving with its interdependent parts, the associations of vegetable, animal, and human communities. The biotic assemblage including man acts as a whole, bringing to bear upon the environment only the surplus of forces remaining after all conflicts interior to itself have been adjusted.[4] It is usual to regard plant associations as absolutely inert and rigid. This is not a true picture. In the biotic assemblage every part strives for growth and dominance. Studies in plant ecology in reference to sustenance, environment, reproduction, and linkage with other organisms suggest the general idea that plants are moving toward some betterment—toward more food, more light, toward multiplication and mastery. As Thomson and Geddes observe "The concept of purposive endeavour, which is suggested by a study of the higher animals and is consciously verified in man, does not grip in the plant world, but that is not to say that it is irrelevant. We must think of the plant as if it were continually sending out tendrils which feel for support and often find it. Whence it begins afresh. This is the ecological picture."[5] The biotic community, including plant, animal and human associations is thus a moving, reverberating system. Every part of the biotic community as it seeks dominance contributes to bring about a new balance in which the numbers and claims of all are well adjusted. Thus the biotic community as a system keeps on and even moves toward betterment through fresh individual endeavor and fresh inter-relation.

The physiographic factors, etc., determine the climax type of vegetation through successive stages and each stage is associated with an animal assemblage through the provision of protection, shelter, breeding sites, and food. But the climax types of vegetation take time to be established in a region. At first the pioneer species of plants, which are more plastic, such as algae, lichens, and mosses occupy the soil. In community migrations, animals precede plants in many cases due to more rapid migration. Animals are thus better short-period indicators than plants, observes Shelford. "Their presence and abundance at any hour, day, region, or cycle is indicative of conditions relative to which plants cannot fluctuate at all or must lag behind indefinitely. One thus sees the pushing of the dry-community animals into the wet-community in dry seasons, and vice versa as a regular phenomenon with attendant effects upon the habitat."

In much the same manner the pioneers or leaders among human communities first make their appearance in adverse environ-

[3] John Phillips, "The Biotic Community," *Journal of Ecology*, February, 1931.

[4] See C. A. Forbes quoted in footnote 1.

[5] *Life: Outlines of General Biology*, p. 199.

ments, and are found like the pioneer species among plants widely and largely distributed under the most trying conditions all over the globe. Pioneer men like pioneer plants readily and quickly conquer new habitats. In a stable plant community the pioneers become scarce, and are killed out by the more complex forms of vegetation which can only establish themselves on soil prepared for them by the former. This also happens in human communities. The pioneer men and novel institutions prepare the ground for the stability and complexity of modern culture which ultimately weed them out. An ancient rural settlement is like a stable forest community where the climax types among men completely overshadow pioneer types. For its permanence the human community must depend in its early stages on some special skill in the cultivation of certain plants and the rearing of certain domesticated animals. The distribution of different crops such as rice, wheat, Indian corn, or vine, and different domestic animals selected from among the native stock of a region, may definitely limit the expansion of a particular race. On the other hand, such crops and animals govern materially man's interests and habits as well as his spatial relation to the region and the possibilities of organization and labor. A definite type of labor imposed by climate and the assemblage of cultivated plants and domesticated animals makes for the selection of a particular racial type suited to the region. But man's adaptation takes also the form of mental and social accommodation. Thus a type of culture comes to have a certain correlation with the physique of a people, both registering the trials and errors of the environment.[6]

Lastly, as the ecological area passes through regular stages of succession, which are well nigh uniform and predictable, with corresponding stages of development of plant and animal communities, both population type and distribution undergo a change with the transformation of the ecological base. The ecological area with its characteristic distribution of natural forces and harmonic animal and vegetable aggregations accordingly presents a well-defined patterned formation. As in the life-community in a region there develop a complex inter-relationship among the various organisms and a balance and rhythm of growth for all, so in the culture of a human community which is woven within the framework of the ecological area there is found a great complexity of inter-relations among the social, economic, and other institutions and traditions, establishing some kind of equilibrium for the whole community or culture. Thus, like the ecological community, society or culture develops as a whole, maintaining a balance for its different institutions and traditions, all interlaced with one another, as culture progresses, in finer and finer patterns of correlation and solidarity.

[6] Mukerjee, *Regional Sociology*, p. 230.

SAINT-SIMON AND AMERICA

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"THE founder of Saint-Simonism is more celebrated than known," is the regretful remark of the brilliant Frenchman, George Weil, who is the outstanding authority on this nineteenth century thinker. And, indeed, if the world knows little of Saint-Simon himself, it knows still less of the universal and enduring influence of his ideas. It is an absorbing study to trace the odyssey of his ideas, their expansion and destiny, their distortion and adaptation, their deathless vitality and power, their migrations and vicissitudes during the past hundred years.

Such a survey cannot help impressing one with the wonder of this movement. Not only Europe, but the two Americas, North and South, were and still are consciously and unwillingly repeating, following, and developing Saint-Simon's ideas. In general, all the social sciences were fertilized by his writing, and the high-capitalism of our day is a fulfillment of his dream. To be sure, Saint-Simon's work did not die with its creator. He strove to combine two worlds, those of theory and of practice, Utopia and actuality, dreams and life. And he himself lived in both.

This fascinating figure, whose friend was Rouget de Lisle, and whose secretary was Auguste Comte, engaged in the self-appointed task of a wholesale and unlimited reorganization of human life. His far-flung vision constituted the great passion of his life. Yet, despite his zeal for "reorganization," this builder of system could not convert his own theories into a complete and orderly system, for they were soon submerged in the flood of new ideas which they provoked. "My life has been a series of experiments" said Saint-Simon, presenting the biographer with a mixture of philosopher and man of affairs, aristocrat and sans-culotte, pupil of d'Alembert and pensioner of Louis XVI.

The influence of Saint-Simon is universal. He affected *philosophy* through Auguste Comte; *socialism* through his embryonic theory of class struggle; *history* through Augustin Thierry; *politics* through his interpretation of it as a reflection of the modes of production, and his sketch in 1814 of a League of Nations; *theology* through his theories on the New Christianity; and in *sociology* he may be represented as one of the chief founders. His scientific writings and his pronunciamentos, his unique versatility of interest and knowledge and his talent for combining them, make Saint-Simon as modern in present-day Europe as he was in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. His psychology is still in agreement with the modern *Zeitgeist*. "Society," he wrote, "is based entirely on industry. Industry is the sole guarantee of its existence, the sole source of all wealth and prosperity. That estate of things most favorable to industry is, therefore, for this reason alone, most favorable to society. At the time that is both the point of departure and the goal of all our efforts."[1]

Saint-Simon was not "le dernier gentilhomme et le premier socialiste," as is the verdict of his biographer Hubbart, who appears to have been influenced by Rodrigues. He was not "das Bindeglied zwischen den vagen Utopien eines Morelli

[1] *Oeuvres de Saint-Simon*, II, 13. Paris, 1868.

und Mandeville und der echten Gesellschaftsforschung eines Prudhon und Marx,"[2] as a recent German historian attempts to depict him. It is not socialism which is the essence of Saint-Simon. Rather he was the prophet of the high stage of capitalism which marks our day. He was the leader of the new ranks of politicians, journalists, technologists, and industrialists. He was the spokesman of the generation to come and the realization of its restless spirit of modernity. Throughout the works of Saint-Simon one finds no enthusiasm for the "Ordre Naturel" and no glorification of the noble savage, both of which were so prominent in the eighteenth century. Saint-Simon's eyes were always turned toward the future. "The Golden age is not behind, but before us,"—and its construction depended upon the forces of the new industrialism.

It is highly significant that the composer of the *Marseillaise* also penned the *Chant à l'Industriel*. The real death of the ancient regime and the birth of true liberty were for Saint-Simon the results of industry. "Tout pour l'industrie et tout par elle" is the key-note of his economic program. By industry Saint-Simon meant the productive efforts of the people, maintaining that it depended for its expansion upon the development of transportation and credit. Railroads, canals, and banks are the vehicles of industry and together they constitute the hope of the new golden age.

The specific rôle of the industrial producer in his system leads to an understanding of politics as a "science of production" and points to the conclusion that the future society will require administration, not government. But who are to conduct the administration? The leaders of production, of course, assisted by scholars. Saint-Simon's administrative theories project the "conseil de Newton," the "Parlement de perfection" and so forth. Under the influence of the banking circles of the time, Saint-Simon finally developed with architectural splendor a hierarchical structure for his industrial system, wherein the banker was portrayed as national director of production; credit was represented uniquely as the path to the new social organization, and a central hierarchy of banks, as the distributor of capital. Banking was thus the moving and controlling force in this organism. This may serve to explain in part why contemporary business men became ardent devotees of Saint-Simon. His theory proved more attractive to Rothschild than to Louis Blanc. Banks became an essential feature in the Saint-Simonistic movement throughout its history. Early in 1787 Saint-Simon was associated with Francesco Cabarus, the founder of the Banque Saint-Charles in Spain; and during 1791 and 1792 he was an intimate of his own banker, Perregaut, in Paris. The first meetings of the Saint-Simonists were held in the Caisse Hypothecaire, managed by the reformer's faithful pupil and friend, the banker Olinde Rodrigues, where Enfantin, son of a banker, was cashier, and the son of the President, Charles Duveyrier, the future editor of "Le Crédit." Gustave d'Eichthal was also a member of the banking profession. Contemporary pamphlets indicated the sympathies of the Rothschilds with Saint-Simonism.

The banking problem constituted the source of the greatest achievement and the greatest failure of the Saint-Simonists: the Crédit Mobilier. It became in effect an attempt by the bankers to dominate contemporary life. Repeatedly in its development the practical and selfish aims of the founders became foremost. The idealistic aspect of their banking program was

[2] E. Salin, *Geschichte der Volkswirtschaftslehre*. p. 26. Berlin, 1923.

gradually submerged. Enfantin, typical in this respect, declared in 1846, concerning the Suez Canal: "This is no longer a theory, or indeed a question of politics; it is business."[3]

Looking back upon the life and ideas of Saint-Simon, we are often struck by the fact that the modernity of his work seems to belie the fact that the man lived from 1760 to 1825. A man of struggle, of practical affairs and speculation with vacillations in each, one who delighted in the great projects of railroads, banks, canals, and big business in general, one who took the planet for his field of activity, a cosmopolitan whose initiative stopped at no geographical barriers, a close follower of modern scientific business administration, founder of a philanthropic religion, patron of sciences and scholars, devoted to social welfare—is this not a portrait of a modern American captain of industry? Between the two poles of Saint-Simon—gentleman and sans-culotte—modern capitalistic psychology was predominant; and it is little to be wondered that his disciples became enthusiastic workers in practical affairs, reconstructionists of the material side of life; it is little to be wondered that we today are witnesses of a revival of Saint-Simonism.

These features of the modern business man are clearly to be found among the Saint-Simonists. Those early reorganizers were without geographical boundaries. Paris, though their home, was also their point of departure for Suez and Panama, for railroads in Russia and Spain, for the Orient and Egypt, for banks all over the European continent. If these Saint-Simonistic ideas disappeared in the early functioning of their enterprises, one cannot deny their power at the time of their inception. Their spirit gave birth to their organizing activity and is especially conspicuous in the work of the brothers Pereira, founders and leaders of the Crédit Mobilier, probably the intended center of the Saint-Simonistic industrial system. "The Saint-Simonists became scholars, technicians and industrialists, politicians and journalists; many of them strove ceaselessly to realize in action the glowing ideas of their early dreams, though very often in their acquiescence to reality these ideas suffered an unavoidable transformation."[4] And we must agree with Isaac Pereira, that these men tried all their lives to fulfill the golden promises they envisaged in their youth: "liberation of the peoples through the development of credit and labor, creation of railroads, the binding together of worlds and oceans by the building of the Suez and Panama Canals."[5]

II

"It was in America, while fighting for the cause of industrial liberty, that I conceived the first desire to see this plant from another world flower in my country."[6] The years 1779–1783 Saint-Simon passed in America. His activities and acquaintances in this country have not yet been investigated. We know, however, that he fought under Bouillé and Washington and became a member of the Cincinnatus Association; that he considered himself "one of the founders of the liberty of the United States;"[7] that he met Benjamin Franklin; that he acquired here "le goût des affaires;" and that he submitted to the viceroy of Mexico a project of an inter-oceanic canal. Saint-

[3] J. L. Puyjalon, *L'influence des Saint-Simoniens sur la réalisation de l'Isthme de Suez et des chemins de fer*, p. 91. Paris, 1926.

[4] Johann Plenge, *Gründung und Geschichte des Crédit Mobilier*, Tübingen, 1903.

[5] *Ibid*, p. 52.

[6] *Oeuvres*, *op. cit.*, II, p. 133. *Cf.* also pp. 142, 148.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 140.

Simon emphasized his American influence on several occasions. He wrote to his father (November 16, 1782): "I foresaw that the American Revolution signalized the beginning of a new political era, that this revolution of necessity ought to determine a progress important for general civilization, and that to some extent it would bring about great changes in the social order which then existed in Europe." Saint-Simon admits that "During my sojourn in America, I engaged much more in political science than in military tactics."[8] He made note that "the celebrated Penn was the dominating character of the American nation, that this nation showed itself in general essentially pacific, industrious and economical."[9] There is a modern note in his disappointment, however, the belief that Europe has declined: "Our Europe, who has become old and who was in dire need of regeneration."[10] Realizing that the only solution lies in industrialization (modern Americanization?) he develops a program of reconstruction in a series of letters "à un Americain."[11]

His disciples and followers often turned their eyes toward the American Continent. This interest in America was especially strong in Michel Chevalier, who "was sent to this country in 1834, under the patronage of Thiers, then Minister of the Interior in France, to inspect the public works. But, attracted by the novel spectacle of our society in the United States, he extended the time of his stay and the sphere of his observations amongst us and spent two years in visiting nearly all parts of the Union and studying the workings of our social and political machinery."[12]

He published a noteworthy book on the United States, wherein we may find traces of Saint-Simonian industrial enthusiasm and, of course, investigations on the Isthmus of Panama.[13]

III

Saint-Simon became acquainted not only with the United States. He touched the soil of Mexico and the Antilles. But although he later made friends in Spain, and found his best collaborators and followers in men of Portuguese origin, as Rodrigues and Pereira, he derived no inspiration from Latin America. He was inspired by practical life in the United States, but he was himself the inspiration of theoretical currents of thought in Latin America.

His main ideas and his formulated plan of industry were predestined for adoption in the United States, in its railroads, banks canals, and factories. But the soil of the United States was not propitious for the cultivation of theory. The industrial system became here a matter of fact, not of thought. The "American System," of course, bears many similarities to the industrial program of Saint-Simon. In particular two American statesmen, Henry Clay and James G. Blaine, despite the differences in their eras, were both ardent believers in the American system, propagandists for railroads, and interested in the Panama Canal. Blaine in addition was connected with the American Crédit

[8] *Oeuvres, op. cit.*, II, 138.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 141.

[11] "You desire, Monsieur, to know what is happening in the old continent; you ask me to acquaint you with the march of the spirit of Europe; you offer me, in return, similar information about America. . . . . "*Lettres de Henri Saint-Simon à un Americain. Oeuvres., op. cit.*, II, 139.

[12] Introduction to the English translation, Michel Chevalier, *Society, Manners, and Politics in the United States, Being a Series of letters on North America*, translated from the third Paris edition. Boston, 1839.

[13] *L'Isthme de Panama. Examen historique et geographique des differents directions suivant les quelles on pourrait le peger et des moyens d'y employer, suivi d'un aperçu sur l'isthme de Suez.* Paris, 1844.

Mobilier. Both were enthusiasts in favor of Pan Americanism, a project similar to Saint-Simon's plan for the organization of an European league, and both were influenced by practical Saint-Simonism. It would be highly interesting to study the origin of the ideas of these statesmen as well as their relations in Europe.

In the United States one cannot find the "Politechniciens," a group devoted to Saint-Simonism, closely applying their doctrines to practice. Yet the real conditions of life tended toward the ideal of this knot of Saint-Simonian thinkers.

Entirely different was the influence of Saint-Simon in Spanish America. His doctrines were retailed second or even third-hand to the La Plata republics, often through Lamennais and Leroux. Not the economic program, but the nebulous socialism and religious and mystic enthusiasm of its content became the fashion, and developed cults of an intellectual movement in these countries. It is curious to note how the industrial program of Saint-Simon was neglected in Spanish America, while his social ideas, strangely distorted, became the passionate credo of the intelligentsia. Revolutionists and ruling government preached Saint-Simonism.

The excellent investigations of José Ingenieros and his school in Argentina first revealed the hitherto in appreciated influence of Saint-Simon. The investigation of the spiritual background of the "Asociación de Mayo" of 1837 and the Saint-Simonian zeal of Echevarri, Gutierrez, Alberdi, and Sarmiento redound greatly to Ingenieros' credit. Of course, the influence was not of the same force or quality on all these men. A most careful study of Echevarria's "El Dogma Socialista" reveals no traces of Saint-Simonism, while Sarmiento's article on "Cajas de Ahorro" impresses one as a Spanish compilation of Saint-Simonian writings. Ingenieros is forced to admit that Echevarria was only "*latu sensu* a Saint-Simonian socialist."[14]

The industrial program of Alberdi recalls more clearly the French doctrine. In Uruguay Miguel Cané and Andres Lamas belong to this current of thought. In Chile Francisco Bilbao and Lastarria represented a brand of Saint-Simonism, derived from Michelet and Quinet; "while the work of revolutionary clubs, such as the 'Society and Equality,' formed a party of romantic youth eager to sacrifice itself for its ideals."[15]

But it would be to no purpose to trace the movement in the various La Plata republics. It must be recalled that in this period of *Sturm und Drang*, of continuous revolution and reconstruction of the former Spanish Colonies, the intellectual unity may have been greater than even at present. The intellectuals migrated from one country to another; Argentine exiles found refuge in Uruguay and Chile, the Chileans in Argentina. Many were temporarily residents in Paris and on their return imported the contemporary French spirit into Latin America. They provided on their native soils the milieu for the imitation of French societies and clubs. The Colegio de Ciencias Morales and the Universidad de Rivadavia in Buenos Aires prepared members for all the numerous literary and political associations. The case was very much the same in Uruguay and Chile. Inasmuch as the associations and their leaders were, for the most part, conspirators against the government, the ruling generals attempted to stamp out Saint-Simonism wherever it raised its head because the theory of Saint-Simonism not only provided matter for discussion, admiration, and rhetoric in Latin America,

[14] *Revista de Filosophia*, p. 295, 1918, Marzo.

[15] Francisco Garcia Calderón, *Latin America*, p. 169, English translation, London, 1913.

but it became the "bandeira" of insurgency and revolution. It served even to bind together for a time two former friends and future enemies, the only two realists in the history of Argentine thought, Alberdi and Sarmiento.

In the case of Brazil, Saint-Simon's influence was different. Not his theories, but the practical activity of his followers, especially of the brothers Pereira, found a worthy counterpart in the inter-American financier, statesman and diplomat Visconde de Mauá. I am dedicating to this period a special chapter in a book now in preparation.

Not only revolutionaries, but the governing tyrannies also were frequently touched by the doctrines of Saint-Simonism. One need only turn the leaves of Calderón's "Latin America" in order to detect this influence, directly and indirectly. In Argentina, Bernardino Rivadavia "was the pupil of Lamartine and Benjamin Constant in a barbarous democracy" (p. 135); in Columbia, President Nunez "forgot his original socialistic principles, the theory of Louis Blanc and Saint-Simon" (p. 308); and in Bolivia, Ballivian and Linares dreamed of a "tyranny of the intellectual elements" (p. 126).

Thus both, the governments and their oppositions, were superficially infected by Saint-Simonian contagion, while the intelligentsia used and imitated its schemes for social reconstruction.

Anglo-Saxon America never became interested in the theory which was inspired in part by the practice native to her soil. She continued her efforts toward the realization of the "American System," which corresponds to the industrial dreams and ambitions of Saint-Simon.

IV

Europe today, as a hundred years ago, is suffering from the aftermath of a world-shaking war. Today, as at that time, a new industrial revolution menaces the European hegemony of the world. Just as at that time when Saint-Simon called upon Europe to imitate the United States, economic Americanization has become recognized as the only way to avoid the decline of her economy. And just as a century ago, the old standard has been raised aloft again. Saint-Simon's socialism became half-forgotten; but his industrial visions are again programed, even retaining their old dress. New Saint-Simonism, born after the war, attempts to continue the old orthodox theories. The formation of a cult of production marks the beginning of the new Saint-Simonian campaign, and the new organ, "Le Producteur," founded in 1920, continues the work of its percursor "Le Producteur" of 1825 and 1826. The program consists of "a Saint-Simonian alliance of pure intelligence with utilitarian technique." And a new group of "createurs d'affaires" declare the primacy of economics and the basic mode of production. "Should anyone ask us our opinions in domestic or foreign politics, for the moment at least, we would be able to answer only in an elusive way, by such words as coal, iron, credit, organizational bureaus, technical culture, general culture. . . . . Hence, not politics in its common sense, but politics of production. Again and for all time—production: this indeed is a central idea of Saint-Simonism."[16]

This, however, is not the place to discuss the revival of Saint-Simonism today. But it is worth remarking that at present, just as a century ago, it is drawing its inspiration from the material success of the American System. It is under the guidance of disciples who are still loyal to their Saint-Simonian patrimony, and who are attempting to make the movement the spir-

[16] Bourbonnet, *Le Neo Saint-Simonisme et la vie Sociale d'Aujourd'hui*, p. 12, Paris, 1923.

itual forerunner of the economic energy. And, although tendencies are still vague, the repetitions of history would seem to suggest that out of this group of new "Createurs d'affaires," including Gabriel Darquet, Ferdinand Gross, and others, may emerge accomplishments parallel to those of Pereira, Talabot and de Lessep.

THE CHANGING BACKGROUND OF SOUTHERN POLITICS

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THE South is manifesting economic and social changes that must vitally affect the spirit and content of politics. These changes are, in part, an expansion of the southern portraiture in the national picture and, in part, a distinct shifting of the southern scene. The changing South—more changing than advancing—may be briefly viewed by noting the coming of industry, the shifts in agriculture, and the movements of the population.

The substantial progress in southern agriculture in the twentieth century has been matched by much greater gains in manufacturing. In fact, manufactures exceed twice the value of farm crops in the South, with the eleven ex-Confederate states showing seven billion dollars in manufactured products in 1929. The industrial development has been most important in the Appalachian regions of coal, iron, and water power, though mention should be made of other sections, particularly those of lumber and petroleum. Industrialization since the Civil War has tended to shift economic predominance from the lands of the old plantations to sections that were only slightly touched by the plantation economy of the Old South. These newer and rawer sections, with a shortage of traditions, have tended to stimulate the spirit of the "economic man" and to foster an industrial consciousness that threatens the agrarian philosophy in every sense except in the teachings of *laissez faire*. The captain of industry or finance rather than the country gentleman has become the prevailing pattern in the minds of the aspiring youth of the South.

Southern manufacturing is chiefly in the coarse-goods stage, with low values added to the product by the manufacturing process. The last census figures furnish strong testimony on this point. Texas, for instance, with a total of $1,449,801,916 in manufactures for 1929, contributed only $451,869,640 as "value added by manufacture." Only three southern states showed "values added by manufacture" that equal or surpass fifty per cent of final values of their manufactures. At the same time, the "value added by manufacture" in proportion to the units (not the cost) of labor used was much lower for the South than for the rest of the country, very much lower than the figures for the Northeast. One laborer in manufacturing in South Carolina measures a "value added by manufacture" of $1457 for the year 1929, in comparison with $3050 per laborer in Massachusetts. The comparatively low wages in southern industries are as closely connected with the nature or class of the industries as with any other factor. It is in no small degree true that those industries which thrive on cheap labor have

been coming south because of cheap labor, as is so clearly indicated by Clarence Heer in his *Income and Wages in the South.*[1] With cotton manufacturing leading by a good margin in southern industries and this cotton milling restricted largely to the making of yarn, the South is facing a stage of exploitation suggestive of the British industrial revolution of a hundred years ago.

The southern industrialists may be ready or willing to support business methods in government, to support public education, highway improvement, and health regulation, but they are not dominated by a social awareness in the realm of relationship between labor and capital. Their section is lagging in the public control of labor conditions, in state protection for women and children in industry, and in sympathy for labor organizations. The standards for workers in southern industry are low,[2] and the individualistic spirit is strong in the sphere of industrial problems. Cotton mill owners in the land of Dixie have shown a sensitiveness to the discussion of labor problems not unlike the prejudiced attitude of the slave-holders of an earlier day, and a worshipped industrialism may be as destructive of the freedom of thought as was the institution of slavery. Especially is Negro labor in general rather effectively subject to the *laissez faire* system which it entered upon passing from slavery, and the present depression has not benefitted the cause of labor in the South, either as to protective regulation or public respect for labor unions. This region has yet to pass from the labor views of Hayes or Cleveland even to those of Theodore Roosevelt I.

The South's traditional tariff attitude has been threatened by aggressive minority elements, though the recent plight of the cotton farmer and the cotton merchant has brought forth such denunciations as "Our tariff is a wet nurse to inefficiency." Al Smith did not lose the votes of a group of Southern states in 1928 on account of his wide departure from "tariff for revenue only." For tariff reasons genuine peanut politics can now be found in parts of the South, and the daughter of the Great Commoner of silver fame has gone to Congress and worked for tomato protection. Louisiana sugar protection votes in Congress are finding southern support at times from the regions of the Carolinas and the iron and steel districts of Alabama. With this trend, other tenets of the conservative wing of the Republican party are becoming more evident, for not a few Republican business men are coming south, and, in the language of Will Rogers, "the rascals bring their Republican politics with 'em." The writer has elsewhere[3] pointed out how Hoover's southern vote in 1928 was due partly to an interlocking of conservative Republicanism and industrialism in the newer regions, where important interests sought insurance against upsetting the applecart of prosperity (strange as that may seem now!). Hoover captured the progress-conscious districts of Houston, Dallas, Birmingham, Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Richmond, while Smith carried the more easy-going districts of San Antonio, New Orleans, Mobile, Montgomery, Savannah, and Charleston, with the growing old river town of Memphis. Hoover carried the centers of industrial politics, Smith the centers of traditional politics; and the rather constant religious-prohibition fac-

[1] Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1930.

[2] Lucy Randolph Mason, *Standards for Workers in Southern Industry.* National Consumers' League Pamphlet, November, 1931.

[3] "The Changing Political Philosophy of the South," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1931, pp. 246–50.

tor can not remove the validity of this generalization. As to the change of attitude since the autumn of 1929, I quote a Tennessee Negro, who, in discussing the panic with his fellows at lunch time, observed that "them northern folks ain't got as much sense as us Democrats."

The spirit of industrial progress mixed with the elixer of federal aid has tended to kill states rights in the South, while in the recent cries for "relief" the South has been about one hundred per cent nationalistic. With the decline of states rights, we have seen the beginning of the end of the country-lawyer conception of checks and balances and the coming of business notions of government. It is significant that outstanding changes and improvement in state administration must be associated with the governorships of men who entered office with business experience and without formal legal training, such as Comer and Kilby of Alabama, Parker of Louisiana, and Byrd of Virginia.

But the industrialist and the business man in the South have not supplanted the agrarian Bourbon to share the field alone, for both an urban proletariat and a rural peasantry are to be reckoned with, as well as a certain type of politician that has sprung up to lead them.

In the transformation and partial industrialization of agriculture, the Southeast has not been able to keep pace with the Southwest. Cotton acreage and cotton production have been gaining in the West and relatively declining in the East, with Arkansas showing recent figures second only to Texas, while Georgia has led the Southland in the reduction of acreage and the abandonment of farm lands, the abandonment in this state for the years 1920–1930 being three and a third million acres. It is said that the "man who farms hill land is that much nearer Heaven, and he deserves to be," and the margin of cultivation is driving hill dwellers farther from Heaven, while mechanized farming has been spreading over the Western Plains, where it is said one can plow a furrow a hundred miles long and farming becomes a sedentary occupation. Texas has been increasing cotton acres twice as fast as Georgia has been decreasing them, and some of the red old hills of Georgia are becoming inadequate to support crops of cotton or crops of county politicians. The abandonment of farms is followed by agitation for the abolition of rural county jobs and even for the abandonment of counties through consolidation. Incidentally, the Georgia population has reached a stand-still, in spite of a heavy natural increase, for Georgians are migrating to Florida in sufficient numbers to outvote the comers from the North and to make Florida safe for Democrary.

Where the farm population in the South is decreasing, the Negroes seem to be leaving the farms faster than the whites. Where the farm population is increasing, the white population is increasing faster than the colored. A study by the Georgia experiment station showed that between 1910 and 1925 whole counties in that state had lost from sixty to seventy-five per cent of their Negro farmers.[4] The rural state of Mississippi lost in Negro population between 1910 and 1920, while between 1920 and 1930 the number of whites caught up with the number of Negroes. Slowly but surely the Negro problem is becoming an urban problem and a national problem rather than a problem of the rural South.

The hill-billy whites, if not moving to town, to Texas or to Florida, are coming down from the highlands to the lowlands of their respective states to enjoy more fertile and accessible soil (perhaps getting

[4] *Report of the Commission on Recent Economic Changes of the President's Conference on Unemployment*, II, 573. New York, 1929.

more deeply in debt). Whites from the hills and new-fangled machinery are supplanting the lowland gentleman and his Negro labor in the changing cotton economy. The Mississippi Delta counties are drawing white farmers from the hill counties not far away. Bolivar county, in the Delta, increased its number of white farmers nearly three-fold between 1920 and 1930. The excessively high percentage and increasing percentage of white tenant farmers in Mississippi is a factor not to be neglected in explaining the recent era of Bilbo politics in that state. The tenant-one-crop system, as much as the one-party system, is responsible for the high proportion of non-voting and unintelligent voting in the Cotton Belt. The proportion of tenant farmers, ranging above sixty per cent in a few southern states, including Georgia, South Carolina, and Mississippi, will not show a decrease when all returns are in from the present depression, which is making King Cotton so sick, and, with the proportion of whites increasing in this increasing tenantry in the region of lowest per capita farm income in the nation, the politics of the countryside may offer little for which to be thankful. Of course there has been improvement in the grade and status of farm tenants in many parts of the South within the past generation, but it is nevertheless true of this section that share "croppers . . . . formed more than four-tenths of all tenant farmers in 1930—about one third of the white tenants and considerably more than one half of the colored tenants."[5] The leaven of well-to-do families is proportionately decreasing among the farm population of the South, and a vigorous agrarian political leadership is no more.

The rural hills of low incomes and high birth rates are also furnishing abundant labor supplies to textile mills which have been coming to the South to find individualistic "Anglo-Saxon" workers. From independent mountain farms a certain number of laborers of stamina and even fight have come, and it is quite significant as well as natural that the labor element from this source has tended to give employers the most trouble and to be most active in staging textile strikes in the last few years, though working in mill districts where the wages are relatively high for the South. In the cotton mill villages in the cotton states of Georgia and Alabama, however, where wages have often been lower than in North Carolina or Virginia, the white labor has been more docile and less given to strikes, primarily because the mill labor supply in the lower South is more regularly drawn from tenant-farmer families, not so much from the mountain farm-owning class. In general, it is hard to deny the observation that the "mills have drawn primarily upon the lowest social strata of the white population for their labor force," producing "a vast converging of undesirable elements,"[6] and tending to develop a social type not sympathetic to healthy political ideals or ideas.

The mill village proletariat and the farm-tenant peasantry are somewhat interchangeable, and there is a high mobility from mill to mill and from farm to farm. It is almost true that, when those of a certain type of mill-worker or farm tenant undertake to move, "all they have to do is to call the dog and spit in the fire." Whether on mill or farm, this element will often be found strong for a Bilbo, a Heflin, a Cole Blease, a Ferguson, or a gentleman

[5] L. S. Truesdell in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* VI, 123. New York: Macmillan, 1931.

[6] J. J. Rhyne, *Some Southern Cotton Mill Workers and Their Villages,* p. 111. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1929.

of Louisiana, for some one who seems to be a sort of "Karl Marx to hill-billies." It is not immune from exploitation in the interest of the spoils system; it has hardly yet had a genuine and socially-minded spokesman in southern political high places, with the sure and definite exception some years ago of Governor Charles B. Aycock of North Carolina.

With this inarticulate vote to play on and with the increase in functions, cost, and spoils of government, politics in the South becomes in itself a business of gain, even of graft, instead of just the means for the control of public policy on the part of a social group. The political exploitation of highway funds in certain southern states has even led to southern praise of federal control as a partial protection against graft or mismanagement. The group that profits by the expansion of government, by the increase in jobs, in taxes and in public debts, has become sufficiently powerful in the South in recent years to give the business man a run for his money. A skyscraper capitol moving upwards from a Mississippi River bottom in days of depression brings down no effective criticism on the main in power. Dave Crockett used with effectiveness in a political campaign the point that his opponent had a carpet on the floor, while his frugal simplicity was not associated with such extravagance; but Governor Long seems to gain in popular support through reports of personal wardrobes in three different towns, not to mention green silk pajamas and an LL.D. outfit and hood. The amateur spirit of the South has been largely driven out of politics by a mixture of the influences of spoils and an industrial economy.

Southern voters often have to choose between spoils politics and business politics, with little chance or choice with reference to social politics. In Texas in 1930 it was a choice between Ferguson, a spoilsman (and wife) and Sterling, the business man. In Alabama there has been Brandon, preeminently a politician, versus Kilby, an industrialist, for the governorship. Parallels can be found in other states, though in Tennessee there has recently been a high degree of fusion between big spoils and big business. If there is a check to this trend at present, it is the check by panic, not by choice. A Bilbo as well as a Luke Lea may owe his fall to the depression, and economic necessity may be the mother of better government.

Inquiring spade work toward the study of social needs and social politics is being done by a few university groups, notably in North Carolina and Virginia, and a few bold newspapers are daring to champion change in political ideas, among them the Macon *Telegraph*, the Chattanooga *News*, the Ashville *Times-Citizen*, and, sometimes, the Marshall Ballard editorial page of the New Orleans *Item* and *Tribune*. A small group of traditionalists in the South is also crying out against an unchecked and uncontrolled industrialism and indirectly provoking a bit of criticism of the system it would overthrow. But these intellectuals, critics, and traditionalists are minority voices. The value of history is at stake in the South, where the coming of industry is late enough for a political social-mindedness to avoid many of the evils of earlier industrial days in England and in New England. Yet it must be observed that political steps to meet changing needs are far in the rear of economic development in the South, and history is in no little danger of largely repeating itself.

THE COMPARABLE INTERESTS OF THE OLD MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE MODERN SOCIAL SCIENCES

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I

WHEN it is said so often that the social sciences had their origin in philosophy it is surprising to find that no historian of any one of them has yet analyzed the particular kind of philosophy from which they came, namely, moral philosophy. Whatever the reasons for the neglect, these questions are fair: How can a political scientist interpret Grotius correctly if he extracts from Grotius' work only those chapters which deal with government and international law specifically? How much of Adam Smith's economics do we know if we neglect the background of *The Wealth of Nations*? Why in a definitive way should Adam Ferguson be called a sociologist when he can with equal right be called psychologist, political scientist, economist, jurist, anthropologist, and teacher of ethics and aesthetics as well? These men were moral philosophers, with interests as wide as the customs and institutions of man. To be a moral philosopher was to be an analyst and interpreter of the current *mores*, and at the same time a protagonist of new relationships thought by the philosopher to be more highly ethical and advantageous. Not only do we put a false light on the moral philosopher when we claim him in one of the social sciences as if he had no other affiliations, but we also fail to see the separate social sciences themselves in true historical perspective when we forget that they once had a very definite pattern of belonging together and of inhering as one mass in a common set of presuppositions.

Twentieth century social scientists, and even twentieth century philosophers it is suspected, are in the habit of too completely equating moral philosophy with ethics. It is true that the ultimate aim of that discipline was to bring about human relationships which would be in advance, ethically, of current practice. In the course of argument, however, the moralists' material included discussions of human nature, social forces, progress, marriage and family relationships, economic processes, maintenance of government, international relations, elementary jurisprudence, primitive customs, history of institutions, religion, ethics, aesthetics —all topics of import in the social sciences of our day. This comprehensive table of contents has been consistently characteristic of moral philosophy since the days when the discussions of Socrates were transcribed.

Within such a mass of material there was a definite pattern of arrangement of the different sections. Usually in the beginning the moralist would take the reader into his confidence somewhat by setting forth his aims, his starting points and his methods. Here occur those definitions of science and scientific procedure which still rise up to confront an investigator and which should be intensely interesting to students of methodology and to historians of ideas. After setting out in view his working tools the writer would next lay what he considered his foundation stone, his discussion of the "facts" of human nature. This discussion was the requirement of most importance, to his

mind, since it afforded what his definition of science demanded: that every subject matter should have, in order to be considered scientific at all, a general principle capable of unifying and organizing the whole mass of material. (It is worth noting that science was regarded as a certain kind of subject matter rather than as method.) On this foundation of the "facts" of human nature the moralist then built a generalized ethical teaching, such as Bentham's dictum that actions should be determined so as to produce the greatest good to the greatest number. Then came the application of that generalized teaching to the various social institutions, which were abstracted, and regarded as so many fields for the application of that law. In the course of describing the history and function of the institutions, however, the moral teaching was often lost sight of or applied very loosely, and the result was an approximation to a modern discussion of institutions and human relationships.

Now that the social sciences are independent, supposedly, of moral philosophy, we find some likenesses and some unlikenesses to the old pattern. Each science in its general treatises gives, of necessity, its starting points, objectives and methods, very much in the old way. Most of them still rely heavily on the "facts" of human nature, thus becoming analytical and logical rather than historical in method. The striking differences are, of course, that each separate abstraction of the older formulation has now become a separate discipline, instead of a segment of a larger whole, and that no one general ethical principle is applied to the discussion of all relationships. But over and over occurs the discussion of the same sets of relations and institutions. And once the segments broke away, such elaboration set in within each one that in our day we witness the creation of Institutes of Human Relations, designed to bring us again into some unity as we approach the study of man.

The United States has been the scene of the widest differentiation in fields of social study and the greatest elaboration of college and university courses. But in the early days here as elsewhere the discussion of social institutions and relations was directed from chairs of moral philosophy. Examination of college records reveals a series of conditions as follows:

1. In the first century of colonial life all information concerning human relations was supposed to be found in the teachings of the Bible, the preachers and the elders.

2. By the middle of the 18th century, however, after an increase in the number of educated immigrants and the founding of the early colleges, there comes into the curricula the European systems of moral philosophy. A teacher would be called a professor of moral philosophy, his lectures, lectures in moral philosophy, and treatises would be given the general inclusive title. Within the bounds of the treatment, however, would be a section on what we should now call psychology, then named pneumatology, or the philosophy of mind; a section on oeconomy (still the family economy of the Greek discussions); sections on government, jurisprudence, international law, taste, ethics, and religion. To bind together these various elements there were usually two controlling ideas: the starting point was human nature, and the object was a suggestion for social arrangements ethically justifiable.

3. From about 1818 until the Civil War a change is discernible. In 1818 the Reverend John McVickar, professor of moral philosophy at Columbia, asked to teach a separate course called political economy and in 1825 he edited, under the title *Outlines of Political Economy*, an article of J. R. McCulloch's which had recently

appeared in the Encyclopedia Britannica. This is typical of the period. The chair of instruction continued to be called moral philosophy, but classes and treatises on the various sections of the discipline increased. The names of Francis Bowen of Harvard, Francis Wayland of Brown, John Bascom of Williams College and the new University of Wisconsin, George Tucker of Virginia, and Thomas Dew of William and Mary suggest the situation.

4. About 1870 began the period of the great elaboration of the separate sections, and the addition of new sets of problems for discussion. One result is multitudinous courses of instruction and treatises of widely varying titles. Another result is our forgetfulness as to why we continue to do certain things and maintain certain interests throughout the fields of the social sciences.

In this paper we shall consider a few facts from the first two periods.

II

At Harvard College, founded in 1638, any possible interest in philosophical speculation was at first absorbed by Puritan theologizing. By the time that the Mathers, both Increase and Cotton, were in control, their scorn for philosophy as a discipline meant that no one dared uphold it. Cotton Mather bitingly says that at Harvard "they do not show such veneration for Aristotle as is expressed at Queens's College in Oxford; where they read Aristotle on their knees, and those who take degrees are sworn to defend his philosophy."[1] As for ethics, he considered it "a vile peece of Paganism," and entered in his diary a reminder that he must watch for opportunity to bear public testimony against it.[2]

[1] Cotton Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana*, II, 21. (Hartford, 1853).

[2] Entry of June 28, 1716, *Diary*. Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 7th series, VIII, 357.

In the early American Colleges the head of the college was usually the teacher of the seniors in moral philosophy. So it was with the Reverend Thomas Clap, M.A., (1703–1767) fifth rector of Yale, and, under the charter of 1745, the first to be called president. But when he came to teach his senior sophisters, he was somewhat perplexed about the systems of moral philosophy which were available. They did not offer really false teaching as did certain latitudinarian churchmen who wanted access to the college, and from whom he was trying to protect his scholars. The moralists, he was willing to concede, might "keep the world from many hurtful disorders" but they were not correctly oriented, and a student might be inadequately equipped in this important field even after careful study. Toward the close of his busy life, therefore, he set himself the task of writing an introduction to the study of ethics, to be used as a preface to the study of other philosophers by the students of Yale College. It was a slim little pamphlet, "to save the charge of printing, wrote in as concise a manner as can be intelligible on such critical and metaphysical subject,"[3] and it required only about two weeks of a senior's time. It was used by the college for about thirty years, first in conjunction with Locke, then with Edwards, then with Paley and the Scottish moralists as they became popular. It is obvious that his aim is to keep the students' faith fixed in God's revelation to men, and to relate them in their ethical theory to the teachings of orthodox Calvinists of the day. Though his essay is meagre and crude, it is apparent that he knew thoroughly the current European systems—Cumberland, Hutcheson, Locke, Clarke, Wollaston, Grotius, and Pufendorf.

For some of the students at Yale, however, the life of the intellect was aflame

[3] Thomas Clap, *An Essay on the Nature and Foundation of Moral Virtue and Obligation*, (New Haven, 1765).

though Clap's little treatise would hardly lead us to judge so. The spark was kindled by the arrival of two large gifts of books from England. The first, about one thousand books, came in 1714, and was the result of the efforts of Jeremiah Dummer, who served New England's interests abroad in more than one way. Among the authors represented were Malebranche, Hooker, Bayle, Newton, Bacon, Grotius, Burnett, and Milton; and among the twenty-eight books sent through Dummer by Governor Yale to the college of his name was "Mr. Lock's *Essay on the Humane Understanding*." the book which gave rise to the philosophy of Jonathan Edwards and the American Samuel Johnson. The second gift, numbering three hundred forty-six works, was received in 1733 from Bishop Berkeley, who hoped that Yale would become the center for the Episcopal form of worship and church organization. Too much has been written of the philosophy and theology of Jonathan Edwards for us to go into it again here in this brief paper. While acknowledging his superior ability, we shall only say that in the field of moral philosophy he represented that group of New Englanders whose metaphysics were an odd combination of theology, Descartes and Locke; and whose discussion of human relations and institutions was bound by the teachings of the Bible and the elders of the congregation.

III

With that other Yalensian most deeply influenced by the gift of the books, it is another story. Samuel Johnson of Connecticut not only was stimulated by the Lockeian *Essay* to develop a system of philosophy which is comparable in its small way to Berkeleyan idealism, and by the pamphlets in the collection to believe in the superiority of an Episcopal form of church service and ordination, but he came in his writings to include far more of the breadth of interests found in European systems. As president of King's College from 1754 until 1763 he was a power both in the liberal college and in the tolerant community of New York. In the Johnson Collection in the Library of Columbia University is a number of volumes which reveal his interests, but we must limit ourselves to his moral philosophy. For the instruction of his own sons he wrote an *Introduction to the Study of Philosophy*, published first in London in the Republic of Letters, May, 1731, and later in New London, 1743. It was designed to be useful to young gentlemen to whom knowledge of the sciences is likely at first to "appear like a meer wilderness," so he would map the region a bit for their guidance. In outline form his discussion would present itself as follows:

Moral Philosophy
- 1. Speculative, or Pneumatology (which teaches us all we can know respecting Spirits):
  - 1. Psychology
  - 2. Daemonology
  - 3. Theology
- 2. Practical
  - 1. Ethics: the art of living happily by the practice of virtue toward ourselves, God, our neighbors
  - 2. Arts of government:
    - (1) Economics — which deals with families, which may be called Natural Societies
    - (2) Politics—Civil Government, Ecclesiastical Government[4]

Another King's College teacher, a generation later than Johnson, showed a similar range of interests. He was the Reverend Johan Daniel Gros, (d. 1812), minister for some time in the German Reformed Church of New York, and Professor not only of moral philosophy but

[4] *Cf. op. cit.*, p. 10.

also of geography and chronology. His book, *Natural Principles of Rectitude*, published in New York in 1795, has a scheme typical of the English and Scottish systems of the times.

Part I deals with Moral Philosophy, comprehending the Law of Nature. It contains the usual long list of definitions and angles of approach. Part II deals with the various obligations men find themselves under by virtue of the several relationships in which they live their lives. First, there is a general theoretical discussion of ethics or duty; second, a section treating of natural jurisprudence; third, a section of "general oeconomy," in which he discusses the rights and duties which result from the constitution of the sexes, rights and duties between parents and children, between master and slaves; a fourth section treates of politics—of the origin and function of civil society, the source of its power in the popular will, the internal and external nature of sovereignty. Part III deals with the Universal Law of Nations, in much the usual eighteenth century way, with some additional enthusiasm produced by the recent revolutionary struggles. In Gros' work we feel that we are dealing not with theology but with the matrix of the social sciences.

A group of men in Pennsylvania represented what has now become the practical and applied aspect of the social sciences. Everyone remembers the homely features of Poor Richard: Benjamin Franklin dominated the scene during the course of his long life (1707–1790). With him were associated Dr. William Smith of Aberdeen, the first president of the University of Pennsylvania, which was founded in 1750 largely through the efforts of Franklin; Dr. Benjamin Rush (1745–1813), the physician who was so keenly interested in mental derangements; Dr. Charles Nisbet (1736–1804), who was brought over from Scotland to be the first president of Dickinson College at Carlisle (founded 1787).[5] There was, too, Dr. Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), who spent the last ten years of his life in Pennsylvania, preaching Unitarian liberalism and carrying on his chemical experiments.

Of Rush we may note in passing that great sections of his writing deal with education. He is greatly concerned as to the proper education for citizens of a republic and he advocates a free school system for Pennsylvania, modelled on that of Scotland.[6] He insists on the necessity of educating women, particularly in the use of liberty and government.[7] Whereas others wrote abstractly on the passions, as was the custom of the century, we find Rush observing carefully and venturing hypotheses as to those mental derangements so common to civilized life.[8] We find him attacking the punishment of murder by death with what sounds like the most modern of sociological argument. And we find him criticizing the term "common sense" as used by Thomas Reid and others of the Scottish school, maintaining against them that a common sense judgment is not infallible.[9]

Intensely practical also were the studies at the College of William and Mary in Virginia. But there the reason was not the demands of Puritan theology, nor the dominance of any person's prejudice against the merit of philosophy, but rather as Herbert Adams puts it, the fact that

[5] Nisbet's lectures may be found in a manuscript in the Ridgway Branch of the Public Library, Philadelphia, which is marked *Nisbett's Philosophy*. Included in it are discussions of logic and metaphysics also.

[6] *Essays, Literary, Moral and Philosophical*, pp. 1–20. (2d ed., Philadelphia, 1806).

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 92.

[8] *Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the Diseases of the Mind.* (Philadelphia, 1812.)

[9] *Essays*, as cited, p. 249 ff.

"the College of William and Mary, almost from its original planting, was a unique seminary of history and politics—of history in the vary making, of politics in the praxis."[10] There was no time for purely theoretical philosophy, so busy were students and professors in the affairs of their colony. As Adams says in the same connection: "In colonial Virginia there was an entente cordiale between the college and church and the state. The clergy held their conventions in the college buildings, and, before the capitol was built, the House of Burgesses used to assemble in the academic halls. The head of the college was the head of the Church in Virginia, and there was a representative of the college in the House of Burgesses down to the Revolution. These facts merely illustrate the intimacy of educational, ecclesiastical, and political relations in that social microcosm at Williamsburg."

It is probable that the spread of the "enlarged morality" was due chiefly to the strategic position occupied by Princeton, and the prestige of its long-time president, the Reverend John Witherspoon (1723–1784).[11] Witherspoon was a graduate of the University of Edinburgh and held an honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity from St. Andrews. He was said to be a man of great vigor, both physical and mental, and possessed of a brand of humor which, upon occasion, could be used with effect upon an adversary. Before leaving Scotland he had engaged in controversy with the Moderate party of the Scottish Church, attributing to them such beliefs as the following, which he dubbed their "Athenian Creed": "I believe in the beauty and comely proportions of Dame Nature, and in almighty Fate, her only parent and guardian; for it hath been most graciously obliged (blessed be its name) to make us all very good. I believe that the universe is a hugh machine . . . . . and I myself am a little glorious piece of clockwork. I believe that there is no ill in the universe, nor any such thing as virtue absolutely considered . . . . In fine I believe in the divinity of Lord S——, the saintship of Marcus Antoninus, the perspicuity and sublimity of H—e, and the perpetual duration of Mr. H—n's works, notwithstanding their present tendency to oblivion. Amen."[12] Finally, he suggested as a mild form of evening devotions in the Moderate style this fervent prayer: "O, Lord, we thank thee for Mr. Bayle's Dictionary. Amen."

However crude this weapon, it was more effective with immature students than it had been with the Moderate party in Scotland, and before long there was only one philosophy at Princeton, and that the philosophy of Common Sense. The Reverend Dr. John Rodgers, who preached the funeral sermon of President Witherspoon, spoke more truly than he knew when he said of Witherspoon's work, "The stile of learning, if you will allow me the phrase, has been changed by him."[13] It was a composite of the Scottish philosophy that

[10] Herbert B. Adams, "The College of William and Mary;" in, *A Contribution to the History of Higher Education, with Suggestions for its National Promotion.* Circular of Information of Bureau of Education, No. 1, p. 28. (Washington, 1887.)

[11] For good accounts of Witherspoon's character and activities see Varnum Lansing Collins, *President Witherspoon*, 2 v., (Princeton, 1925); Collins, *Princeton*, (New York, 1914); James McCosh, *The Scottish Philosophy*, pp. 185–190. (New York, 1875.)

[12] *Ecclesiastical Characteristics.* (*Works*, III, 233) Mr. H—n is Francis Hutcheson, whom he blamed, with Shaftesbury, for fostering Moderation. Mr. H—e is, of course, Hume.

[13] *The Faithful Servant Rewarded: a Sermon . . . . occasioned by the death of the Rev. John Witherspoon.* Witherspoon's *Works*, p. 35, (Philadelphia, 1802). For a similarly complimentary notice of his work, see Samuel Miller, *A Brief Retrospect of the 18th Century*, II, 376–379, (New York, 1803).

Witherspoon taught, for he himself was not a creative philosopher. But he taught with enthusiasm, and he had read widely, and soon it was noised abroad that Nassau Hall was the American Academy of Philosophy. The relative practicality of the Scottish teaching by the side of the older abstract ethics, the eschewing of an involved metaphysics, and its realistic epistemology all were acceptable to the American mind. It is not surprising, then, to find Scottish Common Sense becoming not only the distinctive Princeton school, but in the opinion of many thinkers preeminently the philosophy of America.[14]

It is only fair to say, however, that it was not simply Witherspoon's teaching which was popular and redounded to the enhancement of Princeton. We must give much credit to his public service, especially to his enthusiastic espousal of the colonists' cause against Great Britain. And had he been succeeded by a man of mediocre ability it might have happened that the prestige of the Scottish philosophy as mediated by Princeton would have been lost. But there followed him one of his own first converts from Berkeleyan idealism, his able son-in-law, Samuel Stanhope Smith (1750–1819), who continued to keep the name of Nassau before the scholars of the new country and the old. Smith was not the executive that Witherspoon was, but his scholarly, contemplative bearing was equally forceful, and he showed a willingness to liberalize many of the old and more strict dicta of moral philosophy.[15] He was particularly concerned with the problem of slavery in America, and advanced a scheme for making freedmen economically independent, which foreshadowed our modern views as to how deeply the race problem is one of economics.[16]

But the work which brought him to widest recognition beyond the college was *An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species.*[17] This essay was written to refute Lord Kames' theories of the diversity of the races of man. Smith discards the "arbitrary hypothesis" that men are originally sprung from different stocks and are therefore divided by nature into different species. Instead, he argues ably for the effects of climate and for the effects of what he calls "the state of society" in producing variety of physique. In connection with this latter argument he has this amusing sentence: "Society and thought put a stricture upon the muscles of the face, which while it gives them meaning and expression, prevents them from dilating and swelling as much as they would naturally do. They collect the countenance more toward the center and give it a greater elevation there."[18] His conclusion is a statement of belief in the unity of the race, arrived at independently of revelation, a conclusion which "renders human nature susceptible of system, illustrates the powers of physical causes, and opens a rich and extensive field for moral science."[19]

One of the absorbing problems for the eighteenth century, as for our own, was the form and mechanism of social change.

[14] As with Adam Smith's *Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms*, preserved only in student notebooks, so with Witherspoon's *Lectures on Moral Philosophy*. See Varnum Lansing Collins' edition, pp. xxi–xxiii, (Princeton University Press, 1912).

[15] S. S. Smith, *Lectures on Moral and Political Philosophy*, II, pp. 119–123, 127–135, for a fairly liberal discussion of monogamy and polygamy. (Trenton, 1812.)

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 158–177.

[17] Delivered as an oration before the Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, February 28, 1787, and printed in Philadelphia the same year. Largely in appreciation of this effort Yale bestowed upon him the honorary degree of D. D., and Harvard the LL. D.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 111

Influenced by the new geological theory regarding the effects of slow, gradual, and continuous modification as against the older theory of catastrophe, the social theorists of the latter part of the century adopted the same position as the geologists. Social theorists then, as now, were quick to follow the lead of the sciences which they felt had firmer standing-ground than their own; and then, as now, the transfers of theory which they made were not always accurate nor suitable to the phenomena. Be that as it may, it is interesting to find Samuel Stanhope Smith, here in a little American college, abreast of the current of thought on this subject. At one point of his discussion he has this to say: . . . . "permit me to make one general remark which must often have occurred to every judicious inquirer into the powers both of moral and physical causes—that every permanent and characteristical variety in human nature, is effected by slow and almost imperceptible gradations. Great and sudden changes are too violent for the delicate constitution of man and always tend to destroy the system. But changes that become incorporated, and that form the character of a climate or a nation, are progressively carried on through several generations, till the causes that produce them have attained their utmost operation. In this way, the minutest causes, acting constantly, and long continued, will necessarily create great and conspicuous differences among mankind."[20]

IV

One aspect of the early college life in this country was the vitality of the literary societies. The debates and orations held under their auspices mirrored not only the problems of the day, but, in the nature of the case, the classroom instruction in moral philosophy. At Yale, for example, there were two such societies, the Linonia, founded in 1753, of which there exist early manuscript records covering the years from 1768 to 1802; and the Brothers in Unity, founded in 1768. The early records of the Brothers are lost but the minutes for the period 1816–1836 contain many items of interest. In 1797 there was founded the Moral Society, for the promotion and preservation of morality among the members of the college. The discussions of this group when not concerned with some specific "immorality" were quite in line with those of the literary societies. Let us see with what questions these students of more than a century and a half ago were concerned in their extracurricular activities.

Among the questions debated by the Brothers in Unity we note these:

October 30, 1816. Are the abilities of the sexes equal? (Decision for negative.)

December 11, 1816. Ought the immigration of foreigners into this country be encouraged? (Decision for negative.)

October 29, 1817. Are the blacks inferior to the whites in point of mental abilities? (Decision for negative.)

March 10, 1819. Were our forefathers justifiable in taking possession of this country in the manner they did? (Decision for negative.)

Among the questions disputed from time to time by the members of the Moral Society are these:

February 10, 1801. Did all mankind descend from one pair? (Decision for affirmative.)

November 30, 1802. Is man by nature wholly depraved? (It is gratifying to note that even the Moral Society voted in the negative.)

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

The last item in the book, undated, unfinished, reads: "Are Lotteries justifiable? When considerably advanced in the discussion"[21] . . . . Perhaps then, as now, it was not always expedient to inquire into questions touching on the acts of university administration. Yale, along with Princeton and Columbia, had known what it was to procure a building fund from holding a lottery.

That the young men who debated these questions were not a colorless and lifeless group we glean from other college records, such as the accounts of the buttery and more than occasional disciplinary reports. We have the comment of Ezra Stiles, some years later when he was about to become President of Yale, to the effect that "An hundred and fifty or 180 young Gentlemen Students is a Bundle of Wild Fire not easily controlled and governed—and at best the Diadem of a President is a Crown of Thorns."[22] Doubtless many a living president would support President Stiles' contention, and doubtless, too, many of old Yale's young gentlemen students would feel fairly at home in some of the social science classes of our generation.

We may note, in very brief statement, the several philosophies characteristic of America in the eighteenth century: in New England, Calvinism,[23] giving way to deism at Harvard and Berkeleyan idealism at Yale and King's; in Virginia, such vital interest in practical politics as to rule out almost all theoretic inquiry, until later when French materialism was fostered by Jefferson; in Pennsylvania an exceeding practicality;[24] at Princeton, the common sense realism of the Scottish school, which became so popular and so widely spread as to bear legitimate claim to being the American philosophy. Truly, "the stile of learning" was changed by John Witherspoon.

The important aspect of the situation for social scientists, however, is not the shift from deism to idealism to realism. The significant thing is, that by way of the Scottish morality, chiefly, there came into the curricula of American colleges and universities a certain pattern of thought concerning human relations and institutions, or, as President Witherspoon put it, concerning "the whole business of active life,"[25] and that the pattern, that of moral philosophy, has continued to influence the sciences of culture to this day.

[21] The Moral Society. (MSS. in Yale Library.)

[22] F. B. Dexter (ed.), *The Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles*, II, 209, (New York, 1901).

[23] For a discussion of Calvinism as a philosophy see I. Woodbridge Riley, *American Thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism*, pp. 8–9, (New York, 1915).

[24] For a discussion of materialism in Pennsylvania see I. Woodbridge Riley, *American Philosophy*, Book III, ch. 5, and Book IV, (New York, 1907).

[25] Witherspoon, *Lectures*, as cited, p. 140.

CRITICAL NOTES ON THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGY AS A SCIENCE

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A NUMBER of recent articles in Social Forces[1] have been concerned with defining the nature of sociology and its field. We are in essential agreement with Professor Sorokin's statement of the field of general sociology and of the special sociologies, especially when that statement is supplemented by Professor Rice's statement of the problem presented by the interrelations between the special social sciences among themselves and between them and the non-social sciences.

Our own conception of sociology can be rephrased into their terms. It is that sociology is the study of those uniformities which are group-situational emergents, that is, uniformities for which there is a necessity, or toward which there are tendencies, arising out of the nature of group situations, letting "group" represent here any social situation of more than one individual. Thus adaptation of the material culture to the environment is a situational emergent, the environment imposing a range within which, through fortuitous circumstances, the specific culture may vary in shaping itself, but beyond which it cannot go. The biological factors similarly impose a range of possible adaptations. And in the working out of any particular social structure or the carrying out of any particular social process we have the interaction of biological and environmental factors plus the culturally accumulated influence of the past actions. Out of the group-ness of this situation emerge vested interests; so also emerge of situational necessity group-wide uniformities of behavior and of belief, tendencies to rigidification, and yet other tendencies toward change. Sociology in the broad is the study of all these uniformities, uniformities which are the situational emergents (in the group situation) of the incidence upon each other of man's nature (as it is made up), of the physical environment (as it is made up), and of the products (in culture cumulation) of the past incidence of these factors.

The specialized social sciences, such as economics and political science, study a limited section of all of this. The problems involving the factors studied by two or more of these disciplines are the logical field for further specializations, but also the legitimate field for either of those disciplines. And the same is true of problems involving one of these disciplines and non-social factors. Thus agricultural economics is really a subfield of economics or of anthropogeography but is logically the place for a specialized sociology. The subdivision into specialized social sciences is not complete and we may yet erect further sciences, such as a science of the family, as Doctor Rice suggests. Until we do, however, these remain in the general field of sociology.

General sociology, in accordance with Sorokin's view, remains the study of general uniformities which obtain in all the specialized subdivisions of the social sciences. If there be such a thing as "pure sociology, it would lie in the study of uniformities situationally emergent

[1] Ellwood, "Scientific Method in Sociology," and Sorokin, "Sociology as a Science" in Social Forces, X, No. 1; Rice, "What is Sociology?" in Social Forces, X, No. 3.

from the group situation *as such*, abstracted from involvements of biological, environmental, and historical factors. There is the logical possibility of such a sociology, but for ourselves we do not see it as a justifiable setting apart, nor a profitable one as yet. For the very nature of social processes (for example the culture process which is sometimes referred to as a "self-contained" process), both as to the possibility of their existence and as to the nature and rate of those processes, is such that it is inextricably interwoven with, and a product of, biological and environmental factors. This point of view, along with the concept of situational emergents, we hope to put forth more fully in a forthcoming work.

It is evident that our point of view makes sociology a synthetic (rather than merely an encyclopedic) science. And such must also be the nature of any of the subdivisions of that science. Thus the subdivisions, if they are thoroughly to exploit their *own* field, must consider as their legitimate problems those which ramify into the fields of other specialized social sciences and those which ramify into non-social fields.

There is room then for two categories, first general sociology, and second specialized sociologies; and it is only an historical accident that we do not recognize the already established social sciences other than sociology as being really specialized sociologies. Let convenience or importance or logic indicate what further specialized sociologies they may, these are the two fundamental divisions. And, although they are the logical place for further specializations, we doubt if the interstitial territory can as yet be definitely allotted, practically, either to general sociology or, so complex are those interrelationships, to specialized sociologies. For we would need an economics-political-science sociology, an economics-geography sociology, an economics-ethics sociology, an economics-anthropogeography sociology, an economics-biology sociology, an economics-psychology or economics-social-psychology sociology, and so on through all the combinations and permutations! These interstitial regions, or better these overlapping, border line fields, may very well be the place for many specialized *studies*, but whether they are the practical place for specialized disciplines cannot be so clearly shown.[2] Interdependence rather than clearness of demarcation is the more cogent point for emphasis.

But we shall here concern ourselves with only one of the points considered by Professor Rice and Professor Ellwood—the extent to which evaluations may be permitted to enter into sociology as a science. Traditional thought is certainly behind Professor Rice's point of view that evaluations exist as elements in the phenomena which we study and that, therefore, we may study evaluations as data but may not study them as being cogent or as lacking cogence, and may not introduce evaluations of our own into a science. Thus we may plot the temporal and spatial distribution of moralities and religious sanctions and we may study their correlation with other parts of the culture and we must do so if we would cover all our data. But we may not pronounce upon the validity of those moral systems or religious sanctions and we may not introduce our own evaluations into studies of our own or of any other society. Professor Ellwood, however, would like to see evaluations introduced in their own right, and has even said that he is interested in sociology

[2] This is possibly Professor Sorokin's own view, for he says, "In outlining the field of the special sociologies I have in view the logical nature of these fields and their problems but not the specialty of the men who study them." *Op. cit.* p. 27.

only as a handmaiden for social ethics. Let us examine a little more closely the problem of whether the introduction of evaluation into social science can be justified.

In what follows, we are not so much rendering a decision as presenting some factors which must be considered before a decision is reached. We trust in view of this fact that the person who disagrees with us will temper his outrage, and that the person who agrees with us will not take it that we necessarily agree with him in the further implications of his private convictions. But it seems to us that there are seven possible points at which evaluations may permissibly intrude themselves into social science, although not always intruding themselves in the same sense.

(1) Evaluations may furnish subject matter for social science as outlined two paragraphs above. Here the fact of the existence of evaluations and the fact of their being what they are, are data for sociology. But while we here deal with evaluations, we do not deal with them evaluatively. All would agree that evaluations must be dealt with by sociology in this sense. Though we shall presently show that adequate handling of evaluations as data is more complex than here appears.

(2) Evaluations could be treated evaluatively in a specialized sociology which represented the sociology "interstitial" between general sociology (or any of the other special sociologies) and ethics, that is, in a specialized sociology which we would term social ethics. The validity of this point of view would depend upon viewing ethics as a science rather than as a subdivision of philosophy. Now if we take the contrast in the meanings of the terms "morals" and "ethics." we learn that morals are the following out of group prescriptions, which prescriptions vary tremendously in time and place. In culture A it is immoral (and subject to divine taboo) to have more than one wife; but in culture B it is not only moral but a man's social status may depend upon how many wives he has; and the religious sanctions are on the institutions of concubinage and polygamy. And so on through endless illustrations. In each of these cultures the individuals have reïfied the group prescriptions and believe in the intrinsic reality of their moral systems and in the reality of the supernatural sanctions and agents involved. Now if we regard ethics as an attempt to get above all of these provincialisms and to determine inductively what is the really right, appropriate, or rational action, then we must see that ethics is at least an attempted science, which after all is about all we can say of sociology. If this be granted, then the treating of evaluations evaluatively need not intrude itself into general sociology but may consistently and perhaps profitably be done in a specialized sociology, social ethics.

(3) The treating of evaluations evaluatively, or the attempt to set criteria of appropriateness or of the desirability of particular historical social structures and processes with which our science deals, may also be validated if we conceive of our science as a functional science rather than as an exact or non-functional science. That is, even though in a strict classification of the sciences no further postulates and no further dimensions seem to emerge after we leave the exact sciences, it is still a rather tremendous assumption that all the phenomena of the biological, psychological, and social realms can be described at the level of description of the exact sciences. Perhaps one of the fundamental difficulties in our social sciences is occasioned by our attempt to apply to them methods which are appropriate to the

exact sciences but which are inappropriate to the social sciences or which at least must be supplemented by methods (such as the case method) which are not well suited to the exact sciences.

Now if we take the concept "functional science," we may perhaps admit that, while the desirability of the death or life of a particular individual is not a part of the province of medicine, so that medicine assumes subjective goals which can never be objectively validated, none the less we would probably agree that biology as a functional science cannot escape inductively arriving at the function of, say, the heart in the human organism. And if so, neither can it escape arriving at criteria of the performance of that function on the part of any particular heart and even at inductive evaluations (within the framework of her own interbuttressed and functionally-analyzed universe) of things which affect the structure and functioning of the heart. In a similar way the psychologist must arrive at conceptions of the function of mind in the human organism, at criteria of the healthy and unhealthy functioning of a particular mind, and at inductive evaluations of the desirability (in the perspective of *his* functionally analyzed cosmos) of things which affect the human mind. And sociology, within its entire field and not merely in one specialized subdivision, must do the same with social structures, forms, and processes and with the things which influence their functioning. It takes no inordinate amount of credulity to believe that sociology, viewed as a functional science, must arrive at the functions of various generalized social structures and processes, must arrive at criteria of perfection or lack of perfection in carrying out those functions, and (in the total perspective of the minute functions and criteria) must arrive at an integrated and functional appraisal of the sociological desirability or undesirability of particular social forms and social institutions, or of the rôle played by, say, tradition and the factors making for rigidity on the one hand and research or education or the factors making for change as appropriate change is occasioned on the other. From the point of view of sociology as a functional science, then, the making of *such* appraisals is warp and woof of its analysis of processes and functions.

Part of our difficulty in understanding each other doubtless arises from the confusion of two types of evaluation.[1] Thus we may have an evaluation of a food object which is *authoritative* (the gods or the morals define it as evil and taboo), *naively subjective* (I simply prefer this food to that, and that seems, naively, an ultimate criterion), and *rigid* (the religious and moral prescriptions presume to be in accordance with an intrinsic merit or evil). But, contrasted with these authoritarian, "axiomatic" (reïfied, deductive, and rigid valuations, we may get from scientific investigation (physiology, metabolism, organic chemistry, dietetics) evaluations of the same food object (say pork or fish) which are not authoritarian and not rigid, but *inductive*, *public*, and *subject to correction* with every further scientific advance. The first is the moral and religious "ought," the second the evaluation of functional appropriateness which is an emergent from a functional science.

Now no one would doubt the reality of these two types of evaluation nor deny that rigid and authoritarian evaluations (involving pre-judgments as they do) are to be excluded from science. Both the evaluations imposed by prescription and those imposed by wishful thinking must be kept from preventing the following of the data to wherever it may lead. Nor, it seems to us, can one deny that evaluations of the functional-analytic type are ines-

capable in a functional science. It is the confusion of these two types of valuations which causes our difficulties: That is, for fear that evaluations of the *first* type will intrude and block the free carrying on of the investigations of science, we reject *all* evaluations. But evaluations of the second type are not only inescapable and plastic and inductive in themselves, *they are the most effective weapon against the intrusion of those of the first type!*

The dogma of a *strictly* non-evaluative science, strangely, is imposed by religion and religious hangovers and represents the lingering hope that science can test the reality of belief in one section of the universe and leave our fond dreams untested in another. It represents a lag of the accommodation worked out when science first began to intrude itself into a religion-dominated culture. Like other modes of control, the dogma is highly rationalized, institutionalized, and coercive, so that it is audacious and heterodox to oppose it. But the failure to follow out the implications of the fact that sociology, economics, psychology, and the like are functional sciences, by attempting inductively-arrived-at evaluations, is a culture lag. And academic sociology, like academic psychology, may presently be startled into recognition of her own stilted meaninglessness by new schools that dare to be functional. Or, like classical economics, may find her beautiful theoretical structure overturned by functional change itself.

Nevertheless, I shudder at the thought of the probable misinterpretation of my contentions. For, unless the reader keep in mind the distinction just made between rigid, authoritarian, *moral* evaluations and inductive, scientific analyses of functional appropriateness, and unless he keep in mind the further distinction about to be drawn, there will be no meeting of minds on our problem.

For there is a further distinction to be made among evaluations of functional appropriateness. I may analyze the functional appropriateness of the gears and pulleys of a machine. That is *applied* mechanics, not the pure science of mechanics. For the function of the machine is tacked on to it arbitrarily and does not emerge from the data of the science of mechanics. But the same may not be said of hearts and lungs, of mental and emotional processes, or of social structures, functions, and processes. Here the functions are not extraneously tacked onto an arbitrarily assembled collation. They are inescapable emergents from the process of scientific analysis and are warp and woof of our data as it confronts us, *in situ*, in the natural universe. They are not in any sense superimposed.

From this point of view, a strictly non-evaluative sociology opposes the sense of the other functional sciences in their continual use of evaluative terms (evaluative of functional appropriateness or of reality-contactedness), e.g., (biology:) adaptation, fit, vestigial remains, bodily functions, pathological, morbidity, benign, malignant; (psychology:) mental deficiency, subnormal, superior, after-image, dream, phantasy, illusion, hallucination, delusion, abnormal, personality maladjustment; etc. Would it or would it not be a loss for us to discard terms like adaptive culture, social disorganization, maladjustment, institutionalized functions, culture lag, accommodation, and the like?

This does not say that evaluations must pervade sociology's *entire* scientific task. They certainly do not do so with biology. It is still true that in many aspects of her scientific functioning and at diverse points in the process of investigation, sociology is interested, momentarily it may be, solely in the objective fact of what is or what has

been. We do not preclude the utility of factually-descriptive, quantitative, and objectively-correlative studies as paralleling, leading to, or issuing out of, processual and functional analysis. But we maintain their high worth is in that connection. That is the proper sphere of such studies in a functional science. The failure of such objective studies to *arise out of* or *center upon* the problems of functional analysis explains what is so much referred to as the meaninglessness of current studies of that sort. As well, their so-frequent lack of dialectic significance. For it is a functional realm with which our science must be concerned.

(4) If one will not go the whole way with the writer in calling sociology a functional science, perhaps he will go part in admitting that culture lag, folkways, mores, institutionalizations, and the like are data for sociology. All would agree that they are data to be plotted in their temporal and spatial occurrence and treated as so many events. But we would point out here that, unless we contrast the "is" with the "ought to be," there is no room for any such concepts as culture lag, social rigidity (as *social*), or, in their implications, folkways, mores or institutionalizations. In a strictly natural science (non-functional science) point of view, nothing can be "occasioned" until it is really *occasioned*. Hence the concepts culture lag and social rigidity become nonsensical for any except a functional science. True, we can oppose tendencies toward rigidity, in a natural science orientation, to tendencies toward change, if by tendencies we do not mean forces making toward. But if we speak of forces and processes and integrations of forces or if we imply them in our term "tendency," we are hazardously near a functional science orientation. Whenever we speak of folkways, mores and institutionalizations as leading to anachronism or producing vestigial[3] forms and the like, there is an implicit evaluation of the that-which-is over against the that-which-ought-to-be.

In spite of scientific advance, many people still plant their crops according to old superstitions, and there is still a lingering opposition to, and failure of passage of legal measures for, vaccination against smallpox. In spite of the close interrelatedness of the modern world, our "leaders" still cling to a once-appropriate "splendid isolation." Ordeal by battle lingered on the statute books long after its inadequacy was so thoroughly recognized that it dropped out of practical use, so that fully five hundred years later a husky defendant actually claimed the right to be tried by that method. To make our point quite clear, suppose trial by ordeal, imprisonment of the poor, prison conditions of the old Bridewell and of the prison ships, and the trying and severe punishing of animals and of tiny children to have persisted down to the very present. Is there any social scientist, even the most self-consciously scientific, who would not say that these lags were group-occasioned phenomena, in their "lag-ness" group-produced and of the essence of our subject matter? Is there any who would not call them cases of culture lag instantly, and call them such for the very reason of the maladjustment they embody, the disparity between the called-for and the entrenched, between the potential and the effectual? Is there any who would not recognize the problem of the causes of culture lag as a central one among our problems?

We suspect that the present-day failure of sociology to have courage enough to follow out the implications of the rather

[3] Note the biological term and the appraisal implicit in the use of the term by biology as a functional science. The evaluation of "functional inappropriateness" is not there hesitated.

inescapable fact that she is a functional science has much to do with the complaints so often heard within our ranks that we are producing so much that is objective, painstaking and disciplined, so little that is (and here we mean from the standpoint of pure science) important or meaningful. Our objective studies are so little pointed at the solution of the strategic functional problems, in a scientific rather than an applied sense. The same can be said of economics, political science, and academic psychology. Certainly the writer feels much greater discomfiture when a layman razzes him about stuffed shirts and colossal futilities (quoting) in our science than when an expert, say in physics, kids him about sociology not really being a science. And since functional orientations involve appraisals, since these hit close home, close to vested interests, and close to the embattled sides of applied measures, and since all this makes dealing in those terms dangerous to the stable integration and orientation of the personality of the investigator and render his position and status precarious, it does not take much psychoanalytic background to squirm under the layman's thrust that our over-protested efforts at pure and exact science are escapes into objectivity (again quoting). But is science to excuse herself from a job because it is difficult or hazardous or scorned upon?

Taking evaluations as data, no one would say that they descend from the blue sky, that they are not a part of our cause and effect universe. If then they are data for our science, so is the problem of their origin, development and accentuation; and if the study of these aspects shows little consistency between their origin (and accentuation) and their content, then an evaluation of their *cogency* has thrust itself upon us. Thus if the study of the origin and accentuation of a food taboo shows its causes to be quite other than the pronouncement of the gods, the harmful nature of the food, or the disastrous results of the violation of the taboo (as asserted by their content), then an evaluation of the lack of cogency in the content of the taboo and its derivative attitudes cannot be escaped.

That is, evaluations and attitudes are in a sense beliefs. They posit qualities, relationships, and sanctioning entities. These beliefs are cogent or not, and science may legitimately work on the problem of the cogency of any belief or belief-system. The strain toward consistency cannot lastingly be compartmentalized. It is not to the point that science is not well enough equipped as yet to do much with purely individual preferences. But socially enbuttressed valuations are beginning to yield.

Yet it is very illuminating to consider the light reflected on 'purely individual' preferences which is shed by the relativity and adventitious character of reïfied value systems as shown by comparative cultural ethnology. One cannot go through extensive study in this field without setting into wider perspectives ever so many judgments which theretofore seemed 'purely individual.' The same is true (relative to food taboos, etc., but especially relative to subjectivated sex mores) of a study of biology. And psychoanalysis gives an exceedingly valuable insight into 'purely individual' preferences. It pronounces (1) on their reality-contactedness and cogency (are they direct or displaced evaluations? Even are they at all what they seem to their holder to be?); (2) on the apparent unanimity of their content (are they simple, ambivalent, over-protested, or defensive?); (3) on their seeming intrinsic-ity (are they fixations, regressions, reïfications delusions?); (4) on their seeming perma-

nency (will they presently yield to their contravalents; or condense; or displace; or yield to analysis and a full-perspectived synthesis?); and (5) on their functional appropriateness in the immediate and the long-run economy of the personality and in the social interrelationships of the person! And the patient's 'purely individual' preferences tend to *change* under analysis from the naive to the inductively validated! Indeed, if one range through the fields named, he is himself amazed at how many seemingly 'purely individual' preferences are set into wider perspective, altered, and reshaped into a closer approximation of a potentially public functional-conceptual system. Ever one *approaches* the inductive evaluations of functional appropriateness as *his own* preference! He approaches a *public* evaluational system!

Admitting that the ultimately individual item may elude us, just as the ultimates of the physical world elude physical science, still we can push back the horizon bit by bit and ever approach the total configuration. And that, we later show, is all that *any* science can do. If, as Professor Clifford Kirkpatrick has said, sociologists, "aware since Durkheim of mental interpenetration and the social origin of conceptual categories," should be thereby motivated to the refinement and correction of their private and subjective conceptual structures and should therefore set the public conceptual structure as their ideal, no less should they, being aware since Bagehot, Kidd, Tylor, Sumner, Cooley, James, Le Bon, Tarde, Durkheim, Freud, and ever so many others, of emotionalized mental interpenetration and the social origin of many evaluational categories, set the public inductively-arrived-at evaluational system as also an ideal for their functional science.

For I would further point out that when (out of their "individual" convictions) a person or sub-group in our culture goes to prayer meeting or to mass or observes Lent or refuses to eat pork or opposes socialism, internationalism, and paçifism or refrains from premarital and extra marital sexual relations or refrains from stealing or so on down through the tremendous list of prescribed actions, such behavior constitutes *one kind of phenomenon* if, on the one hand, the moral systems involved are intrinsically cogent (or reality-contacted, as they are thought to be) and if there is a God who has commanded these things. It is *a vastly different datum* if on the other hand there is no intrinsic cogency or appropriateness or desirability in the behavior and if there is no God or if the gods have not so commanded. In other words, the adequate treatment of evaluations *as data*, after the manner of our first category, cannot really be adequate unless we fully define the nature of the phenomena with which we are dealing. And it is a vastly different type of phenomenon which confronts us if it is a response to reality on the one hand or if it is a response to socially thrown up and buttressed illusion on the other.

Thus, if the view of sociology as a functional science would introduce the necessity of erecting criteria of functional appropriateness, reality-conformity, or desirability, the inclusion of evaluations merely as data does not release us from that obligation. In order to treat these phenomena exhaustively and adequately as data we must, incidentally thereto, decide this much about them: are they "real" or are they artifacts; are they reality-contacted phenomena or are they the products of group-thrown-up illusions; more strictly, are they the products of the direct interaction of the surrounding environment and the biological nature of man *or are they our most distinctive type of data, the products of group processes themselves?* It

is certainly a datum for our science if the group prescriptions can carry individual behavior and belief in the face of reality.

In a word, the functional sciences, in some aspects of their search, must *apply* the findings of other aspects of scientific discovery to arrive at the *complete factuality* of the phenomena investigated. In this sense psychology applies the findings of other aspects of scientific discovery to arrive at the complete factuality of after-image, contrast phenomena, fatigue phenomena, dream, phantasy, hallucination, illusion, and delusion as phenomena. The functional sciences, as *pure* sciences, cannot escape partaking of the nature of *applied* sciences in certain aspects of their inductions and findings.

This resort to, and these criteria of, application are implicit in the nature of science and of epistemological certainty. The criterion *par excellence* of both of these is the internal rational consistency within our belief systems *and* the breadth of inclusion within that internally consistent system. Science cannot rest short of the completely consistent total configuration. Certainty cannot be conferred on belief short of that point. Hence the rigid demarcations traditionally made within science and between science and ethics, art, religion, and other parts of the culture are seen not to flow from this basic scientific and epistemological principle. No more than in the individual, can such compartmentalization and "cultural schizophrenia" yield enduring contact with reality or complete integration either to the compartmentalized sections or to the cultural totality.

This fourth point, then, becomes related to the third and first in the following manner: When we examine the data of our universe, we are met by a noteworthy division within it, the inanimate and the animate. The inanimate can be completely described at a very simple level of description. However much science may wish that, or live on faith that, she may some day reduce all phenomena to the complex interaction of one or two simple factors, she can never *completely* describe the animate at the level of description of the inanimate; and she maintains separate disciplines at separate levels of phenomenal complexity. For these more complex phenomena confront us with (1) organisms, (2) structures, organs, and processes (social structures, etc.) within them which have (3) functions relative to the functioning totality.[4] We are also confronted by instances, *in situ*, of (4) functions adequately performed and (5) functions inadequately performed. More important, we are confronted by (6) factors that correlate with functional adjustment, and (7) factors that correlate with functional maladjustment. Science has not dealt with the complete factuality of the universe that confronts her until she has added concepts, descriptions, correlations, and uniformities of this more complex level of description to her tabulations and systematizations.[5] Evaluation is the word that will

[4] The functional level of description, say of hearts and lungs, cannot be left out of a complete description of them as phenomena. In the physiological gradient and in vicarious functioning (e.g., in some of Lashley's findings or in some of the psychoanalytic displacements), organic and functional categories correlate more highly with other factors than do non-functional categories. Nor does the point of view, here depend upon regarding "society" as an "organism." It is sufficient that it and its component organisms are inextricably intertwined in functional interrelationships. All sciences that deal with phenomena of the animate level must deal with these considerations.

[5] In a paper read at the 1930 meetings of the Society, entitled "Five Levels of Description of Socio-Psychological Phenomena," we have elaborated the point of view, here implicit, that quantitative techniques are by no means logically limited, as they have tended to be in practice, to the traditional "objective" type of phenomena, but that correlations can be run

be applied to such a procedure in the social sciences. And inductive evaluations will be confused with morals. But are we to be controlled by a word?

(5) A point for the inclusion of evaluations as such in sociology, a negative one or a point which is, so to speak, validated by default, is the point that, however much we say we will not introduce them, we nevertheless continue to do so. In a word, that they are inescapable. And therefore we had better introduce themself-consciously and guardedly than to fool ourselves into believing that we have ruled them out and hence permit them to introduce themselves in helter skelter and disguised forms.

First, the "strictly" scientific view puts a "value" on a non-evaluative science. *That* value it retains, while rigidly excluding all others.[6] It is perhaps not yet shown that science must be completely non-evaluative. And however objective the further processes of science, it has its base on a subjective evaluation elevated to a dogma.

This can be seen, in the case of Prof. Rice, by a critical reading of one of his earlier articles.[7] After there considering the hazards and advantages of "emotion" and "reason," he finds the acceptable answer if the "scientific approach" toward all social problems "*is itself selected as the object of emotional attachment*" (Italics his). He continues: "'Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free.' The sentence is overflowing with emotional drive. . . . This is the scientific attitude. It is also the scientific emotion. There can be no worthier 'cause' of social reform." (p. 585).

But one cannot *select* the objects of emotional attachment and retain enduring integration and contact with reality. They must be discovered; or uncovered; or the internal mechanisms must be so adjusted as to permit reality to define them to you. Thus the quotation is like telling one to love God and abhor the devil; or like telling him to love his wife and abhor his paramour. Emotional attachment is not so tractable to willed directing of it. The quotation makes sense, however, if we alter the unfortunate word, selected. But if we leave the word, then science is itself "to be *explained*, *judged*, and (its) right to support determined not alone by the comparative legitimacy of (its) formal aims, but by all of the emotional currents that are caught up and expressed in (it)" (p. 585). (Italics mine.) Accordingly, since this was one of his earlier articles, its author has in it betrayed to us the emotional basis of his embracing of his scientific ideal and of his later scientific and methodological activities and identifications. Indeed, in conversation on the matter, we found emotional bases for *both* of our orientations in all their diversity and specific specialization! And for the orientations and specializations of a number of our scientific colleagues!

But no one would question but what obscure mental mechanisms are at work even in such apparently intellectual choices and in such highly elaborated intellectual rationalizations of choices. The rationale for divergent pronouncements concerning the nature, scope, content, and method of science are thus suspect. They quite probably represent the highly ingenious rationalization of an emotionally embraced identification. I am convinced that *some* scientists do not want *any* evaluations in

between the most elusive and subtle of functional entities and categories. This paper, along with the other papers in the same symposium, will shortly appear in *Sociologus*.

[6] I am indebted to a colleague, Mr. J. P. Shalloo, for this point.

[7] "Motives in Radicalism and Social Reform" *Amer. Jour. of Soc.*, Mar., 1923.

science basically because they do not *want* them. And conversely! But, though suspect, neither are condemned without hearing. For even rationalization selects the more cogent items whereby to buttress itself. So that even the propagandist's arguments must be given the same through scrutiny as another's.

But when pronouncements concerning the nature, scope, content, or method of science are elevated into dogmas and are made into untouchables, they are thereby put under very grave suspicion. Such are the dogmas that *all* science must be *completely* non-evaluative; and that the quantitative is the *only* method of science.[8] For it is an unproved assumption that the functional sciences can be objective in the same sense as the non-functional sciences; and certainly a tremendous assumption that there are no functional sciences. Or that sociology is not one of them. Or that they may not require different modes of handling from those of the non-functional sciences. So that any strictly non-functional treatment of sociology is based on a dogmatization of an "as if" universe, which posits the reality of one side of a philosophical, metaphysical, and methodological ambivalence.

Also, the truly great contributors to sociological theory were motivated by the desire for knowledge in order to reach *inductively validated* criteria of social appropriateness. Professor Rice's "distinction between ethical valuations as data for investigation and ethical valuations as motives" thus fails to take account of the distinction between ethics and morals. What be really fears is *moral* (fixed, preconceived) valuations as motives. For the ethical motivation is a motivation to discover appropriateness, not to impose preconceived appropriateness. Hence the ethical ends and means or methods are identical with those of science and the opposite of those of morality. The ends are to be discovered by the inductive method of functional analysis rather than to be posited beforehand to the blocking of discovery. The rôle of the ethicist, in this sense, is identical with that of the scientist. It is "a completely impartial one," ready to follow the data (relative to choices) wherever they may prove to lead. Fully as much as science, indeed as an attempted science, it is "primarily founded upon, and concerned with, consistency among all the data of experience." It is no indictment of ethics, as such, or of the functionally-emergent appraisals of *any* evaluative science, that proved interrelationships and processes delineated may be used by Al Capones, embattled nationals, or social workers either to build or to destroy. Any more than it is an indictment of grammar that people make slips of speech. These are applications of science to superimposed ends and of no necessary relationship to an inductive search for ends emergent from functional analysis.

At any rate, the great contributors to sociological theory were motivated by the desire to reach inductively validated criteria of human social appropriateness. We not only stultify the content of our science by casting out *all* evaluations, but we institute a process of selection of the prosaic, unimaginative minds lacking in social sense and human insight for our personelle.

The extent to which the functional orientation of the science and the extent to which introduced evaluations are implicit

[8] Prof. Rice, incidentally, regards his scientific identification as integral with his world-view, but his identification with quantitative method as one only of specialization of labor. He appears as the object of criticism in the present article only because this article took his as a starting point for the discussion. In our conversations as colleagues, it is apparent that our views are not startlingly different, but have most of their content in common.

in all the use of all the terms for social rigidity in all the literature from Bagehot's "Cake of Custom" through de Roberty's law of lagging to Ogburn's "Culture Lag"—the extent of that intrusion and the unselfconsciousness of that intrusion perhaps further justify our point (that evaluations will intrude in spite of us). The point may be opposed, however, by the contention that eventually, by making our discipline a stricter and stricter one, we could really exclude them. Personally I doubt this; and I find ever recurring instances of supposedly rigid quantitative and objective studies which, on analysis, are full of loopholes of this sort. Perhaps Ogburn furnishes us an outstanding example of this. Certainly his presidential address[9] was the panegyric of quantification and objectivity, almost to the point of portraying a set of complexly regulated comptometers doing the whole business of future research. Yet one so evangelistically self-conscious in his adoption of the quantified and objective and in his exclusion of the ratiocinative and the subjective is, on carefully analyzing the culture lag concept, seen to have introduced by the back door in disguised and pseudo-objective form that same evaluative subjectivity which was kicked out of the front door.[10]

We would repeat, however, that historic lapses into evaluation validate our present point only tenuously and by default. Any intrinsic inescapability of their appearance would merge this point with point (3), the functional nature of both subject and object in the functional sciences.

We now turn to *extra-science* considerations of the relationship between sociology and evaluations.

(6) Probably everyone would agree that in sociology as an *applied* science rather than as a pure science there is a legitimate place for evaluations and, as well, for the objectives and goals that flow out of them. Still it is strategic for general sociology to keep the line of demarcation fairly sharply drawn between pure science and applied science. But the line can never be as sharp as that between mechanics and engineering. For in that case the applied problems in no sense emerge from, or give rise to, the science itself but are tacked on arbitrarily. But in our case the applied problems overlap and merge with the problems of functional analysis which confront us in our data as we find it *in situ.* Many mutual contributions always occur between a pure science and its applied branches. And since social research is so largely artistic as well as "strictly" scientific in its nature, since the living person and the functioning group are our laboratory, perhaps sociology should keep

[9] "The *Folkways* (Italics mine.) of a Scientific Sociology," *Publications* of the Amer. Soc. XXIV, No. 2, pp. 1–12.

[10] We have already added Professor Rice to Professor Ogburn as an instance of the intrusion of evaluations in disguised form among those who are self-consciously very precise in the attempted exclusion of them. Probably Professor Sorokin would frankly admit that evaluations have intruded into some of his work despite his best efforts, e.g., in his study of revolutions. In private correspondence he indicates the first of our seven alternatives as his preference and rejects the culture lag concept, in part, because it seems to him to be attentuated Marxianism. If we consider his emotional reaction to Sovietism which is built on Marxianism and other theories of maladjustment and readjustment, it becomes a problem which end of that list of choices it is from which its consistency derives. Certainly, e.g., historical materialism is differentiated intellectually from the concept of lag itself! Those who would attempt to introduce evaluations self-consciously and guardedly (?) also fall into error; and Professor Ellwood seems in some of his work to express rationalized inflexibles rather than an unfettered inductive quest. These men are mentioned only because our discussion takes some of their work as a starting point, Indeed, our present thesis is that it would be impossible to find any social scientist anywhere into whose work evaluations have not crept.

more closely in touch with its applied branches and keep the practical coöperation much more close than do the exact sciences. After all, the application of measures emerging out of our theoretical analyses, and observations of their results, are our nearest possible approach to the experimental (especially in problems involving the larger groups). However, we only point here to the validity of evaluations in any applied science.

(7) One can, quite apart from science, view the rôle of the sociologist as a person and the rôle of the social scientists as a sub-group in the particular culture. One could ask, what is the function of this sub-group in the total culture? They are presumably the ones who know most about certain practical problems. Does the rest of the group lay a moral obligation upon them to speak out, either in their private capacities or in their sub-group concensus, their scientific or extra-scientific evaluations, instead of letting social policies be determined, as they are, by the fanatic, the demagogue, the ignorant, or the scheming, among all of which are readily included so many editors, ministers, politicians, labor leaders and capitalists?

Or, what does ethics, as one working part of the culture, expect of science as another? If we lay a moral obligation on ethics to stay out, can she lay one on us to come in? Ethics, if it would be a science, must approach its universe in the functional orientation we have above discussed and must piece together the findings of all the sciences to arrive at inductively self-validating criteria of the desirability or undesirability of particular lines of choice in the perspective of a presumably completely functionally-analyzed universe. And sociology must have its analyses and criteria ready for ethics (as do psychology, psychoanalysis, biology, and the other functional sciences), ready for ethics as the final synthesizer to use them in defining appropriate choices. We cannot expect ethics alone to cope with so ramifying a task. Thus it is not too much to expect of the scientific sub-group within a culture that, after having destroyed our supernatural "sources" of values and choices, it should presently furnish the group self-validating criteria based on a reality-emergent functional analysis of our make-up and the make-up of the milieu in which we function. Individuals within the group and other sections within the culture, having their belief-systems and their sanctioning agencies so largely devastated at the hands of science, expect some positive criteria and goals in return and are little concerned with what concerns us so greatly—whether the furnishing of them constitute exact, functional, pure, or applied science!

If by evaluations we mean inductively arrived at appraisals of functional appropriateness, the serious minded person who has been robbed of his religiously "revealed" cosmic orientations expects that these detailed appraisals, integrated and synthesized with, and interbuttressed by, inductive appraisals of further and further interrelated structures and processes, shall ever approach, whether ever to reach, a complete orientation of man in his universe, completely validated analyses of preferability. Which calls for no greater stretch of credulity than that required in believing that the mathematical physicist will reduce the cosmos to a single formula. Before *that* pretension we are overawed.[11]

[11] This ethical ideal is quite parallel to the scientific ideal and is acceptable for the same reasons. According to Singer, the "scientific" ideal is the mechanical image; it is acceptable as an ideal because (1) it is desirable; (2) it is unattainable; but (3) it is indefinitely and progressively approachable. Both are to be inductively approached. The hazard in embracing

Indeed, society, to save itself from further and further social disorganization, may presently impose this obligation on the scientific sub-group in less uncertain terms. For the coincidence of extreme individuation, through social complexity and mobility, with the undermining of the former uniformity-yielding prestige agencies (principally religion) leaves society without any defining agency of group-wide prestige. And the result is chaos, waste motion, and social and personal disorganization. With the social evolution as rapid as it has been, no agency (as W. I. Thomas points out) has been developed to regulate behavior in the new conditions, to analyze and replace old standards with new. There is no universally accepted set of definitions of situations. Churchman, scientist, educator, and radical leader are so far apart they do not speak the same language, not to mention the schisms within their respective camps or the more widely diverging definitions of situations given by the newspaper, movie, magazine, radio or any of the thousand and one racial, linguistic, national, geographic, or rebel sub-groupings within our complex population. There is no such unanimity of voice as obtained in the village of even half a century ago and there is no scientifically established code which does not *assume* authority, but which, by observation and measurement of the results of actions, *demonstrates* the validity of its standards. Only demonstration can now carry full group-wide prestige. No present code is, therefore, self-evident or universally binding; some situations were once defined, but have become vague again; some have arisen and have never been defined; there are rival definitions of the same situation, and none of them is binding in its own right. The result is that all the diverse definitions get themselves more or less accepted, new subgroups form about even the most divergent of them (witness the criminal, racketeering, gambling, and vice groupings of our large cities), and the final crystallization of values and attitudes in any two people is apt to be most diverse. The net result is as above emphasized—chaos, waste motion, and social and personality disorganization. Perhaps society has now grown so complex, so divided into occupational, professional, social, economic, religious, educational, and interest sub-groupings (a tendency which is bound still further to increase), that it will soon be inescapable that we face the inadequacy of mores *as mores* to conform the behavior of the whole complex group and in some way institutionalize a scientific procedure of observation and of tabulation of the results of action into self-validating principles of behavior, that we change the emphasis of our moral education from conformity to intelligent adaptability, from morals to ethics. Thus society as a whole may become more insistent that sociology, along with the other functional sciences, develop the requisite self-validating criteria of functional appropriateness. And a functional sociology would be pointing the way in its demonstration of this situational imperative.

We think it is this extra-scientific obligation from which Professor Ellwood's depth of conviction about the matter emerges; and we would hold our above discussion rather sharply separate from that

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the ethical ideal is in forgetting that we are but just starting the long voyage toward its attainment and thereby failing to suspend judgment as we do in more impersonal realms. Marx, Schmalhausen, Dorsey, H. E. Barnes, McDougall, Binder, Hornell Hart, and Ellwood (and doubtless the present writer) are in point. We have but thrust the tip of our toe into the ocean's fringe. But the objection to embracing this ideal is like refusing to start on a journey of discovery because we are not already at its destination!

of Professor Ellwood. And we trust the reader will hold our own first five points separate from our last two.

Neither can it be given as a point against the inclusion of evaluations evaluatively that so little unanimity can be found in regard to them. As a matter of fact there is little unanimity with regard to the "legitimate" content of our science. It is full of unilateralisms, physiographic determinism, biological determinism, racial schools, selectionist schools, economic determinisms, and so on endlessly. So is every science. Thus physical anthropology has a fundamental controversy in the monogenetic and the polygenetic theories; cultural anthropology has one in diffusion and independent origin; biology a fundamental one in Lamarckianism and Weismannism not to mention entelechy and the physiological gradient; psychology a fundamental one in the controversy about instincts; and so on and on.

It should not then be expected that, in delineating the foregoing, the writer's further ideas as to the appropriateness of our social order and its institutions, moralities, or religions, would coincide with those of, say Professor Ellwood, who may share a part of the above orientations. Indeed they probably differ so much that we are tempted to say mischievously that, strictly, Professor Ellwood does not mean all that he thinks he means, that scientific ethics, could it be arrived at, would bring us out so far from where Professor Ellwood conceives that it does bring us out, that he would look upon it as anathema, and that he would be the last to sanction scientific ethics if we really made it scientific by applying the method *par excellence* of science, by experiment, say, in sexual relations and godlessness. This is by way of showing that, while Professor Ellwood and the writer are in agreement on some theoretical points, we are doubtless on other points very wide apart. And we hope that those who share his point of view will not, because we are at one on some points, impute to him (or to us) any other heresies (or orthodoxies) which perhaps may not be shared.

In the foregoing discussion, we have shown seven possible points at which evaluations might legitimately enter into social science. Point 1 includes evaluations in sociology as data only and not in an evaluating sense, includes them in sociology as an attempted exact science. Point 2 permits the intrusion of evaluations evaluatively in a specialized social science, social ethics, but excludes them from general sociology and from the other specialized sociologies. Points 3 and 4 seem to show that the inclusion in their own right of *inductive evaluations of functional appropriateness*, not moral evaluations, is necessary in our logical conception of sociology as a functional science or is necessary in the exhaustive dealing with evaluations as data. These two points would indicate the inclusion of evaluations evaluatively in the body of the science itself and in its subsciences. Point 5, while not logically validating their inclusion, raises the question whether their inclusion in the body of the science would not be a strategic or a prudential move, since if we do not let them in guardedly they slip in in disguised and chaos-producing forms. It is a tenuous argument, an argument by default. Points 6 and 7 involve extra-science considerations of the relationship between sociology and evaluations. Point 6 permits evaluations evaluatively in applied sociology but not in sociology as a pure science. Point 7 raises the question whether the rôle of the sociologist as a person within the group and the rôle of the social scientists as a sub-group within the particular culture do not involve an obligation upon them to

subordinate their individual and sub-group desires in the interests of the total group welfare and, at the least, speak out their evaluations in their private capacities, at the most, attack dynamically the task of the ethicist and the preliminary task of the applied scientist, the task of setting evaluations into their complete configurational perspective. Of these points, 1 and 6 are universally accepted; the others are less in conformity with accepted tradition.

Finally, since we have at times rather actively advanced the argument, it may be in order again to emphasize that this article is intended not so much to render a decision on these matters as to indicate certain important considerations that must be thoroughly dealt with before we do reach a decision.

A SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH LABORATORY

A Social Science Research Laboratory, through which students in the Department of Government and Sociology at the College of the City of New York may grapple at close range with the problems they hear about in the classroom, is announced as follows by Frederick B. Robinson, President of the College.

The Laboratory has been in operation experimentally for about two years, and its success from the point of view of a score of coöperating social and civic agencies as well as that of the students now assures its permanence.

Unlike laboratories in the physical sciences, the Social Science Research Laboratory is not located in a particular room or building at the College of the City of New York. Although there is a room so labelled at St. Nicholas Terrace, the students are literally using the entire city as their laboratory with the result that many of them, though they have lived here all their life, are becoming aware for the first time of a New York they did not know existed.

The Social Science Research Laboratory was organized and developed by Professor Samuel Joseph who directs the sociological courses of the College and the practical field work in sociology. So effective has this work become that it has attracted the active interest of leaders in civic and philanthropic undertakings, some of whom have formed an advisory committee to coöperate with Professor Joseph in the direction of the Social Science Laboratory.

Typical of the kind of research projects on which junior and senior students at the College of the City of New York are engaged in the Social Science Research Laboratory are:

A study of housing conditions in the most congested tenement area in New York City.

A study of the difficulties faced by the Porto Ricans when they are transplanted from the village of a backward island to the largest city in the world.

A study of the variability in social backgrounds and criminal careers.

A study of the social organization of the Polish group in Greenwich Village.

An investigation of what unemployed boys and girls do with their leisure time.

A study of child labor in New York City.

A survey of the conditions leading to the decline of the Boy Scout movement in Greenwich Village.

An analysis of the activities of the American Legion in Greenwich Village.

A comparison of relief work conducted under the jurisdiction of municipal agencies with the relief work of private social agencies.

A field and statistical study of workshops located in tenement houses.

TEACHING AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN SOCIOLOGY—CONTINUED

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

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THE authors of *Trends in American Sociology* declare in their Preface that "sociology is a natural science, and hence must study human associational activities in the spirit and by the methods of natural science." This dogmatic declaration raises the question whether the methods employed in the social sciences should be the methods employed in the so-called natural sciences, or whether the social sciences need to develop distinct methods of their own. I shall endeavor to show that the scientific methods found useful in the natural sciences cannot be adapted with any high degree of success to the social sciences, and that the social sciences must therefore develop distinct methods of their own. To some extent, as I have already pointed out,[1] these methods will resemble more nearly those of philosophy than those of the natural sciences, in the sense that they will make a large use of logical reasoning, of synthesis, and of logical criticism of both concepts and theories. However, in addition to these philosophical methods, the social sciences can and should develop methods of their own, which, strictly speaking, have no parallel in the natural sciences.

The main methods of the natural sciences are usually recognized to be observation, experiment, and the use of instruments of precision and of measurement. The natural sciences may, of course, in common with philosophy and the social sciences, employ methods of logical reasoning, of synthesis, and of logical criticism of concepts and theories. But these philosophical procedures the natural sciences, by which I mean the sciences of physical nature, share with philosophy and the social sciences, and they are not the distinctive methods of the natural sciences. Natural science devotees would unhesitatingly acknowledge observation, experiment, and the use of mensurative procedures to be the distinctive methods of the natural sciences, and the concrete embodiment of their spirit.

Now, the social sciences, especially economics, political science, and sociology, have for a long time aimed at becoming true sciences and at having their scientific status fully and cordially recognized by the devotees of those older sciences which we call the natural sciences. Accordingly, the devotees of these new social sciences, in order to get standing with natural sciences students, have in many cases advocated the adaptation of natural science methods to the field of the social sciences. All of the authors of the book

[1] In a paper on "Scientific Method in Sociology," in *Social Forces*, October, 1931.

mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, for example, would agree that sociology is a natural science and must employ, so far as it can, the methods which have been successful in the physical sciences. They do not tell us what they mean by "natural science." All sociologists would of course agree that sociology is a natural science in the sense that it deals with real processes and does not question the reality of its subject matter. "Natural" is a tricky word, celebrated in philosophy for its ambiguity. But it is plain from reading the book mentioned that its contributors mean by "natural science" a science fundamentally like physics, chemistry, or biology. More particularly, they mean to accept the general theory of knowledge pragmatically followed by workers in those sciences; namely, that all scientific knowledge comes from the generalization of sense data. The most conspicuous contributor tells us that "theory that is not based upon logical inferences from sense-experience is not sound theory." Like a physical science, moreover, sociology is ethically indifferent. "Sociology is a natural science" says this contributor, "and as such it is non-utilitarian, non-normative, and no more "important" than any other natural science." So much from the champions of natural science methods in sociology.

Let us now see whether observation, experiment, and mensurative procedures can be very well adapted to the material with which the social sciences are forced to deal. Whether the subject matter of the social sciences be considered human relations, social interactions, social institutions or group behavior, the material with which they deal is very rarely directly observable, or at least only in small part. Human social phenomena of every sort, be they political, economic, religious, or educational, are in a genuine sense constituted of psychological activities or processes. They can only be in a slight degree observed, and then not the significant elements in the process but only certain incidental products or end results. It is true that we can see certain external forms in human relations, and can observe certain processes in social interactions, and also certain results of institutional activity. But the interstimulation and response, the attitudes, values, motives, desires, impulses and ideals of individuals and groups are not directly observable. We have to infer them from behavior or results which can be observed, but which we must interpret before we can understand. Perhaps no one has stated this more clearly than Professor C. H. Judd in a recent article[2] on "The Nature of Social Institutions." "The social sciences," says Professor Judd, "have been timid in recognizing the reality of the entities with which they deal. The physical objects with which the natural sciences deal are so directly recognizable through our sensations that we think of their having a reality and an influence which is primary. The influence of institutions on the life of an individual is less direct, and lacks the immediate sensory appeal that physical objects have, but it is none the less real."

To put the matter very tersely, the social sciences deal with real processes, which are, however, much less observable than the processes and objects dealt by the physical sciences. Therefore, the rôle of imagination in the social sciences is much greater than in the physical sciences. To be sure, as has often been pointed out, the rôle of imagination in the method of the physical sciences is also very great, and it would be a mistake to minimize the part played by imagination even in the natural sciences. Thus a leading physicist has

[2] In *Social Forces*, October, 1931.

recently declared that there was little or no experimental evidence for the existence of atoms and molecules up to about fifty years ago, and that even yet the existence of these particles is an inference, an inference which is now supported, however, by an overwhelming accumulation of experimental evidence. Nevertheless, prior to fifty years ago, the concepts of the atom and the molecule were found to be very useful in the physical sciences. They were purely imaginary concepts, not observable objects, but were found to be useful and even necessary assumptions in explaining physico-chemical processes.

Again, a leading American biologist has declared: "The constructive usage of the imagination, ever checked and reoriented by observation and experiment, is the very essence of science and of spiritual freedom. It is the only means we have of reconstructing the unwritten past, and anticipating or prophesying the future . . . . The chief purpose of the imagination is rightly to orient mental and bodily growth to world growth; rightly to picture the world as it was, and shall be, in order to fit life more profitably to the world as it is. . . . . The imagination is the eyes and legs of the spiritual body with which man annihilates time and space and matter, and with which, in effect, he may project himself far beyond the narrow confines of his physical sanctuary into realms his physical body may not enter. Imagination opens the gates of the universe. In his search for wisdom, it gives man the instant power to look over the edge of yesterday and the top of tomorrow into the abyss of universal time; to fly through and beyond all physical barriers into the infinite expanse of universal space; to explore the dead past and invade the germinating future."[3]

[3] Patten, *The Grand Strategy of Evolution*, pp. 292–295.

Now, it is the contention of the author that scientific imagination, important as it is in the physical sciences, must play even a larger part in the social sciences, and virtually takes in them the place of observation. When I say, "scientific imagination," however, I mean an imagination which builds itself upon and has respect for all observable facts or processes. Imagination is scientific, as Huxley would say, when it permits one little fact to change its entire worldview. A scientific social imagination in this sense is our indispensable method of getting at social processes. Professor Charles Horton Cooley, in his remarkable paper on "The Roots of Social Knowledge"[4] pointed out that there are two sorts of knowledge, one coming from sense contact with material things, which he calls spatial or material knowledge, and the other developed from contact with the minds of other men through communication, which sets going a process of thought and sentiment which enables us to understand them by sharing their states of mind. This latter he calls social knowledge, and he added that while the distinctive trait of spatial knowledge is that it is mensurative, the distinctive trait of social knowledge is that it is "dramatic."

In my opinion, Professor Cooley would have been happier in his terminology if he had said that the distinctive trait of social knowledge is that it is "imaginative," and that it becomes scientific by submitting itself to scientific criticism. To paraphrase Professor A. J. Todd, "Imagination is not sufficient unto itself. Its reservoirs need constant cleaning and overhauling. Here is the function of critical thought. The springs of imagination are not released as long as tradition and superstititon hold sway. Imagination is dynamic, tradition

[4] In his book, *Sociological Theory and Social Research*.

and dogma static. The chief glory of science,—far overtopping its contributions to material achievement,—is to have broken through those crusts of authority."[5] In other words, the imagination which we make use of in the social sciences must be critical and must constantly be checked up by the facts of experience. It is this scientific social imagination which enables us to see and visualize social processes and group behavior. The method of the "participant observer" is nothing but the use of imagination to put ourselves in the place of the group described, checked up, however, by our actual experiences as members of groups. The method of "sympathetic introspection" by which we try to understand the behavior of someone unlike ourselves, such as a child, a criminal, or the member of another race or sex, is again the use of imagination to put ourselves in the place of such individuals,[6] checked up by the facts of our experience with the class of individuals described.

It will at once be said that the history of the physical sciences is replete with instances which show the danger of the use of imagination in scientific investigation and thinking. Thus the history of the medical sciences shows many instances of imaginary hypotheses as to the cause of disease, but Pasteur, with a few facts observed through the microscope, was able to overthrow all of these imaginary hypotheses, and to present for the first time a scientific theory as to the cause of many diseases, namely, the germ theory. This very illustration however, shows exactly what is meant by scientific imagination. Pasteur was not a man without imagination. The use of exact instruments of observation enabled him to verify what was certainly at first only an imaginative hypothesis. Now, it must be granted that at present the social sciences lack such exact instruments of observation. There are, however, plenty of facts of history and of individual experience which enable us to check up our social imagination. The very lack of exact instrumentalities of observation in the social sciences leads us almost necessarily to make larger use of scientific imagination, and in my opinion, it would be more honest and more intelligent on the part of students of the social sciences to recognize this fact. Again, I feel that it would be more intelligent for the students in the social sciences to make use of the critical apparatus which the science of logic affords than to hunt around for more exact methods of social observation. I do not mean, of course, that we do not need these latter, but I do mean to say that we have not yet exhausted the resources of logical science. Better and more critical thinking is needed in the social sciences, even more than better methods of observation. Nothing seems to me more stupid than the motto of some of our hyper-scientific friends, when they say: "Don't think; observe." If this motto works well in some of the natural sciences, it certainly will not work in the social sciences.

No better characterization of these hyper-scientists, or, as Professor Hornell Hart calls them,[7] "positivists" than that phrased by Tyndall over a generation ago, when he said, "There are men who, however wealthy in regard to facts can never rise into the region of principles; and they are sometimes intolerant of those who can. . . . . There are Tories even in science who regard the imagination as

[5] *Theories of Social Progress.*

[6] For this sharing of feeling and thought, the University of Chicago Department of Sociology has invented the term "empathy," but "sympathetic introspection," is surely better.

[7] *Technique of Social Progress*, ch. XII.

something to be feared and avoided rather than employed. They have observed its action in weak vessels and are unduly impressed by its disasters. But they might with equal justice point to exploded boilers as an argument against the use of steam."

As soon as we understand the nature of the subject-matter of the social sciences, that it is nothing but collective human behavior with its correlated psychological processes, we perceive at once that we have two approaches to social reality, which, while they both make large use of scientific imagination to interpret their recorded facts, yet have become so systematized that they rise to the dignity of great methods for the understanding of human society. These are psychology and history, or more strictly, psychological analysis and historical interpretation. Psychology and history are the two great foundation sciences for all the other social sciences. As all social processes are rooted in the human psyche on the one hand, and in the experiences of human history on the other hand, it becomes indispensable for the competent social scientist to understand, so far as scientific knowledge will permit, human nature and human history. The psychological method, or the method of psychological analysis, and the historical method, or historical interpretation, take the place in the social sciences very largely of the use of instruments of precision and mensurative procedures in the natural sciences; and there are no analogues of these methods in the natural sciences.

There is nothing in human relations, human culture, social interactions, social institutions, or group behavior which does not proceed from the possibilities of human nature; and by human nature, we here understand all the capacities, tendencies, activities, and capabilities of the original nature of man. The study of these capacities, tendencies, activities, and capabilities of the human psyche is what we call psychology. It should be evident, therefore, that a scientific psychology furnishes us at once a deductive approach to the study of all problems of human behavior and so all problems of human society. But it may be asked, whether we have any psychology sufficiently scientific to be used as a basis of deductive inferences in the study of social problems; and if so, which psychology. The answer must be that this is the problem of the psychologists, and that the social scientist has no right to say what scientific methods psychologists shall use in their study of human nature and individual human behavior. They may be introspective, psychoanalytic, or behavioristic. But the social scientist has the right to judge the quality of the theory of human nature delivered to him by the psychologist, as to whether or not it is adequate in interpreting the facts with which he deals. The social scientist frequently brings theories of human nature into more vital contact with facts than the psychologist in his laboratory. The social scientist, therefore, has the right to decide what theories and interpretations of the psychologists he finds adequate for his purposes. All this is perhaps equivalent to saying that psychology, or theories of human nature and behavior, as an instrument of research is very inadequate for the purposes of social science. The psychological approach to social facts must be supplemented by another approach, the historical approach.

It should be emphasized that psychology as a theory of individual human nature and behavior only gives us the possibilities of human society. No psychology, for example, could have foretold even the probability of the Great War; but a critical knowledge of European history

would have indicated the probability of such a conflict. Again, psychology could not possibly predict the present machine age; but a critical knowledge of cultural history could hardly have failed to perceive the coming of the age of the machine. More concretely, one of the greatest of American psychologists notoriously failed when he came to write a very learned work upon the psychology of Jesus of Nazareth. On the other hand, an eminent American historian was able in a brief monograph of eighty-five pages to make the personality of Jesus quite understandable, because this historian knew quite adequately the historical circumstances under which the personality of Jesus developed. There can scarcely be any doubt, therefore, that the content of the individual mind, the forms of individual behavior, of social interactions, and of institutions, are much more determined by historical circumstances and situations than by what we ordinarily call psychology or human nature. Both are necessary to understand human behavior and especially group behavior; but history unlocks more doors to concrete processes and events than psychology. History without psychology may be blind, but psychology without history is empty.

There can be scarcely any doubt entertained as to this by the student of human society when once he grasps the fact that present social institutions and behavior are largely products of culture. The anthropologists have shown us that the essence of culture is invention, and that all human cultures have attained to their present state by a series of inventions which have grown one out of another through the creativeness of man and which have been diffused to the peoples of the world through man's capacity to learn and to imitate. This is as true of customs and institutions, of morals, religion, and government, as it is of physical tools. In other words, all of the natural behavior of man has been modified by the historical development of culture. Human societies as we now find them, whether they are societies of Eskimo or of Englishmen, are all products of history. Hence, knowledge of the course, the trends, and the tendencies of the cultural development of any people, including in that phrase their total institutional life, will help us to understand the forces and factors, the possibilities and probabilities, of any social movement or condition. Historical method and historical interpretation, therefore, become equally indispensable for the social scientist with psychology, or psychological analysis. Indeed, because of the wealth of concrete facts which it marshalls, historical method is the only sure way to save the social scientist from the pitfalls of psychological theorizing.

If what has been said is true, then the method of such a social science as economics, for example, should be a method of psychological analysis on the one hand and of historical interpretation on the other. Institutional economics, if conceived in a broad enough way, becomes the only scientific economics; for industries and markets, methods of production and habits of consumption, are all institutions in a very broad sense, and are all historical products. Someone has said that we could have a more scientific economics, with much greater scientific foresight, if our economists could live about two hundred years. Then they would get the historical point of view and understand the trend of events. However, every economist, if he wishes, can live at least two thousand years in imagination, for there is that much if not more than that of recorded economic history. Here it may be remarked that the great defect of the historical method is the breaks or *lacunae* in our historical records. Of course, another

fault of those who use the historical method is lack of scientific imagination in interpreting records, and lack of psychological insight into historical events. History alone is inadequate, and if at times it saves us from the pitfalls of psychological theorizing, it also leads us, if we have no adequate knowledge of human nature, into very stupid conclusions. Synthesis of all methods that will yield truth is alone adequate for the purposes of the social science.

Someone may ask, if we conclude that scientific imagination, psychological analysis, and historical interpretation should be the main methods of the social scientist, where the place is for those newer methods which have been developed under the names of statistics, the social survey, and case study. The reply is, that these do not have distinct places apart from these larger methods, but are special methods of research that have been developed within the larger methods named. For example, we have no difficulty in seeing that the statistics of a century ago, so far as we have them, are a part of history and will be included in the historical method. The same would be true of social surveys made a century ago, or of personal case studies; they would all become so much historical data. The adherent of these methods seems to forget that present society is a part of history. Statistics, surveys, and case studies are all useful in correcting errors and misapprehensions of historical facts. If we are to interpret correctly statistics, surveys of present society, or personal case studies, we must do so in the light of historical developments and with scientific social imagination. And it is the interpretation of statistics, not mere statistical measurements, which creates social science.

We may conclude, therefore, that while observation will remain the starting point of the social sciences, as it is of all science, the main methods of research in the social sciences must be and will become imagination, psychology, and history, when these have been rendered thoroughly scientific and matter-of-fact. These three main methods of the social sciences stand in contrast to the main methods now in use in natural science, which are, and will perhaps remain, exact observation, experiment, and the use of methods of measurement. However, it would seem probable that both the social sciences and the natural sciences, as they exhaust the possibilities of their main methods of research, will turn more and more to the philosophical methods of logical reasoning, of synthesis, and of logical criticism of theories. If these philosophical methods were once the original procedures in all the sciences, there are now some symptoms, even in the natural sciences, of renewed vitality in these methods. The greater maturity of the physical sciences would suggest that it is hardly to be doubted that the final development of all sciences will be philosophical. They began as philosophies without a basis of tested knowledge; they will end as philosophies based upon tested knowledge. The factual and quantitative stage of science appears to be merely transitional.

ARE MINERAL RESOURCES SOCIALLY DETRIMENTAL?

STEPHEN S. VISHER

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As LONG as the mines and oil wells were yielding large amounts of new wealth each day, people overlooked evidence suggesting that these sources of wealth are socially detrimental, at least locally. Now that the economic depression has rendered most mines and oil wells unprofitable, however, it is a good time to consider the evidence more critically.

The commonly accepted assumption has been that he who discovers or in any way hastens the exploitation of a mineral resource is contributing notably to human betterment. Even the best thinkers have declared for decades that one of the unusual advantages of the United States is its great supply of readily exploitable mineral wealth.

The questioning of this belief, so far as the present writer is concerned, grew strong as the result of a study of the birthplaces of prominent people. After having made scores of maps showing the distribution in the state of Indiana of the production of corn, hogs, wheat, hay, cattle, gas, oil, coal, limestone, manufactures, and numerous other valuable products, and discovering the counties and sections of the state yielding most of each, in proportion to area and population, it occurred to me to plot the birthplaces of a list of famous Hoosiers given incidentally in a book dealing with leaders. The birthplaces of these persons were strikingly localized, and none were in the sections yielding minerals in quantity.

Having had my interest aroused, I sought other lists of notable Hoosiers. The larger the number of birthplaces plotted, the wider was their distribution, but still it was decidedly uneven. Even after so many impartially selected notables were plotted that the number totalled many hundreds from Indiana, and after careful consideration was taken of differences in the population per county at the average date of birth of the notables, it was apparent that certain counties were very much more productive of leaders, in proportion to population, than were others. The counties then important for their minerals were consistently among the poorest in the state in yield of each group of leaders studied.

The study was continued into other states with as many types of leaders as I could find. Having rather clearly established, by a study not only of the birthplaces of American leaders but of the leaders in Great Britain, Germany, and France, that areas yielding minerals at the time were the birthplaces of relatively few persons subsequently conspicuous as leaders, efforts were made to disclose the causes of this condition. First statistical studies of people and conditions obviously socially undesirable were made; for example, of local contrasts in the average yield of criminals in proportion to population, of mental defectives, of illiterates, of health as indicated by death rates, of social advancement as indicated by educational facilities, of percentage of pupils graduating, and numerous other socially significant conditions.

The correspondence between the several conditions studied was such that it appeared the relationship is significant. In brief, the evidence that the yield of leaders of more than local and temporary prominence is a good criterion of the social desirability of an area is now sufficient to warrant the generalization that "areas

yielding many leaders in proportion to population are socially clearly more desirable than areas yielding few." Note the present tense of the verb "yielding." One of the significant results of the study of American notables is that changed conditions have conspicuously affected the yield of leaders from decade to decade in many parts of our country. From the standpoint of the present discussion a point of especial significance is the decline in the yield of notables in proportion to population that took place in already well-settled areas in which mineral wealth was exploited.

An attempt to formulate the reasons why people engaged primarily in extracting mineral wealth yield few leaders required necessarily a consideration of what conditions are apparently favorable socially. Hence the present article is a continuation of the book *Geography of American Notables* (Indiana University Studies, No. 79, 1928) and of articles in *Human Biology* and *American Journal of Sociology* and Social Forces.

Conditions may be said to be socially desirable when they facilitate the development of a good social environment. An ideal social environment is one effectively conducive to the full utilization of the human resources of the area—to the development of the special skills of each of its people so that these skills are useful not only in the locality but elsewhere. As intelligent local leadership is essential to a good environment, there should be in each area a considerable percentage of people of superior mentality and idealism. Moreover, they should be effectively encouraged to achievement, without at the same time being encouraged to sacrifice that which is essential to a continuation of the favorable social environment throughout the next generation.

In order that a community can be self-perpetuating biologically without deterioration in the quality of the people and their ideals, it must have available a source of livelihood that is relatively permanent. No place with an obviously dark future economically can afford a good social environment more than temporarily. In brief, one of the characteristics of a good social environment is that it has a fair degree of present and prospective prosperity. Moreover, success should come as a result of effective non-exploitive endeavor and not in any large measure as a result of circumstances that are accidental so far as the individuals involved are concerned. Consequently, there should be a conspicuous correlation between qualifications and success. An environment is ideal in this respect if those who have the most superior ability, preparation, and character also have what is locally considered to be the best success, while conversely people of the opposite type are generally considered as failures. Such a community yields relatively many who contribute to its own welfare and who in other communities also play a conspicuously worthy part.

Let us now consider the local changes that characteristically accompany the exploitation of mineral wealth. There is a prompt influx of speculators, of those who seek quick wealth even at a sacrifice of former ideals or of physical safety. During the exploitation of gold and oil, wealth comes to some who little merit it; as luck plays a large rôle. Living conditions are nearly always unwholesome, with a minimum of influences encouraging intellectual and cultural growth. There are very few "almost ideal family homes" in a gold mining camp or town, or in an oil field. A study of the birthplaces of many thousands of prominent Americans of various sorts has disclosed only two who were born in mining camps, and they were children of pastors!

Even after a successful vein gold mine

has been developed, and the excitement is largely past, and law and order, schools, churches, and fairly wholesome recreational activities have been established, and there are many representative homes in the town, nevertheless, the social environment is seldom superior. Consider for example one of the most successful gold mines in America, the famous Homestake mine of Lead, near Deadwood, South Dakota, owned for many years largely by the mother of William Randolph Hearst, and yielding for nearly a half century a large output of gold. Repeated visits to this small city, and a number of personal resident friends afford the basis for the following statements. Work in the mine is not only nearly always unpleasant and risky but, even in this exceptionally steady mine, it is somewhat intermittent, as from time to time it is stopped by the ingress of water faster than it can be removed by the pumps then available, or by fire destroying part of the timbering, or by the collapse of part of the roof, or by other mishaps. At any time one of the veins which has been worked may come to a sudden end at a fault plane, or may contain too little gold to yield a profit. Then perhaps quite a period is spent in underground prospecting to find the lost vein, or another that is profitable. In the meantime part of the mine is shut down. Because of the various risks involved, most of the men are of the type who have a well-developed gambling "instinct." Likewise, many are characterized by their muscular strength rather than by their mental activities. Since men who are accustomed to the use of force are often prone to labor strikes, one of the uncertainties introduced in even the best of mining centers is the possibility of a tie-up at any time by a strike.

Not only are those who work for the mine therefore largely of a type who should not be expected to create and support a favorable social environment, but most of the rest of the community are relatively deficient in the same direction. The merchants must make large profits because of the large possibilities of heavy losses. Hence few are of the generous type who effectively encourage promising young people. Similarly the professional men are chiefly those who are seeking quick returns. Even the school teachers and officers usually have more troubles than in most communities. Not only are most of their pupils not encouraged by their home environment to be interested in the main objectives of the schools, but because of the characteristics of many of the patrons of the school, the school men are expected to accomplish more than should reasonably be expected. Furthermore, the impetuosity of the laboring type leads often to harsh attacks upon even the best of teachers with selective effects. The situation in respect to ministers is essentially similar.

In an oil field, likewise, chance plays such a conspicuous part that all quiet endeavor is handicapped. Moreover, wealth comes more often as the result of reckless daring than as the reward for high qualifications. The normal rapidity of the depletion of the oil is so well appreciated that almost everything in the oil field is glaringly temporary. No one who has first hand knowledge of life in an oil field would think of it as affording more than a mediocre social environment. The baneful influence of the exploitation of oil is not limited however to the oil field. The cupidity of mankind is so great that every oil field results in significant losses of capital accumulated elsewhere in other activities. The United States Geological Survey estimated not long ago that the cost of drilling for oil in the United States had been greatly in excess of the sums received locally for the oil obtained. As

a considerable share of the oil is obtained from within proven fields, already monopolized, most of the speculative drilling for oil elsewhere, the so-called "wild-cat wells," have yielded oil worth only a small fraction of the cost of the drilling operations. One of the clear evidences of John D. Rockefeller's financial talent is the fact that he never invested in wild-cat drilling. He realized that human cupidity would supply his refineries with oil more cheaply than he could obtain it by drilling for it.

Since the desire for quick wealth is so great that few people can altogether resist opportunities that seem very near, it is often almost a local social catastrophe when a well yielding oil is "brought in" in an area not before known to contain oil. Promptly wells are drilled, at a cost on the average of more than $20,000 apiece, in every direction from the well yielding oil. Local people sink part or all of their savings into such ventures, and many farms are mortgaged in order to obtain funds with which to make more "dry holes." Likewise there is often a fever of excitement which diverts the attention from more worthwhile endeavors. Rarely indeed do the numerous holes drilled cost less than several times as much as the oil obtained. A considerable share of this wasted wealth comes from the nearest sources of capital, as many conservative people who would not invest their money in a distant oil well will risk some on a venture that is close at hand.

The situation in respect to gold is much the same. Much more wealth has been expended in obtaining the gold obtained from mines in America than this gold was worth locally, the United States Bureau of Mines has stated. In practically every area that ever yielded any appreciable amount of gold there is abundant evidence of unsuccessful ventures, prospect holes, abandoned mines, and even almost deserted towns. And slight were the social returns resulting from these expenditures of capital and these blasted hopes!

A number of seasons' work for the federal and state geological surveys has afforded the present writer numerous depressing examples of the disastrious results of speculating in mining stock. Those who have had no intimate contact with the social losses resulting from the exploitation of minerals can with difficulty realize the seriousness of these losses. Rare is the person living close to a mineral boom who has not been involved in it to his detriment. And the damage is not only local. Numerous people even far away have sunk part of their hard earned savings in mine stock, without adequate returns.

Coal mining is very much less speculative, and the local social damage is the result chiefly of other influences, resembling those mentioned in discussing the Homestake gold mine. The work is relatively dangerous and intermittent, and is carried on largely by a type of people characterized by physical strength rather than mental activity. As the coal is relatively soon removed sufficiently so that the mines are abandoned, the coal mining community has a temporary character. Frequently even the most elementary requirements, safe water and proper sewage disposal, are almost lacking. In Indiana, for example, the coal mining counties all have a relatively high death rate from typhoid fever. After a mine is abandoned, the roof collapses, often causing depressions in the overlying fields, and cracks in roads and houses as well as interference with natural surface drainage. Everyone of the numerous coal communities visited, situated in several states, have afforded such conspicuously undesirable environments that there is no wonder that few

of the more desirable people reside in such communities. For example, such communities send almost no students to the neighboring state universities.

The change occurring in a county in Indiana as a result of the opening up of coal mines may advantageously be briefly sketched. This was one of the better agricultural counties, and before coal mining became significant a large percentage of its people were substantial farmers. Many capable young people from it obtained higher education, and the number of persons sketched in *Who's Who in America* who were born in the county was high in proportion to the population. Crimmality and the death rate were low, and the social environment was for the most part distinctly wholesome.

In contrast, after coal mining became the dominant activity, the population had increased by 50 per cent, but chiefly by the influx of foreigners or "poor whites." The county which had been one of the best ranking in proportion to population in respect to literacy, crimmality, death rate, and in yield of notables became one of the worst in these respects.

Lumber camps have been notoriously ephemeral and deficient in respect to wholesome homes and intellectual activity. Not until the timber is almost gone, or its exploitation is strictly regulated, as in forest preserves, is there a prospect, apparently, for an even fairly good local social environment.

In conclusion, it appears that "Such quickly extracted natural resources as oil, gold, coal and timber are socially detrimental to the communities which extract them, and, therefore, are social liabilities, not assets, to such areas."

KÖLNER VIERTELJAHRSHEFTE FÜR SOZIOLOGIE

The following announcement comes from Professor Leopold von Wiese of the Forschungsinstitut für Sozialwissenschaften at the University of Cologne:

The Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation has decided to further the work of the *Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie* by paying one-half of the subscription price for the first one hundred new subscribers to that journal. This reduces the cost of four numbers to $3.—including carriage charges. Subscriptions should be sent to the publishers, Duncker und Humbolt München W 12, Theresienhöhe 10, Germany. This is an unusual opportunity to become acquainted with the official organ of the German Sociological Society, a journal publishing in each issue articles of fundamental importance to the sociologists of all countries. American sociologists frequently publish articles in the Cologne Quarterly: it numbers among its contributors such writers as Barnes, Eliot, Park, Howard Becker.

For the past decade abstracts of virtually every article printed in a large number of American sociological reviews have appeared in this journal.

PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

DOES SOCIAL WORK NEED A CODE?

JUNE PURCELL GUILD
Richmond Council of Social Agencies

THE more the ill winds of social adversity howl, the greater the popular prestige of social work. Do those of us who are spending our lives in the profession and in whose time its largest growth has come, owe any duty occasionally to take stock of actual accomplishments, frequently to define and redefine objectives, and formulate or restate our philosophy? In the present era of rapid growth do we especially need to look out for hypocrisies, artificialities, or weaknesses which may be creeping in at the heart, perhaps later to consume the vitality of the whole? Do we need to turn the search light as often on ourselves as *people* as on ourselves as technical workers?

To me, there appears only one possible answer. Social workers have responsibilities along these lines which laymen do not have. We have facts which the outsider does not and cannot have. If we would avoid increasing criticism and misunderstanding from those less able than ourselves to evaluate social phenomena, let us more often take time to contemplate social work as a whole. Let us be more willing to be critical of ourselves and our results. Let us gather together a body of simple ethical principles for our personal guidance. Let us be more interested in the general social welfare although not necessarily less so in our agency programs and technical tools. Or, are we really so busy with activity that we cannot take time to analyze objectively this gigantic, sprawling, growing thing called social work? How many of us have a deep professional concern with the character and personal ethics of those of us who are attempting to rehabilitate the private lives of others? Do these issues have particular significance during these chaotic days of depression? Or have our professional ideals and routines already hopelessly crystallized? Complete answers would easily run into a book. Let us then merely attempt to enumerate here some topics appearing to need further recognition and discussion, probably decision, and possibly action by professionally employed social workers.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE LIVES?

Certainly private lives should be private matters. But is it necessary for those who insist on the principle to be engaged in social work where activity and support are as publicly controlled as those of the church? Whether we like it or not, do not the communities which support social work believe that the workers—even as clergymen—should be persons of unimpeachable honor, integrity, sobriety, and the highest moral standards diverging not too far from conventional patterns?

These conventional standards may be either foolish and illogical or involve fundamental morality. What's to be done? Should social work ethics lead us to frank attempts to re-educate communities to different standards or should we violate community opinion openly or when job tenure demands, as covertly as possible?

HOW MUCH FOR TRAVELING?

Reasonable conference and traveling expenses of social workers are justifiable charges on contributors' generosity. To what extent, however, is the individual contributor permitted to know that many social workers spend hundreds of dollars annually and lose weeks of time from work because of blanket subscriptions to agencies and chests? It is doubtful whether social workers as a group themselves know the size of the joint annual conference bill nor concern themselves very much about the specific community returns for the money spent. Other professional groups, doctors, lawyers, teachers, as a rule, pay their own traveling and conference expenses. Why not social workers? It is conceivable that there would be better and fewer social work institutes, conferences, state and national meetings if this were the social work rule.

BREAD OR CHARACTERS?

We talk endlessly about character-building. But what is this thing called character-building for which we raise and assist in raising so much money? Where is a definition of the term? Where is the proof that a character has ever actually been built by a character-building agency? Is it right through a constant repetition of catch phrases containing assumptions the facts may not sustain, to persuade a public which blindly trusts us? The facts may support the implied allegation. But where are they? Some contributors already are beginning to ask.

It may be conceded there is a general value in leisure-time programs; doubtless also there is an increased need for this type of work in time of depression. But if the alternate is food and clothes or recreation and character-building, what hungry and ragged man will nobly choose a Y. M. C. A. class? Suppose we look unpleasant verities squarely in the eye. There is a serious question whether the earned average wage in the country in prosperous years makes decent living standards possible. Yet the relief funds now available are only a pitifully infinitesimal fraction of the wages which the unemployed formerly earned. New York with its millions for relief had last winter about 7 per cent of its former monthly pay roll to allow in relief. True, man does not live by bread alone but can he live without bread? The answer seems to be he can live a long, long time on a very little if we social workers keep his morale steady with character-building.

SOCIALIZED RELIEF?

Rapid though belated progress has been made during the present depression by social workers in acknowledging and promoting the responsibility of the government in the field of relief. Considering the regular frequency of unemployment periods and the inadequacy of private funds to meet them, why the hesitancy, why the delay? Even yet many social workers are clinging to the belief that the private agency should control the field of relief. Many, many social workers—eloquent enough on behalf of doles for mothers' or widows' pensions—are afraid of other forms of public social protection, unemployment insurance, for instance. Many use here the uninformed layman's phrase "we want no dole in America," quite fail-

ing to admit that private charitable relief is too, too often only a dole in the cruelest possible sense. If we would spend as much energy in developing plans for improving and safeguarding the administration of all forms of public relief as in fearing and criticizing its shortcomings would it not be possible that tax-supported relief could be as efficiently administered as public education, for instance?

MEASUREMENTS AND OBJECTIVES

The need of exact measuring rods for social work accomplishments has of course long been admitted by some. The subject of defining the objectives of social work and its various divisions has also been considered in recent years by a few. Nevertheless objectives for the most part are still undefined and measuring rods either undiscovered or unused. Is it then impractical to define and to measure the value of social work activity? No social worker worthy his hire would admit that. If we have the proof, why is the case not called for hearing?

NOT ENOUGH MONEY FOR SOCIAL EFFICIENCY?

There are those who deplore the insufficiency of tangible social work accomplishments but who defend inadequacies on the ground of meager budgets. But social work is costing more and more each year. Is it proportionately more socially effective? Is it making itself less and less necessary? Last year community chests reported raising about $82,000,000; this year the amounts being raised are generally running approximately 14 per cent greater than last year. Yet considering the size of relief and related welfare needs at the present time the money available is by no stretch of an optimistic imagination adequate. The point is that in spite of enormous and constantly increasing sums spent on social work privately and through tax supported programs, its exact social accomplishments are still speculative. Or is personal and social maladjustment actually less because of social work? Is crime and proverty decreasing? If contributors insisted on seeing proofs would they remain satisfied with good deeds, idealistic intentions, slogans, and sociological phrases? It may be possible for social workers to prove their case somewhat after the manner of health agencies, or to count up cases won, lost, or reversed as lawyers do. If so, why do we wait?

PREVENTION OR ALLEVIATION?

Allied to the popular American delight in slogans is the reiteration of the word *prevention* in social work terminology. Look over any list of descriptions or definitions of social work or case work and notice how often the word is used. But how much personal and social distress is social work preventing or able to prevent no matter how large its budget? Would it not appear that right now we are having real difficulty in keeping up with routine requests for bread and shoes? Granting that case work is an indispensable tool in preventing and relieving personal maladjustment in what percentage of the records so efficiently filed in our offices have any such results directly flowed from our efforts? Who knows the true and the exact answer? In how many hundreds of thousands of cases do personality difficulties adjust themselves nowadays with no assistance from us or continue on into chaotic terminations, without contact with us, probably for the most part, without knowledge of our existence? On the other hand, if all the cases of individual human maladjustment were to come to us for help where would we find trained and adjusted social workers to treat them? Why do we permit the social case tech-

nique to remain almost the exclusive property of a few overburdened social case workers who seldom have the time to do complete personality studies and adjustments?

CHANGING PUBLIC OPINIONS THROUGH SOCIAL WORK

Our schools of social work are turning out a few hundred so-called trained social workers a year. As a group we continue to look down on the volunteer although we know perfectly well that the supply of available trained workers cannot cope with the whole job of understanding, preventing, and relieving personal and social distress. Considering the social problems confronting us now, do we not need to adopt in every community far more comprehensive methods of recruiting and training not only students, but volunteer workers and board members? The recruiting and training program should specifically take into account the need (1) to refuse training or opportunities for volunteer service to the educationally and personally unfit, (2) to bring first-hand information on social conditions to as many as possible, (3) to lighten perceptibly the burden of the present professional group of case workers, and at the same time, (4) to make possible enormously increased agency case loads so that those who need case work may have some chance of getting it.

HOW VALUABLE IS THE CASE RECORD?

Probably none of us need to remind one another that the social case records so painstakingly compiled need improvement. But to what extent are we making specific and discernible improvement? For the most part, social records are made by supposedly trained workers. But are they not still full of repetition and unimportant detail of little or no social significance? Are they not so poorly written that for practical purposes many significant items are often hidden or lost? How many case records are closed "for lack of contact," that is, closed months after the last contact because the client has disappeared or has made no further request? It may not be necessary to decide here whether social case records can ever be accurate enough for scientific research. But how often is *any* educational use whatever made of them? Would it not be an interesting test to take a dozen consecutive records at random from a standard agency file and copying them exactly with identifying names removed, submit them to a committee of bankers, lawyers, teachers, doctors, and other supposedly intelligent and educated lay persons for critical analysis as to form, meaning, and results obtained? Possibly all professional records are valueless outside the profession which writes them. Ours not infrequently are unintelligible except to the writers. Certainly no other group attaches as much significance to records, nor spends as much time and public money writing them as we do.

THE CATCH WORDS AND PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY CHESTS

Finally, to what extent do community chests live up to published claims? This subject is too large for more than a random noting of examples illustrating lack of complete frankness. One of the points so often used in favor of the chest movement is the great increase in the number of givers and the amount given now as compared to the old cut-throat method of separate solicitation. This is true in practically every city but *who are* the additional givers? Is not much of the extra money coming from employees with small wages? Is it not true that many of these persons give because they are made to feel they

must? This is not to say that the chest movement directs that pressure or compulsion be used in its behalf. But it is the grateful recipient of much money given under chest-inspired hullabaloo and competitive stimuli adroitly applied through well-established campaign techniques. If this were not so, money would be raised on a voluntary basis by opening a chest office and asking people to send in their contributions. It is usually claimed also that the chest movement releases social workers for year-around social work because they are no longer required to finance their own agencies. Is it not true that in many communities most of the executives and some of the subordinates are drafted to participate in the chest campaign so that for one or several months they are continuously out of their offices? These social workers are trained to do work efficiently and should have a responsibility to aid in the chest campaign but the fact is often ignored that they are not free for year-around social work now any more than before. If the wages paid social workers during the time they are engaged in chest work were in any way considered as part of the campaign expense the low published cost of financing community fund campaigns would actually be much higher. There is also the question of local dues to national organizations paid by member agencies of community funds. Would contributors give even as willingly as now if they knew that a considerable percentage of their contribution was going outside the city to carry on indefinite and varied national and international programs? Those programs may be extraordinarily useful but how shall the individual community chest contributor ever be brought to a real appreciation of them if the fact of his own participation in them is rather carefully withheld? Of course most chests state they permit or encourage contributors to designate the agencies to which their money should go. Practically speaking however chest budget committees apportion all money raised according to such knowledge and prejudice as they may have.

It all comes down to this: We social workers are all engaged in raising money or in spending money contributed by the public for something we know a good deal more about than the contributors. We may encourage the public to take us on faith or we may insist on educating that public to a full sharing of the social responsibility with us. By all odds, the latter is the safer course, ultimately.

We may be getting by on slogans and catch phrases: What we need is a professional inventory, re-orientation, and confession of faith.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIPS OF PUBLIC POOR RELIEF IN PENNSYLVANIA SINCE 1875 AND INDICES OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS[1]

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AN EXAMINATION of the public poor relief statistics of Pennsylvania since 1875 is interesting from a number of angles. The present paper is concerned with only one of these, namely, the relationships found between various indices of business conditions and the poor relief series.

Fortunately for present purposes the same forms were used for 50 years for the annual reports of poor boards within the state. The present study has confined itself largely to three series of yearly figures: (1) Total outdoor relief expenditures; (2) total "almshouse" expenditures; (3) total number of "inmates" remaining in the almshouses at the end of the fiscal year.

In several parts of the state reasonably complete figures are available and have been used. Unfortunately figures for the entire state are not available, and a statewide analysis is impossible.

Treatment of the material involved the following stages.

(1) Compilation of the yearly figures by the smallest reporting organization, i.e., the individual poorhouse or the poor board.

(2) Combination of these small units into larger districts. Sometimes the logical district seemed to be a group of counties as of a farming and dairying region, at other times a single county, such as Allegheny.

(3) Deflation of dollar series so that amounts expended may be more adequately compared in terms of purchasing power.

(4) Wherever helpful a reduction of original figures to a per capita basis.

(5) Fitting of trends to the series. Calculation of deviations from trend lines in units of the standard deviation.

(6) Calculation of the coefficients of correlation of each dependency series with the index of general business conditions prepared by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.

(7) Compilation for the district of a local index of economic conditions. Few series covering such a long period of time are available for these small areas. The local series used are: For Philadelphia—bank clearings; for Allegheny County—steel production in the county; for the agricultural counties—(1) total production of principal crops in the state, and (2) deflated value of principal crops in the state; for the anthracite coal region—tonnage of anthracite coal in the state.

(8) Calculation of coefficients of correlation of each dependency series with the local business index.

Representative coefficients of correlation with probable errors are given in the accompanying tables. The very small coefficients are recorded to aid the reader in forming a comprehensive view of the relationships. Through a visual comparison of deviations from trends it was evident in many instances that no correlation existed and the coefficients were not computed.

How shall these correlations be interpreted? In considering this certain facts regarding the dependency series may be mentioned:

(1) Only yearly figures are available. Monthly or weekly series, with proper seasonal adjustments would show the degree of relationship between dependency series and economic series more clearly.

(2) The figures are subject to certain inaccuracies only partly eliminated through a study of each indi-

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[1] This paper reports on one phase of a comprehensive study of Pennsylvania public poor relief. The study was made possible through a grant from the Commonwealth Fund to the Public Charities Association of Pennsylvania.

TABLE I

Correlations of Poor Relief Series with Special Local Indices of Economic Conditions

District 1 (Philadelphia) with deflated Philadelphia Bank Clearings (1881–1925).

Outdoor Relief	−25. ±.09 (concurrent years)
Almshouse Expenditures	−.15 ±.11 (concurrent years)

District 3 (Anthracite Coal Region) with producition of Anthracite Coal.

	Concurrent years	*Relief lagged 1 year*	*Lagged 2 years*
Outdoor Relief	−.25 ±.09	−.15 ±.10	
Almshouse Inmates	+.05 ±.09		
Almshouse Expenditures	−.14 ±.10	−.22 ±.09	−.27 ±.09

District 4 (selected agricultural counties) with deflated value of crops.

	Concurrent years	*Relief lagged 1 year*	*Relief lagged 2 years*	*Relief lagged 3 years*
Outdoor relief	−.14 ±.09	−.43 ±.08	−.51 ±.07	−.22 ±.09
Almshouse inmates	−.14 ±.09			
Almshouse expenditures		−.23 ±.09		

District 5 (Allegheny County) with steel production of the county.

	Relief lagged 1 year	*Relief lagged 2 years*
Almshouse inmates	+.05 ±.12	+.08 ±.11

TABLE II

Correlations of Pennsylvania Public Poor Relief Indices with the Index of General Business Conditions Prepared by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company

	CONCURRENT YEARS	RELIEF LAGGED ONE YEAR	RELIEF LAGGED TWO YEARS	RELIEF LAGGED THREE YEARS
I. Outdoor Relief				
District 1	−.37 ±.09			
District 2	−.71 ±.05	−.30 ±.09	+.20 ±.10	
District 3	−.40 ±.07	−.43 ±.08	−.12 ±.08	
District 4	−.49 ±.07	−.56 ±.06	−.32 ±.09	−.12 ±.10
II. Almshouse Inmates				
District 2	−.46 ±.08	−.06 ±.10	+.10 ±.10	−.10 ±.10
District 3	−.30 ±.09	−.30 ±.09	−.12 ±.11	
District 5	−.16 ±.10			
III. Almshouse Expenditures				
District 1	−.33 ±.10			
District 2	−.45 ±.08	−.12 ±.10	+.13 ±.10	
District 3	−.47 ±.08	−.33 ±.09	−.32 ±.09	
District 4	−.31 ±.09			
District 5	−.35 ±.10	−.35 ±.10	−.22 ±.11	

(In general, the correlations shown are for the years 1877–1925, although in some cases a shorter period has been necessitated by the nature of the material.)

Table I indicates the type of region in each of the five districts given above.

The years covered in the above correlations are: *Outdoor Relief* District 1 (1881–1925); District 2 (1880–1925); District 3 (1879–1925); District 4 (1878–1925); District 5 (1878–1925); *Almshouse Inmates* District 2 (1878–1925); District 3 (1878–1927); *Almshouse Expenditures* District 1 (1878–1917); District 2 (1881–1925); District 3 (1879–1925); District 4 (1878–1925); District 5 (1878–1914).

vidual series and a canvassing of the available sources of information.

(3) In certain respects the series are inflexible. When the "almshouse" is crowded no further additions are made to the number of "inmates," even though the need be urgent. Funds for relief purposes do not readily expand to meet needs. Outdoor relief during the period under consideration was commonly administered through the standing grocery order. This device invites a thoughtless spending of available public funds on a few needy families and a failure to adjust expenditures to changing community needs.

(4) The series dealing with number of inmates is not strictly homogeneous. In the early years many children, insane, feeble-minded and middle aged persons are included. Special institutions have removed most of these. The present population is largely made up of aged, infirm persons.

Regarding the economic series certain facts are pertinent.

First, as to the series prepared by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company:

1. The composition of the series changed 8 times between 1877 and 1922.

2. Many statisticians thoroughly familiar with the series and with the great care used in its compilation are of the opinion that during the first two or three decades covered by the series it must be accepted as extremely rough approximation.

Second, as to the local economic series prepared in connection with this study:

1. The great lack of local economic series covering the fifty years makes these figures of limited importance. A deal of fishing brought a small haul.

2. Specific mention may be made of some of the series. Anthracite coal tonnage varies largely with the severity of the winter and even in the coal region many factors other than coal tonnage are involved in the prosperity of the local communities. Bank clearings have definite limitations as indicators of business conditions, as do the production and value of crops in an agricultural area. Steel production for the Pittsburgh region fails to take into account other industries which in increasing numbers have crowded into this region.

3. Probably these facts are largely responsible for the lower correlations found between local economic and dependency series than were obtained when local dependency series were compared with the general index prepared by the statisticians of the telephone company.

After due allowance for the deficiencies of the materials, however, certain conclusions may be drawn:

(1) There is a considerable degree of negative correlation shown for several of the series. Dependency swings up when business swings down.

(2) In general, correlation is highest for concurrent years though there are several exceptions. In these latter cases correlation is highest when the relief series is lagged one or two years after the economic series. In these instances the effects of depression show themselves after the depression has passed its peak.

(3) Highest correlations are shown for outdoor relief and lowest for number of almshouse inmates. If appears that in emergencies non-institutional relief was expanded.

(4) It is a painfully obvious fact that economic depressions cause widespread distress and force large numbers to seek public relief. It is perhaps surprising from this viewpoint that the correlations obtained in this study are not higher. The type of administration of poor relief funds would enter largely to prevent this. There was a tendency to keep expenditures on a dead level when economic conditions changed, and erratic shifts sometimes occurred when new officials took charge even though economic conditions were relatively stabilized.

THE COMMUNITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD

This department is conducted by The National Community Center Association, and is edited by LeRoy E. Bowman, Hudson View Gardens, 183rd Street and Pinehurst Avenue, New York City.

HOW THE DEVIL-WAGON CAME TO DEXTER

A STUDY OF DIFFUSIONAL CHANGE IN AN AMERICAN COMMUNITY

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CHANGES in culture may be classified as subtractive, additive, and diffusional. In any American community at any given time diffusional changes usually outnumber additive and subtractive changes. It is important, therefore, for sociologists to describe and analyze diffusional change and the conditions that control it. Group-to-group diffusion has been studied by the anthropologists, but primary, or intra-group, diffusion has not received the attention that it deserves.[1]

There are at least four ways of studying intra-group diffusion: We can observe the mechanics of diffusion, so to speak, i.e., the part played by the market, the school, the scientific society, the movies, the radio, etc.; we can take a cross-section of diffusion as it actually occurs in some community; we can trace a single trait from its inception to the present; or we can watch a single trait insinuate itself into some selected community. As illustrative of studies dealing with the mechanics of diffusion, the literature of advertising must be mentioned. But the market is only part of the story and other agencies of diffusion have not been studied in a similar way. The cross-sectional method was used by the Lynds in *Middletown*.[2] An interesting example of the third method was Mueller's attempt to trace the rise of the automobile complex.[3] The fourth point of view was used by the writer in a study of the intrusion of the automobile into the culture of a rural village from 1901 to 1910, inclusive.

The source used was the village weekly, the assumption being that a rural newspaper offered the most convenient and yet valid means of sampling the diffusion process in a small community over a period of years if the trait chosen possessed news value during the time in question. That the automobile had this attention-value from 1901 to 1910 there can be little doubt. For comparison a similar study was made of four issues of the same weekly from November 28 to December 19, 1929, inclusive. The weekly chosen was the *Dexter Leader*, which was published in a village of less than 1,000 population near Ann Arbor, Michigan, and had remained under

[1] For descriptions of group-to-group diffusion see Earl Edward Muntz, *Race Contact*, p. 3 ff.; Roland B. Dixon, *The Building of Cultures*, Ch. IV; Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture*, etc.

[2] Robert S. and Helen Merrill Lynd.

[3] John Henry Mueller, *The Automobile, a Sociological Study*, University of Chicago doctoral dissertation, 1928.

the same owner and editor throughout the period.[4] The facts revealed may be summarized under three heads: (1) Statistical evidence of diffusion; (2) The evolution of the diffusion process; and (3) Individual and social readjustments to the new culture trait.

STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF DIFFUSION

During the ten years, 1901–10, there were 408 references of all kinds to the automobile in the *Leader*. In 1929 there were 74 in the four issues analyzed, or an estimated total of 962 for the year. In one year, in other words, after diffusion had presumably been completed there were more than twice as many references to the trait as there had been in the entire ten years of incomplete diffusion. During those ten years the number of references per issue increased from 0.31, in 1901, to 1.75, in 1910. In other words, the number of references per issue multiplied 5.6 times in ten years. In 1929 the average per issue was 18.5, or *59.7 times* the 1901 average.

TABLE I

INTRUSION OF THE AUTOMOBILE AS MEASURED BY DISTANCE FROM DEXTER AND BY THE PERCENTAGE OF REFERENCES TO DEXTER

YEAR	AVERAGE ESTIMATED DISTANCE OF EVENT FROM DEXTER	PERCENTAGE OF REFERENCES TO AUTOMOBILE IN DEXTER COMMUNITY
	miles	*per cent*
1901	2,612.6	0.0
1910	111.8	18.7
1929	76.3	62.5

During the ten years of incomplete diffusion the average distance involved in each reference decreased year by year and the percentage of references relating to the Dexter community increased, and these tendencies were equally apparent after diffusion had been completed. The trends are shown in Table I.

Analysis of the quality of the references from year to year shows a distinct change from 1901 to 1910 and another change from 1910 to 1929. In 1901, Dexter was still indifferent to the auto. It was something of a scientific curiosity and a plaything of the far-away rich. From 1902 to 1905, ridicule and opposition dominated the tone of the references. Of the 50 editorial comments during these years, not one favored the automobile, only six were neutral, and 44 were distinctly hostile. Of the 70 other references, 26 had to do with speed or accidents, and only 14 with what might be called business or normal use of the automobile. Apparently there was a widespread fear in the Dexter region at this time that the automobile was escaping social control and mixed with this fear was not a little envy on the part of the farmers who sensed the automobile as a symbol of urban superiority.

With the passage of the state registration act in 1905 and with the enactment of speed ordinances, etc., in the years that followed, the fear element disappeared, but rural resentment was slower to die away for we still find evidences of it in 1909 and in 1910 despite the fact that young farmers near Dexter had begun to buy machines.

Between 1910 and 1929 the interest-value of the automobile as measured by references in the weekly newspaper changed. In 1910 91 per cent of the refer-

[4] Dexter, which in 1900 had a population of 984 and in 1910 of 897, is located nine miles northwest of Ann Arbor and about forty-six miles west of Detroit, which by 1910 had already become the automobile manufacturing center of the United States. The *Leader* from 1901 on down to and including 1929 was the property of Mr. John O. Thompson, whose kindness in placing his files at my disposal made the present study possible. The state and national news in the *Leader* came from the Western Newspaper Union in plate form. In 1905 the *Leader's* estimated circulation was 600.

ences were in news stories and only 9 per cent in advertisements. In 1929 the proportions were exactly reversed—91 per cent of the references were now in the advertisements and only 9 per cent in the news. Thus we have a rough measure of the acceptance of the automobile by the Dexter community. In 1910 when a person traveled by automobile the fact was news; in 1929 the type of vehicle was taken for granted—guests at a charivari party, for example, merely announced their arrival "by honking horns." From stage; (4) the advertising stage; and (5) the indirect-aid stage.

1. The symbolical stage began with the publication of the news of the Chicago-Waukegon races in November, 1895. For years after that event the automobile was known to most people only through words and pictures. A few Dexterites may have seen machines from time to time in near-by cities, but the first mention of an automobile actually operated in Dexter occurs in May, 1907, when a young Dexter physician purchased a machine. This was

TABLE II

408 References to the Automobile in the *Dexter Leader*, 1901–1910, Inclusive, Classified by Type

YEAR	NORMAL SPECIFIC CASES	RACING	ACCIDENTS	BACKGROUND FACTS	INVENTION	EDITORIALS			BUSINESS	SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS	TOTAL
						Against	Neutral	For			
1901	2	0	0	11	1	0	0	0	2	0	16
1902	1	0	1	4	4	8	0	0	0	0	17
1903	1	5	1	4	0	10	0	0	2	2	25
1904	2	1	10	6	2	9	3	0	2	1	36
1905	0	4	4	3	0	17	3	0	6	5	42
1906	1	3	5	6	0	7	2	2	1	4	31
1907	8	1	9	7	0	2	0	3	4	6	40
1908	3	3	14	11	1	3	2	2	2	3	44
1909	6	4	14	10	3	3	0	3	9*	14	66
1910	11	5	13	14	2	2	0	2	24*	18	91
	35	26	71	76	13	61	10	12	52	53	408

* Includes three references in 1909 and 10 in 1910 which occurred in advertisements.

being a subject of news the automobile had now become an article of commerce.

The story of the change in public interest from mere curiosity to hostility and fear and finally to acceptance and appreciation of business possibilities is suggested by the changing emphasis year by year in the various columns of Table II.

EVOLUTION OF THE DIFFUSION PROCESS

Diffusion of the automobile in Dexter has been marked by five distinct stages: (1) the symbolical stage; (2) the incidental demonstration stage; (3) the local sales about eleven and a half years after the Chicago-Waukegon races and about seven years after the first real automobile reached Middletown.

2. The incidental demonstration stage began with the arrival of this first machine in Dexter. All and sundry could now see that the thing would run—most of the time.

3. The local sales stage of diffusion appeared when a local resident in August of that year took the Dexter agency for the Jackson car. From that point on somebody in Dexter has always had a

pecuniary interest in pushing the new culture trait on his neighbors.

4. The advertising stage begins in 1909 when the Maxwell-Briscoe-McLeod company of Detroit offered a 1909 Maxwell runabout free to anyone in eight counties sending in the names of "ten prospective buyers, the largest number of whom above three actually purchase cars from May 15 to July 15."

5. The indirect-aid stage did not begin until after our study closed in 1910. Garages, tire shops, filling stations and the other indirect aids that the automobile complex eventually evolved had not yet appeared in Dexter at that time.

COMMUNITY READJUSTMENTS

Perhaps the simplest way to portray the readjustment processes set going by the intrusion of the automobile will be to abstract a few of the references that appeared in the *Leader* between 1901 and 1910.

1901

Item No. 6: June 6—Labor trouble reported at the Olds Motor Works in Detroit.

Number of references that year, 16. *Tone* of references, neutral or indifferent.

1902

Item 20: June 19—"Merritt C. McNeil, a senior engineering student, has constructed the finest automobile in Ann Arbor. . . . . The machine is propelled by gasoline."

Item 28: Sept. 11—"The world at large hangs very little crepe on its door for the scorchobolist who parts company with life at an 80-miles-an-hour gait."

Item 33: Nov. 6—"Another person has been killed by a devil-wagon. Fortunately it was only the chauffeur."

Number of references during year, 17. *Tone* of references, sneering or belittling in eight of the seventeen cases.

1903

Item 37: Feb. 19—"Automobiles are to be used in transporting the mail. All that the public has to provide is good roads."

Item 47: Aug. 27—The supervisors of Bay county, Michigan, have limited speed on country roads to twenty miles an hour.

Item 52: Sept. 10—"A Crow chief has discarded the tomahawk for an automobile. The cunning old murderer!"

Number of references during year, 25. *Tone:* In ten of the twenty-five, ridicule or opposition.

1904

Item 66: May 19—Battle Creek "claims to have the largest number of automobiles per capita of any city of its size in the United States." *Comment:* Evidence of pride in auto ownership.

Item 71: July 28—"With an automobile case going to the supreme court it looks as if a few precedents might get run over."

Number of references during year, 36. *Tone:* Inclined to emphasize need of social control; nine of the thirty-six distinctly hostile.

1905

Item 96: Jan. 12—Governor Warner in his first message to the legislature urges passage of a law regulating automobile traffic in rural districts.

Item 98: Jan. 19—"Representative Holmes of Gratiot introduced a bill to provide for the state registration of motor vehicles and drivers." *Comment:* This bill became a law on June 15 and marked the evolution of readjustment beyond abuse and ridicule to the use of law as a means of control.

Item 110: June 29—The largest harness manufactory in southwestern Michigan closes. Autos and trolley lines have ruined business. *Comment:* The actual turn in the tide of the horse culture generally did not come until several years later.

Item 121: Sept. 21—An impressionistic description of an automobile race from the chauffeur's point of view. *Comment:* The first attempt in the local weekly to lead the reader to identify himself with the man behind the wheel.

Item 135: Dec. 14—Description of the first "automobile," the steam car built by Joseph Cugnot in France in 1769. *Comment:* First evidence of any historical interest in the new culture trait.

Number of references during year, 42. *Tone:* News columns more sympathetic. Seventeen out of twenty editorial references hostile.

1906

Item 143: March 1—An explanation of the law of the road: As in the case of traction engines, drivers of horses have the greater right and the autoist must stop if signaled and wait till danger is past. *Comment:* Evidence of the strain for readjustment.

Item 163: Oct. 18—The secretary of state asks police departments to check up on unlicensed autos.

Item 167: Dec. 20—"The auto is winning its way everywhere," etc.

Number of references during year, 31. *Tone:* More friendly. Fear element less prominent.

1907

Item 168: Jan. 10—Governor urges construction of good roads.

Item 170: May 2—Dr. X of Dexter buys a Ford runabout "which he will have in about two weeks." *Comment:* First reference to an automobile owned in Dexter. There were four references to Dr. X and his runabout during the summer.

Item 178: May 30—Another Dexter resident buys an auto which arrives accompanied by an expert mechanic.

Item 182: July 18—"When you leave your team at the roadside, please remember that the auto driver is not responsible for damage," etc.

Item 183: July 18—"Automobilists near Ypsilanti have offered a reward of $75 for information as to who placed three pieces of wood filled with nails and covered with straw on the south Ann Arbor road." *Comment:* Evidence of rural hostility.

Item 187: Aug. 8—The first auto agency is opened in the village—with the cordial endorsement of the editor.

Item 194: Sept. 12—An autoist who refuses to give a ride to a member of an official party visiting the Jamestown exposition but temporarily marooned along a country road is referred to as "uncivil." *Comment:* The incivility in refusing a ride to a perfect stranger on a country road reflects the horse and buggy mores of rural America.

Item 201: Nov. 21—Dr. X's auto destroyed by fire on a country road near Ann Arbor during his absence. Someone heaped hay and grass around the disabled machine and set it afire. The act was apparently directed at the auto, not Dr. X.

Number of references during year, 40. *Tone:* Paper becoming friendly, but news columns continue to reflect the hostility of the farmers.

1908

Item 209: Feb. 27—New York has a pound for autos left unattended.

Item 219: June 11—A long red car enables the heroine of a syndicated bit of fiction to elope successfully. *Comment:* First appearance of the auto among the stage properties of *Leader* fiction. If there is such a thing as cultural distance, i.e., a feeling of alienation from a culture trait, the imaginative use of that trait in fiction might be expected to decrease it.

Item 240: Oct. 29—The Republican candidate for state representative appeals to his constituents in a half column letter to the editor, asking them to remember that if he failed to make good his campaign promises of 1906 to double the size of auto license plates and make a third violation of the law cost an auto owner his license it was because of the Detroit automobile lobby. He reminds them that he did get the state law amended so as to require license plates in front as well as in the rear of automobiles.

Item 241: Nov. 19—"The remedy for reckless driving must come from the influence of automobilists themselves." *Comment:* First explicit recognition of the social reliability of auto owners.

Number of references during year, 44. *Tone:* Editorials now distinctly favorable. New columns still show evidence of rural hostility.

1909

Item 262: April 29—A Lima township farmer near Dexter buy s a Jackson automobile, i.e., one of the machines handled by the Dexter agent.

Item 266: May 13—The first automobile advertisement appears in the *Leader*, the Maxwell-Briscoe-McLeod advertisement referred to above.

Item 275: June 10—The Dexter postmaster buys an "Oakland surrey." *Comment:* "Surrey" is plainly an example of cultural lag.

Item 280: July 15—"Millions in Motors," in other words, Cadillac Motor Car company stockholders have doubled their money on a capitalization of $1,500,000 in a sale to General Motors. *Comment:* As a source of impressive profits the automobile was beginning its march to respectability and prestige.

Item 286: July 29—"The street commissioner in Flint has chopped down every hitching post in the center of the city." *Comment:* The strain for consistency in the mores.

Item 294: Aug. 12—A three-year-old Dexter child is snatched from a delivery wagon as the horse runs away at sight of an auto.

Item 297: Sept. 2—Washtenaw county auto owners form an automobile club.

Item 308: Oct. 21—A rural mail carrier from a near-by village in a demonstration test covers his route, delivering 500 pieces of mail at 86 mail boxes in one hour and forty-five minutes. *Comment:* This was one of many similar items in 1909 and 1910 tending to prove the practical usefulness of the automobile, i.e., helping to break down the old stereotype of the automobile as a plaything of the rich.

Number of references during year, 66. *Tone:* Some hostility still evident among farmers, but more

of the references were tending to emphasize the practical value of the automobile and the growth of the motor industry.

1910

Item 320: March 24—The Reo Motor Car company of Lansing advertises in the *Leader* for "lathe, milling machine and drill press men, assemblers, rough-stuff and varnish rubbers and painters. Good wages and steady work. *Comment:* Already under way was the redistribution of population which between 1900 and 1930 was to decrease the population of many Michigan counties while the five automobile cities, Detroit, Flint, Jackson, Lansing and Pontiac, were multiplying their aggregate population by five.

Item 326: April 28—"This is the age of the automobile," etc., etc. *Comment:* The auto is now established and it is the horse that requires defense.

Item 342: June 23—Three young farmers near Dexter are named as auto buyers.

Item 343: July 7—A village in an adjoining county limits speed to eight miles an hour. *Comment:* Another example of cultural lag.

Item 357: July 27—The first automobile collision in Dexter. Nobody seriously hurt.

Item 360: July 28—Near-by village claims to have 16 autos. *Comment:* Even the rural villages are now preening themselves on their per capita auto ownership statistics. There were at least 15 autos owned in and near Dexter by the end of 1910.

Item 368: Aug. 11—"Slump in Auto Business" announces on New York authority that "the bottom seems to have fallen out of the automobile business" and that prices will probably drop 25 to 30 per cent in two or three months. "Farmers and small town people have not taken as kindly to the auto as had been expected." *Comment:* The rural editor felt no compulsion to preserve the prosperity myth at this time.

Item 389: Sept. 29—Highwaymen near San Antonio, Texas, hold up an auto, rob the occupants, then escape in the machine. *Comment:* First mention in the *Leader* of the use of an automobile in the commission of a crime.

Item 402: Nov. 3—"An Apologetic Change of Mind" captions the picture of an auto passing a pedestrian. A humorous poem announces that the farmer isn't a rube any more—he drives a car! *Comment:* This seems to be a tacit acknowledgement that envy and a feeling of inferiority were important elements in rural hostility to the automobile. *With a machine* the farmer is just as good as a city man.

Number of references during year, 91. *Tone:* Factual and favorable. Nine cars have been purchased in or near the village during the year. Rural opposition is weakening. Between the lines one senses tremendous readjustments under way—shifts in population; new problems in industry, crime-control, highway transportion. All along the line the old horse culture is creaking audibly under the strain of readjusting to the ex-devil-wagon.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The intrusion of a type trait such as the automobile can be studied indirectly through the columns of a village newspaper. During the thirty years, 1901–29, references to the automobile in the *Dexter Leader* increased more than 58 times, the average distance of reference decreased from 2,600 miles to 76, the percentage of local references increased from zero to more than 62, and interest in the automobile shifted from the news columns to the advertisements.

2. Five stages seem to have marked the diffusion process during this time: a symbolical stage; an incidental demonstration stage; a local sales stage; an advertising stage; and an indirect-aid stage.

3. Social readjustments to the new culture trait proceeded on three levels: a level of individual attitude and behavior; a level of interactive readjustment; and a level of cultural readjustment. Interactive readjustments included legislative debates, newspaper comments, etc. Cultural readjustments included the state licensing act, speed ordinances, the chopping down of the hitching posts in Flint, etc.

4. As an adjustive process public opinion seems to have passed from relative indifference to the automobile into a stage of emotional opposition and demand for social control; then to a more realistic appreciation of the new trait and gradual approval and acceptance. Diffusion seems

to have proceeded from the cities to the small towns, then to the villages, and finally to the farms.

5. Many evidences of cultural lag appear throughout the process. The most outstanding example was the hostility of the farmers, motivated apparently by fear, envy, and a feeling of rural inferiority.

RURAL PROBLEMS IN JAPAN

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INTEREST in rural social and socio-economic problems in Japan may be said to date largely from the post-war agricultural depression which was dramatized in Japan by thousands of tenant strikes.

One of the constructive leaders in devising ways of meeting the problems that arose was Dr. Shiroshi Nasu, Professor of Rural Economics, at the College of Agriculture of the Imperial University at Tokyo. His work on practical aspects of the problems of meeting the depression soon convinced him that economic and social problems were so closely related that the former could not be solved without an understanding of the latter. Professor Nasu, therefore, began teaching the first course ever offered in a Japanese institution under the head of Rural Sociology. The texts used were American but free use was made of German material as well. Professor Nasu began at once to create teaching material from Japanese sources, especially by using students for field surveys. In 1928 he received a grant from the Ohara Research Institute and began an intensive survey of 60 representative Japanese villages. These villages were carefully selected as representative of the four major areas of Japan proper, exclusive of Korea and Formosa. This investigation, while designed to meet Japanese conditions, is roughly comparable to the study of 140 representative farmers' towns surveyed by the Institute of Social and Religious Research in 1924–25 and resurveyed in 1930–31. The results, when available, will permit interesting comparisons on some points between the two countries. Indeed the tabulations of the first fourth of the villages, which Professor Nasu showed the writer in 1929, revealed a number of interesting similarities and some significant differences.[1]

The writer has come to believe as a result of his studies in rural Japan during the latter half of 1927 when he was privileged to have the coöperation of Professor Nasu and one of his students, Mr. Uzaki, that the rural leaders of the United States and Japan would mutually profit by a better understanding of the situation existing in the other's country.[2] Japan like the United States has changed from an agri-

[1] For instance, there was considerable similarity in the proportion of young people in high school, in the proportion of high school graduates going on to higher institutions of learning, in the proportion of the farm population connected with and contributing to some religious society and in the proportion of total income so expended.

[2] The advantages of this are better realized in Japan than in the United States. The writings of rural leaders in Japan, so far as observed by the writer, contain frequent allusions to and comparisons with conditions in the United States. Several standard books by American rural sociologists are carried in stock in the leading book stores in Tokyo. The writer was specifically requested in his report to the Japanese Government on rural social and economic conditions in Korea to make such comparisons and suggestions based on experience in the United States as might be applicable to Korea.

cultural to an urban and industrial economy within a relatively short space of time. In both countries the standard of living of the rural people has risen yet in both it has failed to keep pace with the urban. Both have suffered from an agricultural depression for the last ten years. In both certain similar legislature measures were proposed to assist agriculture.

Asked by the writer to state the most pressing problems of rural Japan, various high officials, at different times replied in almost identical terms, "The disparity between the prices received for farm produce and that paid by the farmer for his necessities; the high cost of rural credit, the high taxation, increasing tenancy and the exodus of rural people to the city." Truly these are familiar plaints.

Yet the social structure of rural Japan, the degree of social control, and the type of agriculture are significantly different from what exists in the United States though there are slight evidences that some of the changes that are occurring will lessen rather than accentuate those differences. How far will the similarities of the basic and largely economic problems of the two countries produce similar solutions and how far will these solutions be variously conditioned by a dissimilar environment? This question cannot be answered for some years but lends interest and value in our understanding what conditions are in rural Japan.

As one contribution toward such a better understanding the writer presents herewith a brief summary of Professor Nasu's first book on the social aspects of rural Japan,[3] entitled *Social Problems of Agricultural Villages in Japan*, (Tokyo, Japan, 1929). Since it is a summary and not a review it follows closely Professor Nasu's outline.[4]

It will be seen in his initial work on this subject Professor Nasu takes the problem approach that characterized the earlier work of American sociologists in this field. This approach he selects because the current mood in Japan is a feeling of oppression by serious socio-economic problems perhaps "more serious than those of any other (industrialized) nation in the world." But unlike many who follow the problem approach Professor Nasu, does not treat the rural situation as a thing apart. To him it is intimately interrelated with the whole social mileau of Japan. It overlaps as it were, the fields of economics, politics, education, and industry and is much affected by social tradition—a force of great power in Japan.

Professor Nasu after discussing certain American definitions of the rural community describes that in Japan "as an agricultural village in which a majority of farmers with a minority of others live together, sharing common interests and participating in the same annual events."

This definition can be used also as a dividing line between urban and rural but as is necessary in the United States in order to use census data, Professor Nasu accepts the government dividing line of 5,000 as the basis of separation between urban and rural municipalities. So divided the proportion of rural people in the total population has decreased from 67 to 44 per cent in the first quarter of the present century as is shown in Table I. This decline is closely parallel to that in the United States which went from 71 to 48 per cent between 1880 and 1920.

[3] Prof. Nasu is probably best know in this country for his book on population problems in which field he is an authority. His English writings on this subject are to be found in the published proceedings of the Institute of Pacific Relations and in the Harris Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago, *Population*, 1299.

[4] The writer desires at this point to acknowledge his indebtedness to Sung Soon Yoon, Teachers College, Columbia University, for translating this work.

The rapid decrease of the rural population in Japan like the frequently alleged decline in American villages is due in part to the decrease in communities of less than 5,000 people both through growth and various forms of consolidation. It does not mean that the number of farm homes has similarly decreased. On the contrary there has been a slight numerical increase although, as in most industrialized countries, the proportion of rural homes to the total has been declining, as Table II reveals.

TABLE I

Distribution of the Rural and Urban Population in Japan, 1898 to 1925

YEAR	RURAL POPULATION		URBAN POPULATION		TOTAL	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
1898	30,491,513	67.44	14,911,528	32.56	45,503,041	100.0
1903	29,903,660	61.60	18,639,076	38.40	48,542,736	100.0
1908	28,107,709	54.32	23,634,813	45.68	51,742,522	100.0
1913	27,802,064	50.44	27,339,206	49.56	55,141,270	100.0
1918	27,070,684	46.60	31,016,593	53.40	58,087,277	100.0
1920	27,105,756	48.43	28,857,298	51.57	55,963,054	100.0
1925	26,413,316	44.21	32,323,506	55.79	59,736,822	100.0

TABLE II

The Number of Farmers' Homes in Japan, 1904–1925

YEAR	NUMBER OF FARMER'S HOMES	PERCENTAGE AGAINST THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HOMES
1904	5,416,703	64.4
1908	5,408,363	60.3
1913	5,527,188	57.6
1918	5,561,053	54.3
1920	5,573,097	52.7
1925	5,548,599	49.3

This stabilization of the farm population does not mean that rural life is completely satisfying. As in the United States there is and has been a steady and large flow of population from the rural districts to town and city. Therefore, according to Professor Nasu, the most needed thing in country life seems to be socialization. This expression recognizes that, when measured by the demands of the present, rural communities are backward. In other words, the homes and schools are not adequate in keeping pace with the changing society of to-day. The young people and the older do not find ample and satisfying culture, amusement, and recreation in their life. The socialization of rural life has become the main social problem in Japan at present.

The significance in the two tables presented above lies in the rapid increase in total population in the face of a practically stationary farm population.

This increase is a new thing in Japan and dates from the Meaji Restoration in 1868 which marked the change from the feudal system to a centralized modern government. For 300 years prior to that time the population of Japan remained practically stationary, fluctuating between 28,000,000 and 33,000,000. The nation at that time was adhering strictly to its policy of isolation. Economically she was self-supporting, and the whole population subsisted on the native food supply. However, within the sixty-year period since the Restoration, the population has jumped from 33,000,000 to 60,000,000. In

order to meet such a desperate situation, the problems of food supply, industry, and communication have become more and more inter-related and pressing.

This increase in population has created real problems in feeding the Japanese nation. By earnest efforts, both the area of cultivated land and the production per unit of area have been increased. The increase from 1880 to 1925 was from nearly 11 to nearly 15 million cho.[5] This has been a real achievement in an area as mountainous as Japan where at best less than one-fifth of the total area is even potentially arable, and in a land where agriculture has always been on an intensive basis. But even so Japan is no longer self-supporting either as to food or other agricultural products. She now imports annually some 4,000,000 koku of rice (20,000,000 bushels) from Korea and Formosa and as much more from foreign countries, including some from the United States. This trend is likely to continue at an increasing rate. Thus the industrialization of Japan, despite the material progress which it has brought, has made her a food-importing nation.[6] She also imports annually from 15 to 25 million bushels of wheat as well as millet from Manchuria and other products in lesser volume.

The fact that Japan, with an area one-twentieth of that of the United States is able so nearly to support a population of over 60,000,000 is due to a number of factors, chief of which perhaps is the extremely intensive type of agriculture. Half the farms are so tiny as to tax the credulity of Americans or Europeans. The 5,500,000 farmers of Japan till on the average only one cho (2.45 acres).[7]

There seem to be no signs that the increase in population and the consequent pressure on food supply will be checked in the near future, Table III shows the increase per 1,000 has been steadily rising. This fact as Professor Nasu points out has large political implications and is compelling some Japanese thinkers to base their immigration policy upon the right of national existence.

TABLE III

The Increase of Population with the Birth-rate and Death-rate

Period	Births per 1,000	Deaths per 1,000	Increase per 1,000
1874–78	25.3	18.4	6.9
1879–83	25.2	18.3	6.9
1884–88	27.4	20.9	6.5
1889–93	28.6	21.2	7.5
1894–98	30.2	20.5	9.7
1899–1903	32.2	20.5	11.7
1904–08	31.2	20.5	10.7
1909–13	33.7	20.5	13.4
1914–18	32.6	22.0	10.6
1919–23	34.4	23.2	11.2
1924	33.8	21.2	12.6
1925	34.9	20.3	14.7
1926	34.7	19.2	15.3

The problems of surplus population naturally bring the question of utilization of natural resources. To be sure, the utilization of natural resources in Japan

[5] A cho equals 2.45 acres or one hectare.

[6] This fact in the opinion of the writer is one of the reasons for the agricultural depression that has gripped Japan. Her farmers must now compete on a world market against the lower cost products of China and other nations. Her silk-cocoon industry, which is a most important source of supplemental income for many farmers and the chief product in some areas, has also had to face competition from other lands and from rayon, as well as decreased demand due to the world depression.

[7] This fact in itself seems to the writer of considerable importance in understanding Japanese rural life. To support a family on two and one half acres or less and still raise something for marketing is an amazing feat but it is becoming increasingly difficult to do this under modern conditions. This again is one factor in the depression.

probably has not reached the maximum point; but it is also true that it has come very close to the limit of the utilization attainable with the present store of scientific knowledge.

In order to improve the rural communities, the establishment of a consistent national land-settlement policy should have for its aim the more efficient and most effective utilization of the agricultural domain and natural resources in behalf not only of those serving in the various capacities as producers, but in consideration of the rights and welfare of all the citizens of the nation. In particular, a land-settlement policy would seek to give bona fide farmers a chance to own and work a farm and those desiring to be farmers opportunity for access to the land.

After dwelling upon the difficulties of obtaining an adequate livelihood in agricultural villages in Japan for some of the reasons already noted especially in the footnotes in this article and because of the scarcity and simplicity of rural industries, Professor Nasu turns to one of Japan's most pressing rural problems, that of farm tenancy.

The traditional tenant system in Japan has become a sore problem, which should be solved sooner or later. There have been a considerable number of troubles and disputes arising increasingly in the tenant farms. As a matter of fact, it menaces not only the tenants and land-owners but the whole community of the agricultural village itself. The balance of power has gradually been lost, and, as a sequence, it brings several changes of economic life. The class feeling between the tenants and the landlords is growing worse and worse. This desperate situation with the similar problems of food-supply and utilization of natural resources menaces the whole structure of society. The causes of these difficulties in the agricultural villages are not limited within the boundary of the village circle alone, but influenced by the whole problem of the national system of economy and social life at large.[8]

Japan seems to have come to a turning point in her history. The real significance of the recent unrest of society, that is, the social movement among tenants and industrial laborers which has become very significant of late, can be understood only in the light of all the facts in the national situation as a background. This social unrest is the revelation, either conscious or unconscious, of the desire to expand the productive power of the national economy which has just about come to a standstill, and, incidently, as an expression of the mass instinct for living, to find therein the only way to self-preservation.

The course of this unrest cannot be said to be entirely free from the influences of the various currents of thought or the theories, in the wider world, such as, for instance, Marxian theories, nor can it be denied that it is partly due to peoples ever becoming keener to the ideals of social justice and democracy; but the real driving power behind the social movements which have gained momentum so suddenly in recent years seems to be the disparity between Japanese population and the opportunities for employment. The natural resources have been utilized almost

[8] There have been well over 10,000 tenant strikes in Japan in the last decade. In some years the number reached over 2,000. Tenant unions have been formed. The owners have also organized and when the writer was in Japan there were several thousand Reconciliations Unions that provided a platform for owners and tenants to talk over their differences and settle them peacefully. In some instances, however, there was considerable violence. Perhaps nowhere in the world have the farmers reacted to the depression as forcefully as in Japan.

to the utmost extent possible under the existing economic regime, and it will be well-nigh impossible to support any added population; therefore, the fundamental motive behind the social movement is to reconstruct the present economic system so as to be able to improve the utilization of natural sources, to raise the efficiency of labor, and to effect a more equitable division of wealth. It aims to remove every artificial barrier relating to the utilization of natural resources, and also to reduce to a minimum the unemployment which is the creation of the modern capitalistic system.

In a closing section Professor Nasu makes some suggestions for improving conditions. He calls for further studies of rural communities and their organization.

1. The tenant should be made secure in the results of his improvements on soil or farm equipment. At the same time, short tenure should be lengthened.

2. In order to increase the productive capacity of a nation it is necessary to exercise a rather thorough social regulation of the use of land. Any artificial obstacle to the development of land—whether it be for agriculture, forests, or mines—must be eliminated.

3. Technical, agricultural, and industrial education should be encouraged; it will increase national productive efficiency. Productive efficiency is very often curtailed by labor disputes, idleness, and frequent unemployment. "We must direct present society toward the point of maximum productiveness which is compatible with social justice and stability."

4. A reorganization of the capitalistic economic system and the abandonment of the imperialistic policy should be made.

5. The two extremes of the traditional conservatism and the modern distructionism should be eliminated. Schools, young men's or women's associations, farm banks, village industrial guilds and any other social organizations in rural communities should be considered and improved in the light of the farmers' conditions and their needs.

Since the above was written, two years ago, conditions in rural Japan have grown worse. The prices of both rice and silk have registered further sharp declines. Taxes are unpaid and hundreds of schools are threatened with discontinuance. The value of mortgaged farms has fallen below the value of the mortgages. Only heroic measures by the Hypothec Bank, aided by the government, have prevented widespread bank failures. Tenant strikes have increased. Delegations of farmers are besieging the provinces for relief and the government is considering many measures. The industrial depression has sent large numbers of urban unemployed back to their homes in the country where, under the family system, they have a right to food and shelter as long as the family has any. The rural situation is in large part responsible for the attitude of the army over against Manchuria and the home government. It is admitted to be Japan's most pressing domestic problem.

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

Contributions to this department will include original articles, reports of conferences, special investigations and research, and programs relating to marriage and the family. It is edited by Ernest R. Groves of the University of North Carolina, who would like to receive reports and copies of any material relating to the family and marriage.

ATTITUDE PATTERNS IN THE HOME-BUYING FAMILY

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SINCE long before the day one hundred and eight years ago when a nostalgic American expatriate indited the words of "Home Sweet Home"[1] to the occasion a few weeks ago when the President of the United States declared that, "to possess one's own home is the hope and ambition of almost every individual in our country" and affirmed, "that our people should live in their own homes is a sentiment deep in the heart of our race and of American life,"[2] the single dwelling, owned by the family living in it, has occupied a prominent place in the ideational patterns of America.

EXTENT OF HOME OWNERSHIP

Nevertheless, home ownership as a practicable ideal is becoming daily less typical, more especially in the urban community. In 1925, Kaufmann and Wiles found that 232,624 out of 434,759 roomers and households in Detroit were occupying flats and apartments.[3] In 1928, the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics found that in 302 cities, only 36.1 per cent of the permits for residential building were issued in respect of one-family dwellings, with an additional ten per cent for two-family dwellings.[4] These data apply, be it noted, both to owned and rented dwellings. The proportion of families living in their own homes would be represented by but a fraction (whether large or small there is no means of knowing) of the single and double houses enumerated.

No recent tabulation of home ownership in the United States is known to the writer. As far back as 1920, however, the United States Census (Tables I and II) showed that for the country-at-large the number of households occupying rented quarters amounted to 54.3 per cent of the total, while for the urban communities—always remembering that the Census classification enumerates as "urban" communities of 2,500 inhabitants—the proportion of renters mounted to 62.6 per cent. In New York State, renting families made up 77.1 per cent of the total for urban communities, and 35.2 per cent for rural, while in Buffalo and New York City they constituted 61.4 per cent and 87.3 per cent respectively of the households in those places.

[1] G. Harrison—*The Life and Writings of John Howard Payne*, p. 90.

[2] H. Hoover—*Opening Address: President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership*. Washington, December 2, 1931, as reported in the *United States Daily*, December 4, 1931.

[3] H. J. Kaufmann and L. H. Wiles. *The 1925 Detroit City Census*. (Detroit Educational Bulletin, Research Bulletin No. 91, 1925.)

[4] United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. *Building Permits in the Principal Cities of the United States*. Washington, 1929, p. 3.

Individual home ownership thus appears to be far from general in the United States, and, in fact, to be quite exceptional in great metropolitan centers, notwithstanding its preeminence in the expressed sentiments and ideals of the American people.

One might, if opportunity afforded, descant at some length on this type illustration of the discrepancy between the rationalized culture attitude and culture behavior afforded by this phenomenon.[5]

ECONOMIC STATUS AND HOME OWNERSHIP

The obvious explanation for this decline in individual home ownership is economic.

TABLE I

PERCENTAGE OF HOMES OWNED AND RENTED, UNITED STATES, 1920*

TERRITORY	PERCENTAGE OWNED AND RENTED	
	Owned	Rented
United States	45.7	54.3
Urban Communities	37.4	62.6
Rural Communities	54.9	45.1

* Source—Fourteenth (1920) United States Census, II, 1302 ("Tenure Unknown" omitted from calculation).

Johnson and Williams, in a survey of cost-of-living studies undertaken for the Committee on Relationship of Income and the Home, of the President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, found that the most reliable recent estimate of annual earnings of "workers attached to certain industries mostly urban" was, for the year 1927, just under $1,500.00, and that for the wage-earners, who made up two-thirds of the group, the estimated annual earnings ranged from $1,202.00 to $2,470.00.[6] The same writers found that renters "predominated" in the "lower income groups," and that in one series of university faculty families "home ownership was not usual until the salary was $3,000 or over."[7]

Halbert, in a survey of semi-philanthropic housing schemes conducted for the same committee found very few such developments available to families with incomes of $1500.00 or less per annum, most of those that were available, moreover, being multiple family structures, in which individual ownership was out of the question, except under the elusive form of "cooperative apartment" ownership.[8] Furthermore, in a special study of 789 Buffalo native white home-buying families,

TABLE II

PERCENTAGE OF HOMES OWNED AND RENTED IN NEW YORK STATE AND IN TWO PRINCIPAL CITIES, 1920*

TERRITORY	PERCENTAGE OWNED AND RENTED	
	Owned	Rented
Urban Communities	22.9	77.1
Rural Communities	64.8	35.2
New York City	12.7	87.3
Buffalo	38.6	61.4

* Source—Fourteenth (1920) United States Census, II, 1288, 1302 ("Tenure Unknown" omitted from calculation).

[5] See D. Katz and N. Carpenter—*A Study of Acculturization in the Polish Group of Buffalo*, 1926–1928. University of Buffalo Studies, Monographs in Sociology, No. 3, 1929, p. 123.

[6] E. Johnson and F. Williams—"Review of Data on Income Distribution and Family Expenditures for Housing and Home Ownership," in N. Carpenter et al., *Tentative Report of the Committee on Relation of Income and the Home.* (The President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, Washington, 1931), p. 36. The income estimates are those of W. I. King in *The National Income and its Purchasing Power* (National Bureau of Economic Research, Publication No. 15).

[7] Ibid., p. 42.

[8] B. Halbert. "Low-Cost Housing" in N. Carpenter et al.—*op. cit.*, pp. 25–34.

Brumbaugh found that, even after he had left out of account all families with incomes of $3,000 or more, only 38 had annual incomes that fell below $1,250 at the time the purchase was made.[9]

ATTITUDES AFFECTING HOME OWNERSHIP

Nevertheless, the concurrence of low incomes and high housing costs does not by any means account for the total number of renting, as contrasted with owning, families. On the one hand, there are families with incomes of less than $1,000 a year who are buying homes.[10] On the other hand, families whose incomes run into the tens of thousands yearly can be found in any large city, living continuously in rented quarters. Obviously the attitude as well as the economic status of the family requires to be taken into account.

SETTLEMENT VERSUS LODGEMENT

To discover the nature of these attitudes and to account for them is no easy task, since they involve virtually the entire repertory of individual and group behavior patterns in contemporary society. Two configurations may, however, be identified as figuring prominently in the total constallation of attitudes. The first is the diminished value of the home as a locus of *settlement* as distinguished from mere *lodgement*. (The phraseology is McClenahan's.[11]) Undoubtedly the increased mobility of modern society—more particularly in its urbanized phases—lies at the root of this attitude. The literature of sociology is so filled with discussions of the shallow-rooted nature of family settlement in the present day that the point needs no further development here. Neither is it necessary to indicate the manner and the degree in which home-ownership is affected thereby.

What is not so obvious is the fact that, in the face of all these up-rooting tendencies there remain large numbers of families which still have a strong sense of settlement,—of attachment to a particular neighborhood and a particular dwelling-place,—and who devote a decade or more of pinching economy to satisfy such a sentiment. In other words, all things considered, the more significant phenomenon is not that most families are swept from their moorings in the tide of present day living, but that many of them remain firmly anchored, essentially as have their ancestors. Thus McClenahan finds that home-owing families have a greater sense of obligation toward their neighborhood than do renters, and that they show a strong tendency to identify their own welfare with that of the locus of their occupancy.[12]

To seek out the factors underlying the presence in certain families of this persistently abiding hankering for one fixed and exclusively possessed place of abode is an occupation that is as fascinating as it is fruitless, with the limited amount of data and the incomplete knowledge of the springs of human behavior that are now available to the student. The probabilities are that factors of "racial," regional, and family tradition are of great signifi-

[9] M. Brumbaugh. "The Buffalo Home Ownership Study—Summary" in N. Carpenter et al.—*op. cit.*, p. 20.

[10] Brumbaugh found three such families, besides three more who had "no income" at the time their home was purchased. See M. A. Brumbaugh. *The Buffalo Home Ownership Study*, (mimeographed). Appendix to *Report of the Committee on Relation of Income and the Home*—The President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership. Washington, 1931, p. 65.

[11] B. A. McClenahan. *The Changing Urban Neighborhood*. University of Southern California Studies, Social Science Series No. 1. Los Angeles, 1929, 38–39; 39; 98–99.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 72.

cance; while probably of even greater moment are the infantile and childhood experiences—both pleasurable and painful—of the individuals composing these family groups. (Witness the young woman whose dominant ambition is to buy back the family homestead which her father has recently sold, because all her happy childhood seems to be preserved within its four walls; and in direct contrast, the young woman's father who, as a young married man bought that same house, after having moved "16 times in 18 years" as a boy, having derived from that experience an over-mastering urge to acquire a feeling of locational permanency through the medium of home-ownership.)

FAMILIAL SOLIDARITY

The second set of attitude patterns characterizing the home-buying family may be denominated familial solidarity. It is indicated in Brumbaugh's Home Ownership Study, and in a special case study which the writer, in collaboration with his colleague, Professor Thomas Neill, made as a follow-up of the other study.

Brumbaugh found that a sharp and significant alteration in the family's expenditures followed its decision to purchase a home. He found that there was a marked *increase* of expenditures for household furnishing and household equipment, and marked *decrease* in expenditures for recreation and vacations, clothing, books and magazines. Expenditures for education and life insurance remained about stationary. A distinct pattern of expenditures is indicated here, and an equally clear-cut attitude pattern is betokened by it: *expenditures on the household and its family as a unit are increased or are not materially decreased; expenditures for individualist satisfactions are decreased.* (Table III.)

Since none of these families had an annual income in excess of $3000 at the time its home was purchased and therefore had to weight carefully the pro's and con's of of every considerable expenditure, these changes in spending patterns may be taken as symptomatic of a clear-cut and consistent tendency to give preference to the family-as-a-group in contradistinction to its individual members.

In making a detailed case study of ten of these same low-income home-buying families, the writer found even more definite evidence of the presence of these attitude patterns.

TABLE III

EXCESS OF DECREASES OVER INCREASES IN 13 EXPENDITURE ITEMS FOR 789 BUFFALO HOME-BUYING FAMILIES*

ITEM	EXCESS
Savings other than investment in home	509
Moving picture theaters	283
Other theaters	272
Clothes	262
Vacations and trips	203
Books	161
Magazines	119
Automobile	68
Paid household help	56
Life insurance	24
Education	24
Household furnishings	*322* (excess of increases)
Household equipment	*403* (excess of increases)

* Calculated from M. A. Brumbaugh: *The Buffalo Home Ownership Study* (mimeographed) Appendix to *Report of the Committee on Relation of Income and the Home*—The President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, Washington, 1931, p. 35.

Family 1415, for example, (Table IV) purchased what was little more than a three-room shack, in 1918. Year after year, the father has worked on the house, repairing, enlarging, equipping. A cellar has been dug; plumbing has been installed; a porch has been added. As much as

$1,700 has been put into the house in a single year. Twice heavy medical expenses have had to be met. Here is a family which has endured physical discomfort, hard work, and grinding poverty in order to acquire a very modest sort of home. Clearly, it could not and would not have been able to carry on if the satisfactions connoted in the words "home" and "family" had not rated very high in its scale of values.

Other families figuring in this case-study reveal similar tendencies. In virtually all of them the father devotes his spare time to work on the house, one school teacher spending much of his summer vacation in painting, papering, and the like. Three of the ten families have foregone the ownership of an automobile, although they belong to an income group that ordinarily has one. In five instances, clothing consumes less than one-tenth of the annual

TABLE IV

Approximate Budget of a Buffalo Home-buying Family, 1930

Family 1415

Father, mother, son and daughter of junior high school age
Occupation of father—house painter and interior decorator
Total earnings—$2,000
Total approximate budget—$1,957.96
House purchased in 1918
Original selling price—$1,050
Amount of down payment—$100

Details of Approximate Budget

Income	$2,000
Outgo	1,957.96

Percentage Distribution

Food	$800	41%
Clothing	250	13
Fuel and light	135	7
Furniture and Furnishings	30	2
Housing	262.96	13
Taxes	55	3
Upkeep	30	2
Insurance (property and furniture)	9	0.4
Repairs and improvements	15	0.7
Financing	153.96	7.9
Interest	(54.00)	(3)
Principal	(99.96)	(4.9)
Miscellaneous	480	24
Health	100	5
Life and accident insurance	115	6
Savings and investments	None	None
Charity	200	1
Transportation (car)	130	7
Education	90	5
Recreation	25	1

income, although Peixotto and Jeschian fix upon ten per cent as "normal" for a family on an $1800 income level, and upon eleven per cent, for a family on a $2400 level.[13] Again, though Peixotto and Jeschian figure recreation as accounting for five per cent of the normal $1800 budget, and seven per cent of the normal $2400 budget, the range for these ten families is from 0.7 per cent to 8 per cent with the median at 1.5 per cent.

As a group, expenditures for items from which satisfactions that are largely personal in nature are thus found to be cut down in these families to the end that the collective satisfactions involved in the common possession of their own homes can be secured.

One final comment may be made on this second configuration of attitudes in the home-buying family. It represents a cast of mind that flows contrary to the direction taken by most of the forces conditioning individual and group experience at the present time. To hark back to the phraseology of Herbert Spencer, the tendency nowadays is towards individuation, particularly in family life.[14] Moreover, such influences as advertising serve as powerful and insistent stimuli towards the expenditure of money on such individualistic goods and services as clothing, cosmetics, tobacco, travel, etc. In sum, to the extent that the decision to buy a home rests upon a highly developed sense of family solidarity, it is made against the grain of much that is typical in contemporary social life.

[13] J. B. Peixotto and O. A. Jeschian: *The Home Budget*, Berkeley, 1929. Johnson and Williams, in a mimeographed summary prepared for the Home Management Committee of the President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, cite six cost-of-living studies in which expenditures for clothing range from 8.3 per cent to 12.2 per cent. In four out of the six, the percentage is more than 10.

ADDENDUM

One important feature in the expenditures of the families included the studies both of Brumbaugh and the writer is not immediately germane to this paper, but should nevertheless be noted. It is the virtual cessation of savings (outside of life insurance) other than those embodied in the purchase of the home on the part of the home-buying family of moderate means. It is necessary to contemplate only for a moment the number of emergencies (child-birth, accident, illness, unemployment) requiring a substantial cash surplus to realize how parlous the financial situation of many such families must be.

[14] See R. M. MacIver: *Society, Its Structure and Changes*, p. 141.

THE TOURIST FAMILY

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MR. JEFFERSON WILLIAMSON in his interesting anecdotal history of *The American Hotel* states that there was throughout the nineteenth century "no such universality of touring and tripping and vacationing as there is today." The recent growth of hotels and auto camps may be used as a rough index to this increase in touring. Better class hotels in the United States increased both in number and in size during the past decade. According to data compiled by experts for a committee of hotel men, the number of better class hotels in this country increased 29 per cent from 1920 to 1929 and the number of rooms in these hotels increased 47 per cent.[1] The number of guests, however, increased less rapidly than the number of rooms with resulting competition for patronage and improvements in service.

The automobile tourist camp has developed with the rise of the automobile and automobile touring. Its housekeeping facilities have enabled many people to tour who would not otherwise be able to travel. Although accurate facts about the trend in this new variety of hotel are not available for the country as a whole, studies on the Pacific Coast, to which special attention is given in this paper, indicate that the trend during the past decade has been from the municipal tenting camp to the private cottage court.[2] Few cabins were available for tourists until 1924 and these were mostly shacks. In 1929 however a study of 714 auto camps in Western Oregon and Washington and in southwestern British Columbia showed that 551, or 77 per cent, were cabin camps with a total of 5,450 cottages. "Formerly people went into the auto camp game with little or no capital and as a last resort for a livelihood, but now it requires a certain amount of funds and a knowledge of the business to be successful."[3] As in the case of older types of transient habitats an increasing differentiation in the prices, physical equipment, and patronage of auto camps has taken place in response to demands from both laboring and business classes.

Although the country as a whole has experienced an increase in "touring and tripping" during the past decade, there are wide variations in the extent of travel in different geographic divisions, states and cities. Sectional variations in the types of habitats for travelers make accurate comparisons difficult. In proportion to its population more full time hotel guest rooms were reported by the 1930 Hotel Census for the Pacific division than for any other section of the country, but the Atlantic Coast divisions led the others in the relative number of part time or resort hotel guest rooms.[4] Although it is common knowledge among transcontinental tourists that motor camps with individual cabins for rent become more numerous and

[1] W. I. Hamilton, *Promoting New Hotels*, pp. 131–36.

[2] See Norman S. Hayner, "The Auto Camp as a New Type of Hotel," *Sociology and Social Research*, March-April, 1931, pp. 365–72 and "Auto Camps in the Evergreen Playground," *Social Forces*, December, 1930, pp. 256–66.

[3] Adapted from an unpublished paper by Mr. Leo T. Mott of the California State Division of Immigration and Housing. This Division, which has charge of auto camp inspection, had listed 1,634 auto camps in the unincorporated areas of the state by May 1, 1931. The law authorizing this inspection was prepared and sponsored by the California Camp Owners Association and was designed to retard the cheap camps.

elaborate as one travels westward, private houses with signs advertising "Rooms for Tourists" serve as roadside habitats in many parts of the East.

THE AUTO CAMP AS A FAMILY HABITAT

The patron is more likely to bring his family with him to an auto camp than to a hotel. In estimating the number of hotel guests on the basis of the number of rooms occupied hotel accountants add only 20 per cent for "double occupancy." This additional fifth is of course not entirely composed of families. In the absence of accurate nation wide data on the subject a Seattle[5] survey revealed that only 16 per cent of 10,961 hotel dwellers were living in family groups. In contrast, studies of auto campers in the Puget Sound region and in Southern California showed that more than 90 per cent were present in family groups. Corroborating these findings on the Pacific Coast is the conclusion from a survey of tourist camps in New Hampshire that the largest class of patrons was the family on tour.[6]

A cottage for transients duplicates the home situation more closely than a hotel room and is less expensive. The basis for charging in an auto camp is the bed rather than the number of persons in the party. A single cabin contains one bed; a double, two beds. The tourist is close to his car and baggage and his wife can prepare the meals at reasonable expense. The traveling man finds that he can stay in an auto camp with his wife for the same price that it would cost for himself alone in a hotel. The hotel on the other hand appeals to people who want comfort and do not wish to set a house to rights or cook their own meals.

In both auto camp and hotel the dominant type of family group is the couple without children. According to the Puget Sound studies mentioned above, which were made in the fall and spring, there were three times as many couples without as couples with children in the auto camps and there were two and one-half times as many childless families as families with children in the hotels.[7] In Southern California, where the investigation was made in the summer when children are out of school, the couples without children were only three-fifths more than those with.

[4] Number of reported guest rooms in hotels having 25 or more guest rooms 1929 per 1,000 population 1930.

GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	RATE FOR FULL TIME HOTELS*	RATE FOR PART TIME HOTELS*
Pacific	24.1	0.8
Mountain	15.6	1.7
East North Central	9.8	0.6
West North Central	9.3	0.3
Middle Atlantic	9.2	2.3
West South Central	7.0	0.15
New England	6.5	4.2
South Atlantic	5.9	1.8
East South Central	3.5	0.12

* The 1930 Hotel Census covers 15,577 hotels of which 13,328 are normally operating the entire year and 2,249 are of the resort type, operating from two to eight months of the year. Reports from 1,734 additional hotels having 25 or more guest rooms were either not received or were incomplete.

[5] In proportion to its population more full time hotel guest rooms were reported by the 1930 Hotel Census for Seattle than for any other city in the United States 250,000 and over. Seattle had 72 hotel rooms per thousand population. San Francisco came second with 62.

[6] "Good and Bad Tourist Camps," *Literary Digest*, Oct., 26, 1929, p. 30.

[7] For case studies of couples living as permanents in hotels both with and without children see pages 226 and 227 in the writer's article on "People Who Live in Hotels" in *The Survey* for May 15, 1928. Like travelers in a foreign country many of these couples have no roots in the local community. They are notoriously difficult to interest in such activities as filling out census blanks or supporting the Community Fund.

Some of these childless couples are married and some are not. One congenial camp owner who requires no registration told the investigator that his camp came in handy for many couples out for a good time. Completeness of registration is probably the best objective index to the moral character of an auto camp.[8] When asked why he did not include names in the registration another camp proprietor said, "I used to include the names, but the people kicked too much. Too many men come here with other men's wives." The fact that 31 out of 96 auto camps in the vicinity of Seattle do not require registration is very significant.

The studies cited above showed a proportion of children among auto campers about eight times as great as among hotel dwellers and about four-fifths as great as in the general population, but they also revealed more than twice as large a percentage of elderly people in the hotels[9] as in the auto camps. People with children seem to appreciate the economy and freedom of life in auto courts while the older folk seek the comfort and ease of the hotel home. Although the sanitary arrangements in cottages for transients frequently leave much to be desired, there is more likely to be an opportunity for children to play out-of-doors and there is no necessity that they stay "dressed up" as in a city hostelry. After the average trip of 250 to 300 miles children jump out of the car and are all over camp in a short time. The chance for spontaneous play in travel-worn clothing is especially desirable after being pent up during hours of driving.

The Southern California auto camps already mentioned seem to fall roughly into two main groups: (1) camps with a predominantly working class patronage in which the usual minimum charge for a five year old cabin is one dollar and (2) camps with a predominantly business class patronage in which the usual minimum charge for a two year old cabin is one dollar and a half.[10] Analysis of the schedules for these two types of auto courts revealed the fact that in proportion to numbers the laborers had twice as many families with children as the middle class group. Women traveled alone three times as frequently among the business folk as compared with the workers. That old tourist courts—and managers of better auto camps consider cabins obsolete that are five years old—tend to become cheap rent slums was suggested by the finding that there were relatively about four times as many permanents among the workers as among the business people.

THE FAMILY ON TOUR

Mobility has been defined as movement that involves a change in residence and fluidity as movement without change in residence.[11] Families vary in mobility from the stable family living permanently in one place to the migrant family;[12] and

[8] It is common knowledge that some of the so-called "legitimate" hotels located in city centers have the reputation for being "fast houses."

[9] People over sixty make up about the same percentage of the hotel dwellers in Seattle as of the general population.

[10] Although 102 auto courts were visited by students in the writer's class on The Family at the University of Southern California during August 1931, the schedules were complete and accurate for only 40 camps containing 516 cabins. On the day previous to visit the 27 working class courts accommodated 497 patrons and the 13 business class courts housed 319 guests.

[11] R. D. McKenzie, "The Scope of Human Ecology," *Publications* of the American Sociological Society, XX, 144, July, 1926.

[12] The following statements reveal contrasting attitudes of two boy members of migrant families:

(1) "We have a little gypsy in us, we all just love to travel and live in a tent. We get in a house and by golly, we can't live in a house, we all get sick."

in fluidity, from the family with a narrow geographical range to the tourist family.

The family at home lives according to a more or less established routine. There tends to be a schedule for work and play. When the family travels,[13] however, this routine is broken and habitual forms of behavior must be modified. Under these circumstances it is difficult if not impossible to maintain a fixed schedule. Novel situations necessitate changes in family customs which sometimes create restlessness and a feeling of insecurity.

At home each member of the organized or integrated family plays a rôle in the family interaction and this rôle is defined by the attitudes of the other members.[14] When the family is touring characteristic changes tend to occur in these rôles and in the relationships between the different members. When the man takes a vacation from work his wife frequently feels that she should have a vacation too, and as a result even in tourist camps the trend seems to be away from cooking and toward more "hotel service," i.e. having the beds made up in advance and the linen furnished. In the words of one auto camp owner an increasing number of his guests "don't carry a thing—only cigarettes" and those parties that do cook commonly "buy a little stuff for supper—'coffee and' for breakfast and away they go."

In the locality of permanent residence each member of the family has contacts outside of the home group which play a more or less important part in his life. On the tour these contacts are cut off and the family itself becomes the social world for each member. Life in the large commercial cabin camp located on an arterial auto route tends to be almost as transient and impersonal as in the "grand caravansery" of the metropolis.[15] One's neighbor is merely a noise. The resulting social self-sufficiency of the family group, especially when accentuated by travel fatigue, tends to place a strain on the family solidarity. On the other hand, the narrowness of interests within the family circle with its consequent conflict and boredom may be offset to some extent by the new sights and strange adventures jointly shared by all individuals in the party.

(2) "Mother, she likes to travel, so does Dad, but me I don't like it so much—get out in the desert and get a flat tire it's not so good."

From interviews included in a forthcoming study by Clarence Marsh Case, entitled "Folkways and Motorways."

See also Marion Hathway, "The Migrant Family and Social Agencies in Washington," *Social Forces*, IX, 232–35, Dec., 1930.

[13] The statements about the tourist family in these last three paragraphs are based on the writer's observations and interviews during the summer of 1931 while touring leisurely from Seattle to Mexico and return with his wife and two small children. Seventeen auto camps and one hotel were visited for periods ranging from one night to two weeks.

[14] See Ernest W. Burgess, "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *Family*, VII, 3–9, March, 1926.

[15] Human relations in the small cottage court located on a beach at an objective point for vacationing tend to be less formal and external and are analagous to those in the small resort hotel.

RACE, CULTURAL GROUPS, SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, program and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

WESTERN CULTURE[1] AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CHINA

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THE present article proposes some generalizations concerning the social changes which occur when economically disparate cultures meet. The problems are illustrated chiefly in connection with the meeting of Oriental and Occidental cultures in China. The social changes arising out of missionary activity are reserved for treatment elsewhere. It is believed that the cultural changes arising from this meeting of cultures are rather closely parallel to those which arise wherever Euro-American and Oriental cultures come into contact. The question is raised whether these generalizations may not also have some relevancy in connection with the arguments concerning diffusion and parallelism in the field of anthropology. It is evident that an adequate testing of such generalizations requires much time and labor. They are offered at present as tentative suggestions for study rather than as mature conclusions.

We may begin with the generalization that *human beings tend to desire and imitate that which has prestige for them*, i.e., those things which they admire, envy, or covet. The question then arises, why does a particular object, person, or mode of behavior have prestige for an individual or a group? Since man is basically a wanting-animal, we may say that he normally desires and accords prestige to that which promises to satisfy more of his wants more adequately than they are being satisfied in his present circumstances.

A poor person normally believes that a rich person is able to satisfy his wants more adequately than he himself. The poor man will, therefore, normally try to acquire more wealth and will use it in general in the ways in which the richer persons whom he knows use theirs. In other words, *wealth normally and almost universally has prestige for poverty*. This generalization is true for individuals, groups, and nations. The point is so obvious as to need little illustration, but we need only consider the changes that have taken place in the homes and habits of farmers and small town dwellers in the United States in recent years to be convinced that they have adopted the behavior forms of wealthier city dwellers wherever possible. The great majority of rural cultural innovations have emanated from the city, and the commodities involved are supplied by the city. While some qualifications are needed, the main fact is that the poor in either city or

[1] The word *culture* is used in its most inclusive sense as embracing all that is outside of "nature;" and the terms "culture trait," "culture pattern" and "culture complex" are used somewhat loosely.

country tend to take over the culture patterns of the rich, but the rich do not tend to take over the culture patterns of the poor. We praise the simplicity and beauty of rural life, but the behavior of our population indicates quite clearly that city culture has superior prestige for the country dweller. Reverting to our earlier formula, we may explain this by saying that the city seems to offer an opportunity for more varied and richer satisfaction of wants than does the country; and wealth offers more in this direction than poverty. That is to say, those culture traits and patterns which seem to any person or group to promise more varied and richer satisfaction of wants will tend to have prestige and to be adopted if possible. In general terms it may be stated, then, that *when two cultures meet, each will adopt culture traits and patterns from the other roughly in proportion to the prestige which the imitated culture possesses for the imitator*. This is, of course, subject to various factors of social inertia.

The assumption that wealth is the main source of prestige which causes imitation of culture needs more critical examination. It is evident that there are many sources of prestige in everyday life—wealth, power, skill, beauty, knowledge, courage, saintliness, age. Unless, however, these are associated with economic betterment, they are usually ineffectual. This does not imply any rigid economic determinism nor that particular acts are always mainly economic in motivation. Men strike out more or less blindly in the effort to satisfy their wants. Their behavior may or may not serve their ends effectively. Many courses of action may be open which would satisfy their wants as well as or better than those which are chosen. Sex and other drives may modify their conduct. What is asserted is that human behavior may be described in universal terms as motivated by the urge to satisfy wants, or to continue to function. The satisfaction of wants consists in *experience* in which *things* (sometimes animate) are always an important factor. Individual satisfactions may be sacrificed to group satisfactions, and economic ends may not be the immediately apparent ends; but in the large and in the long run, the desire for *things* which are necessary in the want-satisfying process is the driving human motive. Consequently, individuals and groups who possess things in abundance have prestige for the great majority of mankind in most circumstances.

If it is true that possessors have prestige and non-possessors lack it, certain important consequences will follow in cultural change in the Orient and in its relation to cultural change in the Occident. Large numbers of educated and influential Orientals and westerners are advocating the idea that future relations between East and West should be in the nature of cultural exchange—each adopting the best elements from the other. Missionary work, they say, has been invidious because missionaries have assumed the inferiority of the Oriental and the superiority of the Occidental. This attitude will be altered in the future, and there will be exchange missionaries just as we have exchange professors. We shall have an eclectic civilization compounded of elements taken from the whole earth. The East will take from the West some of the conveniences and amenities of life, but will reject its sordidness and its materialism; the West will take from the East its courtesy, its mutual aid, and its spiritual values.

What basis is there for the expectation that such a cultural exchange will take place? The simplest approach to this question is by way of material culture. We know that in the long-run trade means exchange. If the Orient buys from the

Occident, the Occident must buy from the Orient. In other words, on the material side, the cultural relations between East and West must in last analysis be on an exchange basis—although it is possible to have an accumulating balance on one side or the other over a very long period. Does this fact of mutual exchange mean equality of cultural exchange?

This brings us to another important generalization. *In the meeting of economically disparate cultures the commodities adopted by the richer culture from the poorer are likely to be raw materials or objects of art and luxury which in most cases do not affect in any important way the social organization or scale of values of the adopting group.* A possible qualification may be made in the case of products which, for climatic reasons, can be produced in the one region and not in the other; but even in this case the social practices associated with the consumption of a commodity by the prestige group are likely to be quite independent of and unlike the practices of the non-prestige group in which it originated. In other words, only the material culture trait is adopted, while the associated non-material traits are rejected. Social practices or systems of ideas are rarely adopted by the richer group. On the other hand, *the commodities taken by the poorer group from the richer are likely to be goods in final form for personal consumption, semi-manufactured goods, or capital goods* (machines, etc.). *In most cases these goods make possible or require the shifting and* (in the past and probably for some time to come) *increase of population, modified technique of associated effort, and the consequent disruption of social groups and mores, involving the modification or displacement of accepted norms and standards.*

The statements of the last paragraph require analysis. If we consider American imports from China, it will be apparent that the facts are in accord with the principles stated. The important imports are bean-oil and bean products, tea, silk, wood-oil, hides and furs, straw-braid and a few metals; and such objects as rugs, embroideries and laces, curios, and ornaments. The only item which needs comment is tea, which is used for final consumption in practically the form in which it is produced. It is recognized that the generalizations of the last paragraph apply less rigidly to articles for personal consumption, particularly food, than to other articles. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that when the poorer culture imports such a commodity, there is a tendency to import with it the practices which are associated with it in the richer culture, whereas when the richer culture adopts from the poorer, the associated practices are usually not adopted. However, it must be admitted that generalizations in this particular area are of only limited application. The other raw materials mentioned (and the list is representative, not exhaustive) are re-shaped in accord with our own culture-patterns. Any modification of behavior which arises out of their use originates in the adopting group rather than in the group where the commodity originated. The later items in the list are objects of art and luxury and have little influence upon the behavior of the people adopting them. They often represent conspicuous consumption, i.e., methods of attaining distinction. Frequently such objects when imported from another country are prized because of their rarity and cost quite as much as because of their beauty or utility. However, it is noteworthy that on the plane of art there is often a closer approach to equality of want-satisfying power in the two cultures and that, therefore, there is much more likelihood of exchange on a basis approaching equality in this area than in any other—although the prestige element

enters here also and causes the Orient to adopt western pictures in very large quantities, while the West takes but a small number of art objects from the Orient.

If we consider Chinese imports from the West, we get an entirely different picture. Excepting cotton, very few strictly raw materials are imported; and even when they are imported they are generally used in the manufacture of a new product or the radical modification of an old one, frequently giving rise to the disruption of existing economic and social relations. The displacement of vegetable dyes by imported dyes is an example. Among articles for personal consumption may be listed kerosene, cigarets, hardware sundries, cotton yarn and cloth, foreign style hats and shoes (mostly made in China), granite ware, soap, matches, flashlights, and lamps. There are hundreds of such articles, but the above list is a sample of those which are most widely used. Even in such a list it is apparent that important social disturbances are involved. Particularly interesting are various improved means of illumination which increase the capacity to work and to play at night. Cigarets have had far-reaching effects upon individuals and families and upon social usage. Cotton cloth and yarns have competed with the domestic loom and spinning-wheel and raised serious economic problems. However, although important changes in behavior do arise out of these consumption goods, such changes are rather slight. One of the important aspects of such personal consumption goods is that their use, and frequently their use in "foreign style," is a sign of up-to-dateness which, in the non-prestige society, quite frequently consists of overt imitation of the dress, food, houses, and other characteristics of the prestige society. That is, the satisfaction arising from such consumption is often derived from its association with the society having prestige rather than from any intrinsic superiority of the article used.

The goods which are most potent in giving rise to social change are those which are used in the main as capital—instrumental wealth. Railroads and railway equipment, telegraph, telephone, airplanes, motor vehicles, street-cars, steam launches and ships, cotton mills, iron and steel mills, flour mills, engineering works, arsenals, bridge and road works, steel and iron tools and machines of all kinds, cement and cement plants, and electric equipment make a suggestive list. It is unnecessary to labor the proof for the statement that these things are socially disruptive, that they tend to break down the large family, that they are the foes of isolation, that they give rise to new problems of crime and sanitation and education that they make necessary new government controls and new moral and business codes, that out of them grow new occupations and a new mobility—and that they afford almost the only basis of hope for a real nationalism.

The forces which are causing their adoption in China are not different from the forces which caused their introduction into the West. The fact that they were invented in the West but adopted in the Orient does not affect the cultural results. Fundamental shifts in population groups and fundamental changes in social institutions are the inevitable accompaniment of the introduction of such goods. The point of the argument is that the richer countries today are of necessity relatively richer in capital and in manufactured consumption goods, while the poorer countries are relatively poorer in such goods. Therefore the poorer countries inevitably buy mostly goods of that kind, while the richer countries buy raw materials which are relatively more plentiful in poorer

countries. And the result of this process is that very important behavior changes and alterations in scales of social values occur in the poorer countries, while only minor changes occur in the richer countries. In other words, *changes in the culture of a richer country tend to originate within the country or in a country on approximately the same economic level, while such changes in a poorer country tend to be adopted or adapted directly from the cultures of richer countries.*

This point may be elaborated. We have in Western (Euro-American) countries cultures which are so nearly on the same economic level that borrowing both ways takes place rather freely—but even with the relatively slight differences in economic levels in the Euro-American culture-complex we may see the working of the laws we have described. In general, however, any invention or scientific discovery in any of these countries spreads in a comparatively short time to all. Not that any particular culture trait will become equally prevalent in all, nor that cultural changes occur with equal facility in all; but broadly speaking, any important innovation in material culture, at any rate, which occurs in any area of the Western culture-complex may be expected to permeate more or less completely all parts of it. This is partly because the general technical development of these countries is at approximately the same stage and the needs for adjustment to environment are of the same general type. It is therefore possible to a considerable extent to use in any one of them devices and ideas developed in any other; and, conversely, since the needs and problems are similar, there is considerable likelihood that in any Euro-American country a device may be developed which will be useful in any other.

This statement, however, is more applicable in the field of material culture and objective science than in the field of fashions, customs, and mores. But the economic disparity of the Orient and Occident is so great that the Orient does not possess the technological development necessary to utilize effectively the more recent Western cultural innovations; and, conversely, the cultural innovations which are developed in the Orient are not likely to be capable of satisfying adequately the wants of Western peoples whose satisfactions are already much richer and more complex than those of the East. Any means of satisfying the wants of the people in a relatively "lean" culture would be too simple to appeal to persons who are already accustomed to rich and varied satisfactions. But in this case, again, the Orient is much more likely to be able to adopt or adapt new devices and ideas from the West than the West is likely to adopt devices originating in the Orient. Therefore the West is not likely to find its culture greatly enriched from the East until the two draw together in their standards of living. Furthermore, it is apparent that the path of least resistance for the East is to choose from the more varied culture traits and patterns of the West, changing and adapting as tastes and needs and possibilities dictate.

It should be noted in this connection that there is no implication that a poorer culture is more subject to innovation and less resistant to change than a richer culture. It is not even correct to say that the poorer culture is more likely to imitate or adopt culture traits than the richer one. In fact, the reverse of both of these propositions seems to be true. If we look at the culture of any Euro-American people, we find that it is made up of elements taken from many countries at many times. Comparatively little of it is indigenous. Americans are always alert to use anything that will satisfy their wants.

No country is free from prejudice against the foreign, and each innovation meets with resistance and inertia; but by hook or by crook, sooner or later, we do take over the useful things we find in other countries. In the Orient, however, such adjustments are much slower. People are more ignorant, and they have little surplus on which to experiment. They are less accustomed to new ideas. Their experience causes them to be suspicious. For all these reasons innovations take place very gradually. The sole point of this argument is that if an Oriental civilization with poor and few means of satisfying wants comes into contact with an Occidental civilization, such cultural changes as do occur, whether they be few or many, are almost certain to consist of adoption from the Occident or adaptation of Occidental culture traits. Furthermore, it seems evident that in the present state of civilization this is the most intelligent possible course of action for the Oriental countries.

Our discussion to this point has had to do chiefly with material culture. There is perhaps more interest in the non-material, at least in connection with the Orient. It is usually impossible to separate completely the material from the non-material, but it is certain that the latter does affect very greatly the quality of the experience of any people. What is the relation of material to non-material culture, and what part does prestige play in non-material cultural accommodation? In the first place, more persons have a definite economic interest in changing the material culture of any people than in changing the non-material culture. Many persons are anxious to sell locomotives to China, but no one wants to sell juvenile courts or cubist art. With this statement in mind we may consider Ogburn's suggestion that changes in material culture are likely to precede and to dominate changes in non-material culture, and that changes in the former are likely to occur with greater frequency and rapidity than changes in the latter.

It has been stated that when material culture-traits are adopted by a poorer people associated non-material traits are also likely to be adopted—or, more likely, adapted. If railroads are introduced, the methods of administration, accounting, and organization characteristic of the country which built the road and furnished the rolling stock are likely to be adopted. If Western arms and ammunition are introduced into the army, Western methods of military organization and strategy are likely to go with Western implements of war. It would be possible to increase such illustrations indefinitely. It is only necessary, however, to emphasize the fact that the non-material concomitants of material culture traits are taken over almost inevitably when the material object adopted is of so revolutionary a character that no technique for its use has been developed in the adopting group. Therefore, we have in the Orient large blocks of non-material culture-patterns taken over bodily, as it were, although it must be observed that there is much more modification of the non-material than of the material culture traits. We may accept it as an obvious truth, then, that many of the changes in non-material culture in the Orient have been the necessary adjustments arising out of changes in material culture, and that in these cases material culture has dominated and determined, in a loose way, non-material culture changes.

In this connection, however, we should not fail to note what appear to be rather numerous exceptions to the principle that material culture precedes and dominates the non-material. In India, Japan, China, and the Philippines one of the early cul-

tural innovations which resulted from contacts with the West was in the field of education. We may say that the reason for this was that the people desired what they believed would result from widespread education, namely, material prosperity. Nevertheless, although economic motivation is not absent, we may regard educational systems as non-material culture patterns. Here was an early and profound adjustment in the non-material culture field which was not the result of any specific change in material culture. Or consider the numerous reforms in goverment and legal machinery. Here again better adjustment to economic factors was the thing desired, but the material element was a hope rather than a fact. This is perhaps not the normal course of legal change, which is usually an adjustment to a situation in which economic change is a part; but in this case the non-material change was rather a direct borrowing and adaptation of Western systems than a result of an antecedent change in material culture. Many other far-reaching and fundamental changes in systems of associated activity in business, in the community, and in religion might be cited in which a desire for change in material culture rather than the existence of antecedent changes was the cause of non-material cultural adjustments. One of the first changes in Japan was in the army and navy. Japan saw from almost the beginning of her modern contacts with the West that military strength was essential if she was to take a place of equality among the major nations. Of course material changes were involved, but it would seem that the system of ideas associated with modern warfare was even more significant than the material equipment for fighting. And so it would be possible to go on at length pointing out instances of systems of ideas, forms of organization, institutions, approvals and disapprovals which were adopted either independently of or synchronously with material culture traits.

There is another area of behavior which has great interest for students of culture change. I refer to fads, fashions, amusements, and signs of smartness and up-to-dateness. To say that a thing is "dzui hsing-shi-dy," up-to-the-minute, is, for many people in China, as elsewhere, to express emphatic approval. Analysis of the things that are "hsing-shi" reveals the fact that a very large proportion of them are brought over directly from the West or are adaptations from Western practices. A few years ago mixed dancing was unthinkable for respectable Chinese. Now tea and dinner dances are common in the port cities. A motor-car and chauffeur are signs of social standing. Motion-picture houses are crowded, and a favorite method of entertainment is a dinner party followed by a motion-picture show, or a show followed by a midnight supper. Bobbed hair for girls has become almost universal in the more progressive centers and has gone far into the interior—and now they are letting it grow! Water-waves and permanents for men and women are common. The smarter women are wearing high-heeled shoes, silk stockings, and short skirts. Foreign food is coming more and more into use for entertaining—although it is doubtful whether many Chinese like it as well as they like their own. Foreign dress is smart for men, and shorts and knickers are very much in vogue. Smoking cigarets or cigars after meals is almost universal—and one sees an occasional foreign pipe. Cabarets with taxi-dancing are increasing rapidly, and the consumption of foreign liquors seems to be much on the increase. These items are representative only, but they make it evident that in this particular field, which is non-material in certain aspects, at any

rate, Western culture is being taken over with little modification. Much of this must be attributed to the prestige which the West has for the East. Many of the practices mentioned do afford a more adequate and varied satisfaction of wants than the older practices. In particular, having the price to pay for them confers distinction. But more basic than their actual utility is the fact that they are the "foreign-style" of doing things.

It is noteworthy that all this has happened and is happening in spite of a considerable amount of anti-foreign feeling. In fact, at the height of the anti-foreign agitation of five years ago the agitators themselves were in many cases wearing foreign clothes, smoking foreign cigarets, and riding in foreign automobiles. In this they were not inconsistent. The agitation was not directed against foreign things or foreign ways. In fact, the appeal was, implicitly, to become modern and up-to-date—which meant foreign. The objection was to foreigners and foreign governments who, it was felt, had deprived the Chinese of the right to enjoy what the rest of the world enjoys. Even Communism pictures a situation in which the goods now enjoyed by the few will be enjoyed by the many.

The discussion leads us now to a consideration of the facility with which change may be made in different aspects of culture. Culture may be considered in strata graded roughly in respect to their susceptibility to change in response to contacts with other cultures. It is perhaps true that in the majority of cases the first changes would be in the field of material culture. Next in order might come those aspects of non-material culture which are associated with the material culture traits which are adopted. Perhaps next would come certain more obvious systems of thought and methods of organization and administration which seem to the imitator to be casually connected with the success and richness of the imitated culture. Next might be placed behavior-patterns which are identified with smartness and up-to-dateness. Then might come habits, customs, mores. Finally, and most difficult to change we might list the intangible approvals and disapprovals, esthetic appraisals, and attitudes toward life. It may be questioned whether such a classification has any value. The categories shade into each other. Many of the changes may be synchronous. Some elements in material culture may be adopted more reluctantly than some elements in a philosophy of life. Certain fads and fashions may be among the earliest changes of all. Whatever value the classification may have will be as a suggestion for analysis rather than as a finally valid statement. The really important observation is that both the material and non-material culture traits and patterns of the prestige culture will tend to be adopted by the culture which accords prestige, but that adoption in some strata is much easier than in others. However, such difference in adoptability varies widely with many differing factors.

It should be noted that this discussion does not imply that Western culture is superior or that the Orient will be better off because it is imitating the West. There have been many cases when the result of contact between rich and poor civilizations has been the destruction of the poorer people and of most of their culture. It is perhaps true that when peoples have been thus wiped out, they have been relatively small groups with rather simple cultures. There is no indication at present that such a result is probable in any of the major Oriental countries. There have been substantial population increases in Japan and India, and there would unquestionably be such increase in China if a

stable government could be established. However, it must be remembered that there is no basis for believing that the Chinese will automatically and inevitably select the "best" from Occidental culture. In some cases the disastrous results for the poorer peoples have been great in proportion to the disparity between the cultures which have met. However, we see one outcome in the case of the American Indian and another in the case of the Japanese—who have increased about ten-fold in a little more than a century. Apparently the process is largely one of trial and error. Even in the case of Japan, it still remains to be seen what the outcome of the adoption of Western culture will be. In the present state of civilization, however, there is no option. Culture contacts and cultural accommodation cannot be avoided. Whether the outcome in a given case will be biologically or sociologically favorable or not seems to be to some extent a matter of chance. When we disregard the effects upon the people and consider only the culture, we are reminded of the assertion that culture never dies. This is doubtless true in some sense, but as we look at the facts of modern civilization, with the increasing contacts among peoples, we see many indications that the world is slowly approaching a condition of relatively standardized culture the character of which will be largely determined by the peoples with the highest standards of living.

We may now turn to certain conclusions which seem to follow from the discussion to this point.

1. *So long as there is great disparity between the economic levels of the Occident and the Orient, the Orient cannot produce for Western markets any considerable amount of basic manufactures.* If this conclusion is correct, it would indicate that most of the talk of the industrial "Yellow Peril" has no support in reality. Not only do theoretical arguments lead to this conclusion, but the practical facts of international trade point in the same direction. For instance, we are told that Japan has already become an industrial nation, that less than half of her people are now rural. She has developed steel mills and cotton mills and a good many other kinds of factories. She has her "Pittsburg of Japan." She builds her ships and her railways. Yet she sells no basic manufactures in Western markets. True, she seems to be able to undersell British cotton goods in India and China, but it is doubtless only a question of time until Indian and Chinese competition will force her out of these markets. In respect to some staples, the Orient will undoubtedly supply its own markets. This may or may not be a disadvantage to Western nations. It may be more advantageous for us to have a market for loanable funds and for machinery requiring large investment for its manufacture than for us to sell cotton goods, flour, and electric supplies direct.

There is, however, another consideration. The Japanese standard of living is still far below the American, yet her labor costs are approaching ours faster than her standard of living is approaching our standard of living. In other words, the danger of Japanese competition in American or European markets is already practically past. In spite of her rising labor costs, however, Japan sells to the United States chiefly raw materials and objects of art and luxury. This is not because the Japanese have not learned or cannot learn to make machinery. It is because the manufacture of many types of capital goods requires a larger investment than the Japanese are able to make, and it is therefore cheaper for them to buy many of their complicated machines abroad, and the things which they can exchange most

advantageously for them are raw materials (including raw silk) and objects of art and luxury.

So long as there is the present great economic disparity between the cultures of China and the United States, the range and amount of commodities which can be exchanged will be distinctly limited. The limit is set by the amount of Chinese buying and borrowing power. China must buy with funds which can be spared above those necessary for the purchase of the necessities of life, or else she must borrow in order to buy goods which will increase her productive power. But when labor is extremely cheap, it is not easy to discover capital goods that will increase this power. Even the cotton mill still meets the competition of the hand-loom and the spinning-wheel. Therefore the prospect of any considerable increase in trade with China is not bright until more wealth (not money, but productive goods) can be accumulated in that country. The discussion of this question has been over-simplified, but it is true, in general, that while the poorer of two economically disparate cultures will imitate the richer, the amount of exchange between them will be far less than it would be if they were on approximately the same economic level.

2. *The Occident is unlikely to adopt from the Orient any culture trait that will change directly or radically any social value or way of living among Western peoples.* This is not because the Orient has no culture traits that are biologically or sociologically superior to the corresponding traits in the Occident. Just as imitation by the poorer group is rather undiscriminating and may turn out to be positively destructive, so rejection of culture traits by the richer group is undiscriminating and may involve social loss. But the fact is that the richer culture has prestige for the poorer and the poorer does not have prestige for the richer. The writer has repeatedly asked Chinese and foreign advocates of culture exchange to mention specific Chinese culture traits which considerable numbers of Americans might be induced to adopt if they were effectively presented. He has never had a concrete reply to this request. He has known scores of persons who have spent many years in China and who are sincere admirers of the Chinese and their civilization, but who have returned to live in America. In no case has their behavior in America differed in any essential way from that of their countrymen. Their years of residence in the Orient left them practically unaffected so far as their behavior patterns and scales of values were concerned. One need only contrast with them the Chinese student who has studied abroad to realize the direction in which culture flows. American culture affords richer, more stimulating, and more varied living, and the normal American will inevitably follow its patterns rather than those of the Chinese, once he is separated from immediate contact with China. His point of view and outlook on life are likely to be broader and more tolerant than they would have been had he remained in America; but in his overt behavior he continues to be a Westerner.

It should be clearly understood that no judgment is suggested as to the intrinsic values of the two cultures. Many Westerners in China become so enamored of the combination of Eastern and Western in which they live that they are unhappy living elsewhere. Nevertheless it seems impossible to really transplant Oriental culture traits to the West except in such forms as do not affect materially social behavior and scales of social values.

3. *If and, roughly, to the extent that the economic levels of the Orient and Occident approach each other, these regions will tend to exchange more and more manufactured goods,*

and the cultural flow between them will tend to be equalized. This proposition has already been implied. It means that from every point of view it is desirable that the Oriental standards of living should not remain far below those of the West. We do not here consider the question whether, with a population already far beyond the optimum, it is possible to bring Oriental standards up so that they will approach those of the Occident. We simply emphasize the fact that any large and poverty-stricken nation is to some degree a menace to the peace and security and prosperity of the world. Such a country gives rise to many kinds of friction—problems of migration, of tariff, of public order, of public health, of copyrights, and many others. The difficulties are essentially the same as those of a community which has widely separated economic classes whose standards of living, culture, and ideals are inharmonious. Vice, crime, disorder are likely to prevail in such a community. Similarly, numerous problems of adjustment are inevitable between two widely disparate cultures which are in contact with each other. Police power or benevolent despotism, from without or from within, may in some degree palliate these inherent problems, but there is no fundamental solution other than a higher standard of living.

In summary we may say that in the relations between disparate cultures certain general types of outcome may be predicted. We have not hazarded "laws," but we believe that we have formulated tendencies which illuminate in some degree the questions of cultural adjustment.

NEGROES WHO RUN AFOUL THE LAW

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MONDAY morning and the Recorder's Court is filled with a motley assembly—Negro and white prisoners, their friends, relatives, and curious onlookers. The police force has been active this week end and a goodly catch has been brought before the bar of justice. The scene happens to be Durham, North Carolina, a city of 52,037, famed for its tobacco factories, but it might well be almost any industrial town of like size in the south.

"These niggers must be a bad lot, just look how many get arrested" says the casual onlooker, as he forms his opinion on Negro criminality. An insight into the actual facts which this situation represents is quite another matter and one that calls for careful study.

Negro crime has been the subject of much research, often with a conscious or unconscious bias. More effort has been spent in attempting to formulate causative comparisons between the relative criminality of Negroes and whites, than to a study of the Negro himself and the environment under which he is forced to live. Figures relating to arrests, convictions, and inmates of penal institutions have been used as basis for estimating the amount of Negro delinquency. None of these is entirely satisfactory but the number of offenses known to the police is the material nearest to the source of the crime.

As a basis for this study figures were obtained directly from the police blotter of the Recorder's Court of Durham and tabulated under eight headings: address, offense, disposition, age, shade of color, marital status, occupation, and sex. Such

material is not a description of the Negro criminal, but of a selected group of unfortunates, some guilty of offenses and some not, whom the police chanced to come upon and to arrest.

The first pertinent question to answer is with what were they charged—were their crimes serious or of a minor nature? Table I states the facts for 11,972 Negro arrests during a five year period from 1922 to 1927, a time of especial prosperity and rapid growth for the city of Durham. It can be seen that among the ten chief crime categories offenses against the liquor laws, gambling, offenses against the person and against property, have places of most importance. Negro men are more apt to be charged with drunkenness, gambling, and fighting, while for women the order of frequency of commission is fighting, drunkenness, and immorality.

TABLE I

ARRESTS BY CLASS OF OFFENSE

Durham, N. C., from July 1, 1922 to July 1, 1927

	MALE	PER CENT	FEMALE	PER CENT	TOTAL	PER CENT
Vs. Liquor laws	2,045	19.80	300	18.10	2,345	19.58
Vs. Traffic laws	964	9.34	20	1.20	984	8.21
Vs. the Person	1,465	14.19	358	21.64	1,823	15.22
Vs. Property	1,334	12.92	177	10.70	1,511	12.62
Vs. Morality	328	3.17	288	17.41	616	5.14
Vs. Public Peace	720	6.97	180	10.88	900	7.51
Vs. Public Justice	430	4.16	88	5.32	518	4.32
Vs. Neglect of Duties	298	2.88	72	4.35	370	3.09
Gambling	1,816	17.60	74	4.47	1,890	15.78
Miscellaneous	918	8.89	97	5.86	1,015	8.47
Total	10,318	99.92	1,654	99.93	11,972	99.95

TABLE II

THE TEN MOST COMMON OFFENSES OF NEGROES IN DURHAM

July 1, 1926 to July 1, 1927

RANK	MALE			FEMALE		
	Offense	Number	Per cent	Offense	Number	Per cent
All Ten		1,462	71.56	All Ten	287	81.07
First	Drunkenness	336	16.44	Illegal Possession	56	15.81
Second	Gambling	239	11.69	Using room for Immoral purpose	43	12.14
Third	Larceny	159	7.78	Assault D. W.	36	10.16
Fourth	Traffic Violations	158	7.73	Cursing	30	8.47
Fifth	Illegal Possession	142	6.95	Drunkenness	27	7.62
Sixth	Assault and Battery	135	6.60	Affray	26	7.34
Seventh	Assault D. W.	124	6.06	Larceny	24	6.77
Eighth	City Ordinance	62	3.03	Assault and Battery	23	6.49
Ninth	Boisterous cursing	54	2.64	Disorderly Conduct	13	3.67
Tenth	Vagrancy	53	2.59	Adultery	9	2.54

When the above crime categories are

further divided into fifty-three sub-classifications, the specific crimes with which Negroes are most often charged are revealed. Table II shows the ten most common causes for arrest during one year. Sex differences are apparent. Four out of the ten men's offenses, namely gambling, traffic violations, violation of city ordinances, and vagrancy, are not found in the women's list, which includes instead, using room for immoral purpose, affray, disorderly conduct, and adultery.

It is plain that Durham Negroes are not arrested for crimes of a serious nature, but rather for causes indicating social disorganization such as fighting and drinking. This is further emphasized when the disposition of 1,141 cases are examined. (Table III.) Persons sentenced to the roads, workhouse, or held for the Superior Court amount to only 12.1 per cent. Almost half of the total get off with a small fine, while a third pay only the costs or are released as not guilty. The really serious crimes are represented among the 2.6 per cent who are held for the Superior Court, and many of these will later be declared not guilty.

The most common way of disposing of offenses was as follows. Of the offenders against the liquor laws, 82.3 per cent were fined and 7.2 per cent sent to the roads. Judgment was suspended in 69 per cent of the traffic cases and 15 per cent paid fines. Crimes against the person were disposed of by fines in 62 per cent of the cases. Offenders against property received an especially wide range of treatment. Of these cases, 17 per cent were held for the higher court and 12 per cent given sentences to the roads; judgment suspended represented 16 per cent; while 14 per cent were turned over to the juvenile court. Offenders against morality were fined in 50 per cent of the cases and sent to the roads or work house in 24 per cent. The remaining classes of offenders had committed crimes of a minor nature which were dealt with either by a small fine or by judgment suspended. Stealing and immorality stand out as the delinquencies most liable to lead to the more severe correctional measures, but they represent only 12.6 and 5.1 per cent respectively, of all the offenses. The Durham Negro is not inclined to fall into serious trouble, so when he does run

TABLE III

Disposition of Negro Cases Brought before the Durham Recorder's Court July 1, 1926 to July 1, 1927

Disposition	Per cent	Disposition	Per cent
Fines:		*Workhouse:*	
$1 to $5	31.8	Workhouse—1 month	0.6
$10 to $25	13.8	Over 1 month	1.5
$50 and over	4.0		
		Total workhouse	2.1
Total fines	49.6		
		Unsentenced:	
Roads:		Judgment suspended and costs	16.6
1 month	3.2	Not guilty	15.6
Over 1 month	4.2	Called and failed	2.9
		Probable cause	2.6
Total roads	7.4	Juvenile court	3.2
Total cases	1,141	Total unsentenced	40.5

afoul the law, he usually gets off by paying the costs or a small fine.

As elsewhere it is young persons who form the majority of those arrested. Two per cent were under 16 years old, 47 per cent between 16 and 25, 45 per cent 26 to 45 years, and 6 per cent over 45.

Drunkenness was found to be the most common offense in the age groups 26 years and over, but gambling and fighting ranked larger than drinking among young persons. The gradual frustration of the Negro's hopes and ambitions leads him as he grows older more and more to find solace in intoxicating liquor. When young, this partly unconscious dissatisfaction expresses itself in a craving for excitement which finds outlet in the playing of games of chance and in rough and tumble brawls.

The proportion of offenses settled by fines remained almost constant in all age groups. Judgment suspended and costs became more common with increasing age, while sentences to the roads followed an opposite trend. Apparently age is dealt with more leniently.

That it is the youthful and unattached Negroes who come into conflict with the law is further substantiated by the fact that 52 per cent of all those arrested said that they were single. There is a difference in the nature of the offense charged against married and single persons. The former are more prone to break the liquor laws, traffic laws, and to commit crimes against the person, while single persons incline to crimes against property, morality, and the public peace. At first glance it seems odd that married people more often commit attacks on the person, but the reason probably lies in quarrels between husband and wife.

When dispositions are considered, it is found that the single are more often sent to the roads or released, while more of the low fines, suspended judgments, and not guilty are given to the married. Evidently, single persons are more frequently held on suspicion, but when sentenced their punishment is likely to be of greater severity.

Negroes in Durham have the opportunity to enter a wider range of occupations than is usually found in a small southern city, because of the large businesses of that race located there. However, it is not the business and professional people who get into trouble, but persons without an occupation or unskilled laborers who constitute 80 per cent of those arrested. Domestics and skilled laborers amounted to 9 per cent, leaving the other 11 per cent distributed among the following classes: commercial, transportation, clerical, public service, professional, farmers, and students. Occupations may not always be ascertained by the police with the greatest care, but the type of crime already described is such as would be committed by persons limited in education and experience. The purely business crimes, including disposing of mortgaged property embezzlement, forgery, and passing worthless checks, amounted to less than twenty-five cases in all.

Comparison of Negro and white crime rates have been intentionally omitted in this description of Negro offenders, because the conclusions to be drawn from such data are seriously biased by social and economic factors. If a higher rate of arrests for Negroes were found, it would have no significance concerning the relative criminality of the two races, unless the attitude of the police towards the apprehension of suspects could be measured. This is not possible, but from limited observation one is inclined to believe that a miscarriage of justice does not lead to such serious complications for the police officers when Negroes are con-

cerned. Besides, there is the constant pressure upon the patrolman to justify his existence by concrete results and where is it so easy to fill out his weekly score than by a little raid in the Negro section?

There is nothing in the facts presented above to indicate that the Negro is excessively criminal or inclined to commit crimes of a serious nature. Social disorganization rather than organized vice is indicated by the Durham arrests.

The fallacy, believed by many, that nearly all Negroes are potential if not actual law breakers, was exposed by this study. The land occupied by Negroes in

TABLE IV

Negro Crime Rates in Durham

NEGRO CRIME AREA NUMBER	NUMBER OF RESIDENT FAMILIES	NUMBER OF CRIMINALS	CRIME RATE PER 100 FAMILIES
1	227	115	50.7
2	686	280	40.8
3	695	193	27.8
4	410	109	26.6
5	717	136	19.0
6	544	62	11.4
7	704	80	11.3
8	491	48	9.8
Total......	4,474	1,023	22.8

the city of Durham was divided into nine different areas based on geographical features. For each area the crime rate per 100 families was calculated as shown in Table IV. The delinquency rates were arranged in order of frequency and showed a distinct ecological pattern with a steady decrease in the amount of criminality as the distance from the center of the city increased. These areas can be briefly characterized as follows: number one, an area of changing use adjacent to the main business district. Area two, poorly built slums south of the business section beyond railroad yards and tobacco factories. Area three, situated just south in a badly drained hollow. Area four, along a busy street to the north of the business district. Area five, on the hill beyond the railroad and the valley. Area six, small, isolated Negro settlements removed from the center of population. Area seven, far to the south, the best Negro residential section. Area eight, two little country villages recently taken within the northern limits of the city.

Large portions of the Negro population are seen to have very infrequent contacts with the law, while in certain other sections there is one arrest each year for every two families. There are Negro sections in Durham to which the police are never called, and whose inhabitants are never summoned for anything more serious than a violation of a traffic ordinance. Here live the business and professional classes, the highest level of Negro society, moving in a closed circle of refinement almost as unknown to the factory Negro as to white citizens of the city. Banks, insurance companies, fraternal societies, and a college attract the best brains of the Negro race, who have here an opportunity to make good use of the abilities they possess.

The other side of the picture, dilapidated shacks down by the railroad, is more familiar to the average white reader and it is from these that he bases his opinion of Negro life. A careful house to house study of the worst of these areas failed to show the existence of a large or organized criminal class. These men and women who get into trouble represent raw recruits from the country, forced out by population increase and attracted by opportunities for work in the tobacco factories. They are for the most part progressive and energetic to whom a wage of even ten dollars a week during the winter working season seems much more advantageous than the life of a tenant farmer. With little education or experience they are soon overwhelmed by the complexities of urban civilization. Too sudden and radical a change prevents

satisfactory adjustment to their new environment. An easy prey to the small class of genuine criminals, they drift into gambling and drinking with its concomitant evils, as a relief for the frustration of their wishes and the monotony of factory labor. Some escape the evil circle, to the well-kept homes on the hill, but most are doomed to spend the remainder of their lives in the squalor of the bottoms. The only wonder is that more do not embark upon the career of the professional criminal.

A solution for Negro crime in Durham—there is none, but the way out surely leads in the direction of better economic position, greater educational opportunities, and broader sympathies within the Negro group itself. A sudden and dislocating change in environment are part of the costs of the rapid industrialization of the South. Possibly the effects of the present depression may not be entirely evil if it slackens the rate of this process and permits the more gradual assimilation of the population to urban culture.

PHELPS STOKES FUND—TWENTY YEAR REPORT

Instead of the usual formal report, the Phelps Stokes Fund has issued a valuable summary of trends in race relations both in the United States and in Africa. The period 1911–1931 has been one of dynamic activity in the promotion of inter-racial coöperation, in which the major events are chronicled by Monroe N. Work, and interpretations provided by Thomas Jesse Jones. Race relations in Africa are treated by J. H. Oldham. Trends in Negro education are discussed by Dr. Jones and J. H. Dillard, and an interesting summary of Native Progress in South Africa is drawn from the intimate knowledge of C. T. Loram.

GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programmes and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspects of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

COUNTY-STATE RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA

ROWLAND EGGER

The University of Virginia

A VERY clever young man who was a student of mine at a small college in New Jersey was asked, in the vein of what professional pedagogues like to call "thought questions," to trace the ultimate source of political authority among the various governmental levels in the United States. He answered as follows: "Above the locality stands the state; above the state, the nation; above the nation, the constitution; and above the constitution, the ghost of John Marshall."

It is perhaps unfortunate that in discussions of county government, among many other things, we too often begin with the ghosts and seldom get around to the tangible processes of administration. This should not be construed to imply that I do not respect and revere these ghosts. But although I might rather talk about Tom Jefferson and Edmund Randolph than about sewage disposal, in this paper I shall confine my attention to a few of the more arresting latter-day facts of county-state relations in the administrative structure of Virginia.

HIGHWAYS

It is not too much to call the 1928 general county road act one of the most intelligent steps in Virginia county-state relations which has been taken in recent times. This act, in brief, substituted a code for what had come to be an unintelligible mass of special local legislation by which various counties had taken themselves out from under the operation of the general state laws previously enacted. Dr. Kilpatrick records that this legislation had succeeded in removing eighty-five of the one hundred counties in Virginia from the operation of the general road laws. That this condition was regrettable and unendurable is more than obvious. That the legislation of 1928 only partially remedied the malpractices extant under the previous plethora of special enactments is undoubtedly true. That the situation was unsusceptible to satisfactory resolution by measures less drastic than the recently enacted Byrd plan is by no means so evident. That the direct assumption by the state of all responsibility for county highways is consistent with current developments in local government in Virginia and in fact with the general structure of Virginia administration is certainly a question upon which divergent views are definitely possible. Let us consider the provisions and operation of the act of 1928. This act not only prescribed three optional, and in-

cidentally altogether commendable, forms of local road admnistration, all of which integrated and centralized the highway services within the local unit, but it provided also a very noteworthy plan for state-county coöperation. The organization, equipment, machinery, and technical skill of the state highway department is, under the terms of section 2039, sub-section 36, of the 1928 act, made available to the counties. Among the services performed gratuitously by the state commission are engineering reports concerning questions of highway location and surveys for laying out such highways; plans and specifications for actual road construction and bridge-building, cost estimates for all material used in construction and maintenance; testing of materials used in road building (stone, gravel, cement, etc.); sale of oil to counties at the low contract price obtainable through large scale state purchase; purchase of road building and maintenance machinery and the surfacing of local roads at actual cost by the forces of the state highway commission.

The 1928 act goes further than this. It sets up the initial machinery for the maintenance of comprehensive financial records. It compels the financing of road improvements under a capital improvement budget. It establishes definitely an administrative relationship between the county and the state in matters of highways which the years from 1928–32 have not proved unsound in principle. It must be recorded parenthetically that the act did not in itself provide the requisite machinery for the enforcement of a budget system for county highways, although the supplementary data not infrequently attached by progressive county officials to these budgets provided in fact the information which was not required at law.

There are few economies which could not have been realized as satisfactorily under this legislation as under the Byrd plan.[1] It is true that the matter of state advice and assistance was not mandatory upon all counties. It is also true that the fiscal provisions of the Harman bill, which enacted the Byrd plan, virtually compel all counties to turn over their roads to the state, and that the alleged economies of large scale administration are therefore quite as possible as if the local option feature were eliminated. It is true that the economies which might be expected to accrue from road surfacing by an organization operating over many counties could not be compelled under the terms of the 1928 law. But was complete centralization necessary to secure these economies?

It is impossible to evaluate the abstract validity of claims made by proponents of centralized road administration regarding economy. Assuming these claims to be true and acceptable on their face, the remaining question is that of the relation of central state road administration to the rest of the functions which no one contemplates, at least at present, taking away from the counties. Consider, for example, the problem of county planning. Now highway construction is the very heart and core of the city, county, regional, and even state planning, and a plan, no matter the size of the region for which it is drafted, is distinctly not a mere architectural and engineering projection of an artistic hypothesis. It is a summary of the people's way of living. If counties are to be planned, road locations, widths, surfaces, etc., will have to be determined by the people who are doing the planning and it does not seem that the state highway commission is in a position accurately

[1] The "Byrd plan" was the recently enacted Harman bill which, in a manner almost identical with the North Carolina legislation of last year, transferred all public highways, except city streets, to the State. This plan goes into effect July 1, 1932.

and satisfactorily to summarize the diverse methods of living throughout the state.

There is another reason why certain questions of local road finance should not be centered in a state body. One of the most satisfactory methods of financing road improvements is that of special assessment. Now special assessment can find no justification if it does not patently enhance the value of the land through which the road runs. But are all of the county roads contemplated to be taken over by the state highway commission of a sufficiently arterial nature to eliminate the justifiability of special assessments? I am fully aware of the constitutional barrier and the sentimental objections extant in Virginia to special assessment of any sort and particularly special assessment for highway construction. I do not believe that these objections can long endure, and when eventually roads, which are not of such general use as to be appropriately a charge against the public treasury and which at the same time materially enhance the value of the property to which they are adjacent, are financed by a special assessment upon that property, the embarrassment incident to state administration will become more evident.

THE AUDIT OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS

A very significant point of administrative liaison between local and central government in Virginia is that established under sections 565 and 565-a of the Virginia Code. This provides for a mandatory audit of all city and county officials and agencies handling state funds, one-half of the cost of which is borne by the local government. These sections permit the localities to employ the assistants in the office of the state auditor to perform their annual audit functions. Supplementary legislation in section 2577-a makes an annual audit with reference to local funds mandatory, the cost of which is borne by the county. The potential importance of this liaison has been regrettably restricted by the niggardly appropriations made by the legislature to the office of the auditor of public accounts and this parsimony has in fact militated most unjustifiably against the general prestige of the local audit functions of this agency.

I have stated elsewhere my belief that in the final analysis the relief of the rate on real property in the localities as well as the continued existence of county government untrammeled by state interference and centralized control to an obnoxious degree lies in the control of local expenditure. Ultimately this control must rest upon scientifically formulated standards of local administration which accurate centralized accountancy alone can produce. The idea of a centralized audit and accounting agency having as its primary function the formulation of advisory standards of municipal administration was one which a group of specialists attached to the New Jersey Tax Survey Commission argued for before that body some two years ago. The idea in its original form was to create a purely advisory agency. As adopted by the commission, however, it embodied numerous mandatory measures with which a number of the originators were quite unsympathetic. It may be admitted also that administrative standards are at the present time in such a formative state of development as to be legitimately of only academic interest. They will never be brought out of that embryonic state except by practical financial administrators. The fact that thus far attempts at the development of such standards have been made largely by swivel-chair experts has contributed little to the dignity which such a method of financial control should and would enjoy if the standards were adequately and

properly worked out. The 1932 session of the legislature, in failing adequately to establish the local audit functions of the State Auditor's office on a sound and comprehensive legal and financial basis, ignored an opportunity to strike an effective blow in the relief of real property and one which is at the same time entirely consonant with the structure of Virginia governmental institutions. The enormous benefits which have been conferred by a central agency, such as the League of Virginia Municipalities, which does not deal in any considerable measure with external local fiscal relations, comprise a striking indication of the capacity of Virginia local governments to take advice when they are convinced that the advice has a foundation in fact.

SUBSIDIZATION AND GRANTS-IN-AID

Educational grants in aid. The question of county-state relations in Virginia is indubitably affected by the system of state subsidization and by the allocational bases of state funds to counties. One of the most anomalous methods of state subsidization anywhere in existence is that of the public school grant in Virginia. The bulk of the appropriation for educational subsidization is appropriated purely on the proportion of county school population to the total school population (children seven to nineteen years of age inclusive). Special claims for vocational education, rural vocational schools, rural elementary schools, and rural supervision aggregate normally less than ten per cent of the total state subsidy and, inasmuch as these special grants are concentrated in a relatively small number of counties, the normal grant made on the school population basis is probably not more than six per cent.

This system was criticized by the educational survey staff in 1928 as follows:

1. It ignores completely the matter of school attendance.
2. Subsidization is not dependent upon the educational need of the counties.
3. The system completely disregards the relative financial ability of various local units to support schools.
4. The system makes no requirements whatever as to the efficiency of the local school systems.
5. The method disregards many important factors over which the unit may have no control, such as the sparse distribution of population and the resultant greater pupil cost required for the maintenance of schools made necessarily small on account of the sparse distribution of population.

It was precisely these objections that the Hall plan, which came to an untimely end in the recent legislature, sought to remedy. The Hall plan aimed at minimum instructional standards for which the state, under conditions of continuing administrative supervision and fiscal control, would assume the financial responsibility. These minimum standards comprise the following five major objectives:

1. A teacher for every group of pupils in average daily attendance in proportion to the density of population.
2. At least two years' training beyond high school for each teacher.
3. A minimum school terms of nine months with improved attendance.
4. A minimum teachers' salary of $60.00 a month.
5. A supervisor for each district.

An additional state appropriation of somewhat over $2,000,000 for the initial year of the plan was estimated to be required for introducing the new educational minimum. Local budgets and hence real property would be relieved by the same amount.

Miscellaneous aid. The proportion of the total county general expenditures, omitting highways and education, which are derived from state subsidization varies widely from one county to another. Dr. Kilpatrick records that in one county the

proportion paid is 0.29 per cent, while in another the state pays 22.67 per cent of the county general expenditure. Expressed as a relief to the payers of the general property tax the variation is from one mill per capita to forty-three cents per capita. While the total amount distributed for non-educational and non-highway purposes is relatively negligible it is important as indicia of a total failure to recognize the true purpose of state subsidization which is in the first instance equalization, in the second efficiency and economy, and in the third, the relief of certain tax sources when general fiscal reorganization is undesirable or ineffective.

County road aid. The method in use prior to the legislation of 1932 for the distribution of $.015 of the gasoline tax levy to the counties was undoubtedly lacking in any semblance of method, equity or discernible objectivity. It would perhaps be unfair to designate the method as exclusively that of "log-rolling" but no one will ever know whether its basis was that or whether the central authorities dealt cold hands of poker to determine the allocations. As Dr. Kilpatrick has pointed out, the granting of state subsidies for county highway purposes bore no relation either to area, population, present road mileage or county capacity to build and maintain highways. "What," one is constrained to inquire, "was it based on?" Roanoke county received over a thousand dollars a mile state road aid according to Dr. Kilpatrick's tabulation. Other counties in the state received as little as $10.80 a mile. Some counties received less than $.25 per capita from state aid, others as high as $3.00. Allocations show even more drastic divergence when compared with area or with the assessed valuation back of each mile of county road.

One may very well question whether in the light of the inability of the state government to formulate a sane, equitable or even explicable method of county road subsidization the central administrative authorities will be able to construct and maintain local roads in any more equitable ratio to local needs. Furthermore, we have indications that the economies which might be expected to accrue from centralized administration will be largely submerged in the general processes of administrative capitulation to political velleities which usually accompany noble experiments in the drastic rearrangement of governmental functions. From no less than eighteen county seats has word come since the passage of the act centralizing road administration that the present county road organization will continue to be utilized in the operation of local highway facilities. The State Highway Commissioner has also indicated his preference for this mode of transition.

If this is true then the sole leg left for the Byrd plan to stand upon is that of real property tax relief. Centralized road administration was urged, by its proponents, as the most feasible method of according such relief. No realist in the field of taxation and public finance will fail to agree that general property, which is to say realty and improvements, is long since due relief from the millstone which each new local function has hung around its neck, and since, under the revenue source segregation extant in the State of Virginia, this burden cannot be relieved by the local governments of their own initiative, the state is compelled to intervene. We are not here discussing the merits of the revenue source segregation utilized in Virginia. The only question pertinent to a discussion of the liaison between counties and the state is the method of state participation.

It is perhaps significant that on March

29, 1932, Mr. Byrd felt impelled to issue a warning against the attitude of a considerable number of boards of supervisors which contemplated standing pat on their levies with respect to real property. He admitted that if these views were permitted to prevail the effect would be to nullify *in toto* the intended relief of this measure. Professor Harley L. Lutz, in his admirable text on *Public Finance*, summarizes very tersely the tendency, of which the foregoing is only one of many oft-noted illustrations, in the following general terms:

> ". . . . It appears to be more certain that public expenditures will advance with rising prices and wages than that they will decline when these elements of cost are falling. To the extent that such a tendency prevails, the responsibility is to be found, we believe, in the absence of adequate standards of purchasing, of personnel management, and of the efficiency of public administration in general. Taxes are pushed up whenever rising prices create imminent or actual deficits. These rates quickly become static, since there is ordinarily no one definitely responsible for a downward revision of governmental costs as prices decline. The characteristic attitude of the typical official is to find means of spending the surplus, in which he is usually aided and abetted by the legislature, as well as by a certain element in the electorate."[2]

The simple fact seems to be that by the direct assumption of county road administration and the complete abdication of administrative fiscal control, which might have been exercised under a proper plan of state-subsidies, the state has laid down its most powerful weapon for the defense of the overburdened real property ratepayer. Sic transit tax relief.

Summary. What is to be said of the relation of state subsidization to county-state relations? Public administration specialists are agreed regardless of the color of their home rule sentiments that the state is charged with the provision of certain minimum facilities and advantages to its entire population. Under the extant state highway system with its approximately 9,000 miles of state highway constructed, replaced, and maintained by the state, together with the admirable statutory provision for the gradual extension of the system, I believe that the Commonwealth meets its present obligation in the provision of minimum facilities for transit and communication without assuming responsibility for 45,000 miles additional. A comparison of the maps outlining the state highway system with those indicating population density has shown on the whole, excepting a slight favoring of less heavily populated areas, a remarkably equitable distribution of state provided road ways. The existing state highway system was largely made by the legislature —that body selecting the routes and mileages to be cared for by the state—and the legislature by its very composition is area balanced against population as factors in determining representation. Hence the existing equality is the result of perfectly natural influences. It may be mentioned parenthetically that the state highway system is inequitable to the same degree, in approximately the same places, for largely the same reasons that the legislature is unrepresentative—the over-representation of rural areas. Consider the condition with regard to public education. It is impossible to conceive of a plan of subsidization which more completely misses the mark of equalization than does the present method. The $900,000 additional state appropriation granted in the last legislature serves only to enhance the unfair operation of a plan of educational subsidization by which literally to those who have is given and to those who have

[2] At p. 66 *et seq*. This point is illustrated admirably by Virginia's experience when the State government retired from the field of real and tangible personal property taxation. See Dr. W. H. Stauffer's excellent tabulation in his *Taxation in Virginia*, p. 87 *et seq*.

not is at least withheld. Most of us have been looking ever since the hectic days of the last legislative session for the theory of government underlying the passage of the road centralization bill and the rejection of the Hall plan. It will require a subtler brand of sophistry than most critics are capable of, adequately to rationalize this deliberate choice of His Majesty's Commons and Noble Lords.

CONCLUSION

It seems apparent at this juncture that a number of factors are at work which in their culmination will transform our counties into amphibious specimens the true genus of which will be completely undiscoverable. When advocates of central administration of all non-city highways propose to transfer all county roads to the state they are doing more than climbing on the centralization band wagon of North Carolina. They are formulating a philosophy of expediency which reverses customary thought to the extent of positing the view that the functions of a governmental unit should be regulated by the tax resources which have been arbitrarily allocated to it. Now there is nothing sacred about the Virginia tax-source allocating constitutional amendments of 1928. Neither is there anything sacred about Virginia counties, but on the whole there are functions which experience has indicated are appropriately performed by geographical units of the approximate jurisdiction of the Virginia county. That many functions at present performed by the counties demand larger areas of administration is evident. There is nothing the matter with the statutes governing intercounty cooperation, which permit joint undertakings of virtually any description. A good many of these are already in effect. On the whole the tendency seems to be in the direction of a certain type of regionalism. The state highway department has already tacitly recognized this fact in the establishment of its residencies for administrative supervision. If the counties are able to rearrange and refurnish themselves under the county reform legislation of 1932, assuming the highly tenuous hypothesis that there is anything left to reform the next logical step in county government is apparently federated regionalization.

It is one of the truisms of administration that in the last analysis function determines form, and it is evident that the problem of county and regional government and administration in Virginia must be approached by an analysis of the functions which these units must perform. Once the proper allocation of these functions is scientifically determined, the only remaining problem is that of securing a financial system of sufficient elasticity to permit the continuous operation of the services upon a basis which will lead to the development of permanent and efficient administrative machinery. Such an objective could be accomplished in numerous ways. State subvention is the most obvious. The levying of municipal and county surtaxes upon appropriate state tax sources under careful state control is a method which has been found quite satisfactory in a number of European countries. The important point, however, is that under existing conditions in which the real property rate is admittedly already too high, the tax system of Virginia lacks the second most important element which every tax system should have. The first is fiscal adequacy; neither the state nor local governments are incurring notable deficits. The second is elasticity. It is obvious that some element must be introduced which will make the functional allocation and the administrative structure permanent and the tax income elastic,

and that the juggling of the administrative hierarchy must be eliminated.

I am not here to offer any panaceas for the problems which this paper has outlined. At the same time it seems apparent that an intelligent program of subsidization, contingent, of course, upon continuing central administrative, supervision, and fiscal control, would have come far nearer accomplishing the objectives of relief, equalization, economy, and retrenchment which were the alleged aims of the last legislature than the methods which were adopted. It would perhaps be not too much to say further that the tampering with the administrative hierarchy and horizontal governmental levels which that body indulged in will probably do more harm than the county government reform measures will do good. And it suggests that the entire field of state and local functions should receive a study as scientific as present day information and methodology will permit. There are undoubtedly many items chargeable to county budgets the financing *and administration* of which should be transferred entirely to the state. Judicial expenses and the courts, including the abortive fees of the Commonwealth's attorneys, are among the most obvious of this class. There are doubtless others, now centrally administered, which the state should devolve upon its local units. It is probable furthermore that an intermediate unit is required which will administer for several counties the functions at present performed by the individual county governments and which will perhaps perform for the state certain functions currently administered from Richmond. It is nevertheless evident that the action of the last legislature not only failed to point in the direction of such a study, but has created an atmosphere which will delay for a long time any functional readjustments which might be dictated by considerations other than a very nebulous possibility of tax relief.

IS CITIZENSHIP A FAIR REQUIREMENT IN OLD AGE ASSISTANCE ACTS?[1]

DALLAS HIRST

The Helen S. Trounstine Foundation

ALL but one of the eighteen states which have passed old age assistance acts, require that the recipients of such aid be citizens. Furthermore, many of them demand that they shall have been citizens for fifteen years before they apply for such assistance. These qualifications affect a large percentage of the aged, as is indicated by the fact that almost sixty per cent of the dependent old in Boston are foreign born. Therefore, the difficulties of acquiring citizenship and proving citizenship have a direct bearing upon the successful administration of acts that aim to meet the needs of the aged.

Three out of every five of the 1115 people on the visible index of the Boston Overseers, who fulfill the requirements of the Massachusetts Act in regard to age and length of state residence, are foreign born. This is a fair indication of the nativity distribution of the aged in the state, as the proportion of the foreign born in Boston is only slightly higher than that in the state as a whole. Among these

[1] This study was sponsored by the Research Department of the Women's Educational and Industrial Union of Boston, Massachusetts.

dependent aged, as among all such aged groups, the women predominate, composing about sixty-four per cent of the entire group and sixty-six per cent of the foreign born. Naturalized citizens, as judged from computations of a smaller group of 480 whose case records were read, constitute thirty-two per cent of these aged dependents, and the non-naturalized, about twenty per cent. In other words, one old person out of every five is ineligible for state old age assistance, because he or she has failed to become a citizen. The following cases suggest some of the difficulties that occur:

Santo Lopresto came with his wife to this country to join his children who had preceded him. Although he was fifty-four, shortly after his arrival he started to learn how to speak English, and took out his first papers. Before he could complete the naturalization process, he had a stroke which disabled him, so that he could not leave his house. Under these discouraging circumstances he failed to complete his naturalization.

Thirty-five years ago Mrs. O'Brien came to this country with her husband. A week before Mr. O'Brien was going to take out his second papers, he was killed in a fall from a scaffold. Mrs. O'Brien was sixty-seven at the time, and there seemed no point to her becoming naturalized. She did not expect to live until she was eighty-five, nor did she foresee that such a step would give her security in old age.

Besides those who were checked by "acts of God," there were cases of people who could not afford the twenty-five dollars necessary to secure the naturalization certificate, or who were illiterate and therefore discouraged by the educational requirements. These two obstacles seemed forbidding even to the men who, stimulated by politicians, had the incentive of acquiring voting privileges. The women were disinterested, because even if they became citizens, at that time, they could not vote, and could see no concrete benefits resulting from citizenship. One spinster described the situation in simple terms when she declared, "It wasn't the style for women to take out their papers." It is not remarkable that such was the case when one considers that it is a comparatively expensive process. First papers cost ten dollars, and second papers, if there are no complications, fifteen dollars. There is also the educational requisite which most women could not meet. Altogether, for women, it took more money and effort than they cared to expend. Among the aged dependents was a small group of married women who could not meet the citizenship requirement, but eighty-five per cent of the women who were thus disqualified for assistance were widows or spinsters.

If the acquisition of citizenship was an arduous and perplexing enterprise for the foreign born thirty or forty years ago, now it seems a hopeless undertaking. Even in Massachusetts, where only citizenship is required without any qualifying duration, there are few for whom it would be possible or practical. If they have no first papers, they must apply for these, then wait two years before applying for second papers. When one is approaching the seventies or is in the seventies, the tenure of life seems insecure, and a delay of two years interminable. Even though three-fifths of the foreign born fall in the lowest age period, 70–74 years, still for many of these, and for practically the whole forty per cent seventy-five years old or more, there would be much hesitation before investing the time and the money in trying to obtain citizenship.

There are further impediments besides the limitation of time and money. For

those who came to this country by land before 1906 there is no record of arrival. This is an important item when one considers that twenty-three per cent of the foreign born are Canadians, and that, as one-third of them are not naturalized, eight per cent of the entire group are affected. They must secure a record of registry which costs twenty dollars, instead of five dollars for the usual record of arrival. The whole procedure under such conditions would cost forty dollars. As all of the group studied are receiving public assistance now, such expenses are prohibitive.

The inability to speak English is another factor in the failure to obtain papers. One out of ten of the single women and two out of ten of the married women are from non-English speaking countries. The single women came when they were young, and, as they had no one to depend upon, were forced to learn English; whereas many of the widows depended on their husbands and children to act as interpreters, and never learned the language. One Syrian woman, when her husband died, used all their savings to come to America to live with her children. She was fifty-five when she first arrived, and she has never learned English. It is impossible for her and for many others in similar circumstances to become naturalized.

Still the handicap of birth in non-English speaking countries in itself does not deter people from becoming citizens. There is but little correlation between the number of persons from English speaking countries and the number of naturalized and non-naturalized. Sixty-three per cent of the English speaking people in contrast to fifty-six per cent of the non-English speaking secured their papers. In the latter group, the 115 Italians, who compose slightly more than half this class, bring down the rate, as only forty per cent of them became citizens. In all other non-English speaking nationality groups, at least three out of five became naturalized. This ratio is similar to that of the English speaking groups.

The age at time of arrival seems to have a more significant effect, as is shown by the close relationship of age at time of arrival and extent of citizenship. Seventy per cent of those who came here before they were twenty became citizens, while only sixty per cent of those who were between twenty and forty years old, and forty-five per cent of those over forty at the time of their coming, did so. Again, the fact that twice as many non-English speaking men as English speaking failed to take out their papers is offset by noting that three-fifths of them were over forty when they came here, while none of the English speaking male non-citizens had reached this age.

Even if the foreign born have overcome these various obstacles and have become naturalized, either when they first arrived or later, all their problems are not solved. Over a period of forty or fifty years papers may be lost or accidentally destroyed. To obtain duplicate certificates costs ten dollars. Proof of citizenship is more expensive and likely to be complicated in the case of women who compose two-thirds of the naturalized. Not one woman has obtained her own papers. They have all acquired their citizenship solely through their husbands and occasionally through their parents. In three cases out of four the person from whom they derived citizenship is dead. If papers are lost, the only solution is to apply for a certificate of derivative citizenship. This costs fifteen dollars. Besides this financial hindrance, there is difficulty in recalling enough information so that records may be traced, and in securing two persons who

know the situation sufficiently to give affidavits. Even with exact facts presented, sometimes the records are lacking. This is particularly true in the County Courts where records previous to 1900 are inadequate. Practically all were naturalized before that time. One widow derives her citizenship from her husband who took out his papers in 1845.

Regardless of whether the foreign born are citizens or non-citizens, they have made their contributions to the life of this country. All of them have lived in Massachusetts at least twenty years. Four-fifths of them have been in the state for more than twenty years. This is true of eighty-five per cent of the non-naturalized dependent aged. Twenty-seven per cent of the foreign born came here before 1880. About one-sixth of the non-naturalized arrive prior to that date.

These people have been permanent settlers, judging from the few shifts they have made from other parts of Massachusetts to Boston in the last seventy years. Due to this stability, in most cases it may be assumed that the time of their arrival in this state coincides with the time of their arrival in the United States. Two out of every ten foreigners came here before they were twenty, and more than seven out of every ten before they were forty. Among the non-citizens the ratio is lower than in the group as a whole, but still more than six out of ten came in the most productive years of their lives.

It has been demonstrated that the foreign born form a large section of the needy aged. They have certain problems peculiar to themselves, such as acquiring and proving of citizenship. These difficulties are most complicated for the women who compose two-thirds of the foreign born, as they have secured their citizenship solely through derivation. Forty per cent of the women are non-naturalized, usually on account of force of circumstances or the attitudes of the past. There are almost insurmountable barriers to be scaled by those old women in order to secure papers now. Seven out of every ten of these foreign born have spent the most fruitful years of their lives in this country, and have made contributions to our economic and social life. In consideration of these circumstances, they should be permitted the benefits of old age assistance.

SOCIAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LABOR LEGISLATION: A COMPARISON

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AS WE all know, our own country has no official connection with the I. L. O., as it is called in Geneva, (International Labour Office) for this is the labor branch of the League of Nations, and, therefore, we are not bound by its pronouncements. Nevertheless, we cannot but be interested in them. We must not forget that our high tariff is, theoretically at least, imposed for the purpose of shutting out goods that are made by cheap, over-exploited labor in foreign lands and thus allowing American manufacturers to pay higher wages and provide better conditions of work than obtain in Europe. For this reason alone, any effort to raise the standards of labor in European countries must be of interest to us. It would be most illogical for us to impose a tariff to protect us from competition with the "pauper workers of Europe" and then ourselves tolerate worse conditions of exploitation than exist over there. So it is well worth our while to consider the standards adopted by the International Labour Office and ratified by these pauper nations, in order to assure ourselves that we really are in a superior position and do not need any outside advice.[1]

The decisions of the I. L. O. are made in conferences held at least once a year in Geneva, to which each country belonging to the League of Nations is entitled to send four delegates, two to speak for its government, one for its organized employers, and one for its organized workers. When the conference agrees by a two-thirds majority that a certain standard in labor practice can be maintained in all countries and should be, it drafts a treaty formulating that standard and this treaty is then referred to all the member countries for their independent action. The governments are pledged to submit it to their legislatures for consideration, but are not obliged to ratify it. This gives public opinion in each member country an opportunity to express itself upon a policy which has received general international sanction but can only come into effect in any country through national action. When a government ratifies a "Convention" it commits itself to passing and enforcing such laws as are necessary for its application. Each Convention holds only for a given period, usually ten

[1] International Labor Standards and American Legislation (A Comparison). By Alice S. Cheyney. *Geneva Special Studies*, II, No. 8, August, 1931. Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Research Information Committee.

years, at the end of which it can be reconsidered.

By this method the countries which belong to the League, and that means more than three-quarters of the nations of the world, have for the last ten years coöperated in efforts to improve conditions in industry, and they have resorted to concerted action because it is very difficult for one country to introduce high standards and continue to compete with other countries in which standards are low. As we all know, the same situation exists in this country, for states with excellent labor laws and a fair wage scale are forced to compete with backward states where the wage scale is low and long hours and unsanitary conditions are permitted.

Thirty-one so-called conventions have been accepted by the I. L. O. and ratified by various countries, some of them being much more generally accepted than others. Let us take first those dealing with children. As we should expect, the comparison between our own standards with regard to child labor and those of the international body comes out quite well for us. Our general belief that in respect to child labor, while we may still have some way to go, we are in advance of other countries proves to be quite true in some respects, but not in all. The studies made by the Children's Bureau show that, when it comes to the age at which children may be employed in industry, we have seven states in which the standard is higher than that of Convention No. VII, which forbids industrial work before the age of fourteen. The laws of 26 states set the same age limit as does the Convention and only 14 states fall short in some ways, none of these being an important industrial state, with the possible exception of Missouri. No industrial state permits work for children under fourteen years.

This Convention has not been ratified by France, nor Germany nor Italy, but Great Britain has ratified it and so have Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, the Balkan States and Japan.[2]

Convention No. VI forbids night work to young persons under eighteen. Here we do not come out so well. It is true that all our states except three have laws regulating night work for minors and one which has no law on night work prohibits all industrial work before sixteen years. This leaves only South Dakota, Utah, and Nevada with no regulations at all on the subject. However, this does not mean that we come up to the standard set by the I. L. O., for our age limit for night work is usually only sixteen years and sometimes fifteen years. Girls under eighteen years may not do night work in six states, and in one the age is 21 years, but for girls only. The canning industry has in six states secured exemption from any restrictions of the kind. Yet fourteen European countries have accepted eighteen years as the lowest age for night work, including Great Britain, France, and Italy.

Agricultural work for children has always presented a difficult problem and the I. L. O. has dealt cautiously with it, limiting Convention XI to the statement: "Children under fourteen are not to be employed in agriculture in any way that will interfere with their attending school for an annual period of at least eight months." All the important European countries except France have accepted this, and so have Canada and Japan. Our states, when they deal with children in agriculture, do so by blanket provisions which require attendance at school. This

[2] It may be objected that ratification does not mean enforcement and that conditions may actually be little affected by such a formal gesture. This is, unfortunately, true also with regard to a good deal of our own labor legislation.

is true of 24 states in which the laws apply to all children under fourteen. (In New York, Arkansas and the District of Columbia, children under fourteen may not be employed at any time except by their parents.) In the remaining 24 states, agricultural work is either specially exempted from the child labor laws or omitted from the list of occupations to which the law applies, but in all these states there are school attendance laws and in many they do to some degree help to control child labor on the farms.

On the whole, our laws dealing with children do not measure up badly with the standards of the I. L. O., even our most backward states coming out fairly well and the more progressive ones going in some respects even farther than the conventions adopted by the Office.

When it comes to labor laws for men and women, there is a different tale to tell. Americans still believe in the "right of every individual to make his own contracts" and refuse to see that a contract made between one lone laboring man and the United States Steel Corporation is hardly one in which the bargaining power is equally divided. We may pretend that a fourteen-year-old girl is making a free contract with the Woolworth Company, but we know it is not true. However, this is the spirit of rugged individualism embedded in our traditions and forced on our legislators by Supreme Court decisions.

Let us take Convention No. 1, "The working day in industry is not to be more than eight hours long and the working week is not to consist of more than forty-eight hours." This was adopted at the first meeting of the International Labour Office which, strangely enough, was held in Washington in 1919, before we or the world knew that we were not going to join the League or have anything to do with its labor organization. Since then this convention has been ratified by 15 governments but not those of important industrial nations, with the exception of Belgium and Czecho-Slovakia. France, Italy, and Spain have, however, announced their readiness to ratify as soon as certain others do, and in Germany ratification has been recommended but not put into effect.

In our country no state has adopted an eight-hour day for men and women in all industries. Some have such a limitation for women, many for children, but none for men, except in various cases on public work. There are federal laws and state laws which place limits on the hours of labor for men, but this is when the safety of others depends on the accurate performance of duty, as by railway signal men, drug clerks, or men engaged in transporting miners in and out of mines.

Even for women our laws are less strict, for only six states come up to the standard set by the Office, that is, eight hours a day and forty-eight a week, and of these New York is the only one of any industrial importance. In seven states, including Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, there is no limit at all set on women's hours.

Convention No. IV may be summarized as follows: A woman is not to be employed in industry at night except in an undertaking in which only her own family is employed. Each country is to make its own definition of the night period, with the understanding that it is to cover at least eleven consecutive hours, including the period between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m.

The cotton textile manufacturers attempted recently to abolish by voluntary agreement that ancient evil in cotton mills, the night shift for women and minors. Henry Kendall tells us in the March, 1932, *Survey Graphic* that 84 per cent of the cotton manufacturers agreed to do this but 16 per cent remained obdurate and thus wrecked

the entire plan. This is perhaps one of the most striking demonstrations of what unrestricted individualism means in the industrial field. Still, if one looks at Miss Cheyney's diagram of the states in which there is no prohibition of night work for women in industry, one sees that cotton textile mills are not the only offenders, for many of these states do not manufacture cotton goods. Only 16 states have laws or commission rulings concerning night work for women, and in only 12 of them is industrial employment referred to. One of these 12, Wisconsin, goes beyond the standard of the International Labour Office; and another, Oregon, equals it. The laws of the other 10 do prohibit employment between certain hours, but neither call for a night period of 11 hours nor forbid work between hours that would guarantee such a period. Among these 10 states are all the important manufacturing states, with the exception of Illinois, which has no limit at all on night work for women; nor have the other 31. Convention No. IV, which covers this point, has been ratified by Great Britain, France and Italy, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Czecho-Slovakia.

Convention No. III deals with the employment of women before and after childbirth. This is a situation which has always interested the Latin countries especially. I remember the discussion at the first Conference in Washington, when it seemed that the Latin countries and the Anglo-Saxon were in opposing camps. The English and the American delegates were unwilling to recognize the industrial work of pregnant women or of women with young babies as a necessary feature in industry. At that time we Americans believed that it was not a vital question in our country and we even believed that the employment of married women in factory work was relatively infrequent. Now, some 13 years later, my own attitude is quite different and I believe that the same is true of the attitude of others who have an intimate knowledge of our present situation with regard to the labor of women.

Convention No. III provides that a woman is not to be employed in industrial or commercial work for six weeks after confinement; she shall be free to leave such work six weeks before confinement; and she shall not be discharged during the period of absence, and, should sickness due to her condition supervene, during such further period as shall be fixed by the competent authority in each country. During the time she is not working she is to draw benefits, either from public funds or insurance, sufficient to support herself and her baby, and to receive free medical attendance. When she returns to work she is to be allowed half an hour twice a day, during working hours, to nurse her child.

These provisions do not apply to agricultural employment and each Government is to make its own definition of agriculture. Family undertakings are also excepted.

Six states, only four of them industrial—Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and Missouri—have laws dealing with the employment of women before and after or merely after childbirth; but in none of these laws are there any of the other provisions embodied in the Geneva Convention, without which a mere prohibition may work great hardship. There is no law at all in Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois, those great industrial states; nor in the cotton textile states of the South, where so many women are employed.

Germany, Italy, Spain, Rumania, Hungary, Jugo-Slavia and Greece, have ratified this convention; and France has recommended its ratification.

We all remember the long fight for the one day of rest in seven for workers in the steel mills, which was finally won only through the personal influence of President Harding, to his eternal credit be it said. Most Americans suppose that that victory was complete, that the seven-day week and the twelve-hour day belong to a disgraceful past, but this is unfortunately not true even in the steel mills, as John Andrews of the American Association for Labor Legislation, will explain to anyone who asks. It is true that we have laws in every state prohibiting Sunday labor but most of them seem to be based on the Westminster Catechism, for they exempt "works of necessity and mercy," which of course have always been open to various interpretations. These laws were passed years ago and in many states they are looked upon as obsolete and are irregularly enforced. It is true that limitations placed on the hours of work for women usually have the effect of providing one day's rest in seven, and the same is true of laws with regard to the work of young people under sixteen. On the whole it must be said that the six-day week is very common, and even a five-day week was introduced in some industries before the industrial depression. Nevertheless, employes of continuous industries are often called on for Sunday work without any compensating rest period during the week.

Workmen's compensation for industrial accidents was slow in coming in our country but, once adopted, it spread rapidly and now 44 out of the 48 states provide compensation for such accidents; and the federal laws cover not only federal employes but longshoremen. Convention No. XVIII covers this. Five of our states, unfortunately all of them west of the Mississippi and only Missouri at all important industrially, go as far as the Convention or even farther, but four, South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, and Arkansas, have no compensation laws at all, and in all the others the laws fall short in some important detail of the Convention, either by not covering all kinds of occupations, or failing to provide for employers' insurance, or setting too long a waiting period before compensation is paid. The situation with regard to compensation for occupational diseases, which is covered by Convention XIX, is quite different. Here the map of the country shows only eight white states; that is, states measuring up to the Convention; and two of these, Minnesota and North Dakota, have little importance industrially. Illinois and Kentucky have some provision, but it is inadequate; and 36 states, including Pennsylvania and Michigan, Rhode Island, Maryland, Indiana, Missouri, Kansas and Alabama, have no compensation for any disease which arises out of employment.

It is a little mortifying to read the record of our struggle to prevent any money paid for compensation for injury or death caused by industrial accidents from leaving the country, by refusing it if the relatives who are entitled to the money are living in foreign countries. No less than 28 states specifically discriminate against non-resident alien dependents, either by reducing the compensation, or restricting it to a few near relatives, or by refusing it altogether. Among those which provide for reduced benefits is the great state of Pennsylvania and another is Michigan, with its large number of foreign born workmen. When we remember that most of the dangerous work in mines, steel mills, quarries, excavations, is done by the foreign-born, this seems a mean sort of legislation. Convention No. XX deals with this point, making it a matter of reciprocal agreement between countries.

Sickness insurance is covered by Convention No. XXV, which has been ratified

by Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and the three Balkan states. There is no compulsory sickness insurance in the United States.

Mrs. Florence Kelley's long fight for a legal minimum wage for women in industry was ended when the Supreme Court declared that such laws violated the famous Fourteenth Amendment, in which it is provided that no one shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. The application of this famous sentence to the question of a minimum wage for women seems to be rather theological in character. It reminds one of the Orthodox Jews who take that poetical verse in the Book of Exodus "Thou shalt not seethe the kid in his mother's milk" and make it mean a command never to let butter be placed on any platter that has held meat. However, there the decision stands and the American people are not to blame if only seven states have any kind of minimum wage laws, none of them coming up to Convention No. XXVII, which covers men as well as women. There is no minimum wage legislation in the United States applying to men, and those laws that apply to women have had to be worded so as to conform to the constitutional limits laid down by the Supreme Court,—all but California, which for some reason has been able to do as she pleased without any interference from constitutional lawyers. Of the other six states, Massachusetts is the only one which employs large numbers of women and here the law is not mandatory and can be enforced only by pressure of public opinion.

One more Convention should be mentioned, No. XXX. This deals with forced or compulsory labor. It would abolish one type of forced labor which still exists in the United States, that is, convict labor performed under private supervision and for private profit. This is forbidden in federal prisons and in about half of the states, but in some large industrial states it is still possible to hand over prisoners to private contractors. Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, are among the states permitting this system. In some cases the contractor practically sets up a factory within the walls of the prison and the convicts work under his foremen, although the prison guards are also in charge. Emma Goldman, in her autobiography, gives a vivid description of what she and Kate O'Hare endured under this system in the Jefferson City Penitentiary in Missouri, where they were serving sentences as war objectors. It is not a pretty story.

The American situation with regard to labor legislation is, therefore, not one of which we can feel very proud unless indeed we agree with the conservative majority of the Supreme Court or are still advocates of rugged individualism. Probably the attitude of the Supreme Court, as shown by its many decisions—Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissenting—has reflected fairly faithfully the opinion of the country at large up to recent times; but it is doubtful whether at present that is true. We realize now that we no longer have a frontier where there is unlimited opportunity for an enterprising man to make his way, and we have begun to wonder if it is really more important to secure to industry a free field for enterprise than to establish a measure of personal security for the individual workman. There has long been a general impression that the regulation of hours and conditions of work, the protection against accident and disease, and the provision of compensation for these, may safely be left to organized labor. But trade unions are far less strong than they were twenty years ago, and they seem to be losing instead

of gaining. The majority of Americans who come in direct contact with labor only in the building trades and the plumber's trade, and who know that the railway brotherhoods are very powerful, have an idea that trade unionism is a very important factor in this country; they do not realize that our greatest industries are either wholly unorganized or have very weak unions. Such are the steel and textile and stockyards and oil industries, the making of automobiles, of electrical supplies, most of the mining of soft coal, all of which are strongly organized in most industrial countries.

There is a general impression also that American employers can be trusted to do the right thing by their workers and that legal interference would only do harm. Those who think this have quite forgotten the obstinate resistance of the great steel companies to the abolition of the twelve-hour day and the seven-day week, of the glass works in the North and the cotton mills in the South to the abolition of child labor, or even of night work for children. It is true that there are many enlightened employers who can be trusted to set their own standards and carry them out, but these are chiefly large employers of labor in fields that are not highly competitive. The great majority of wage earners are employed in establishments with less than 100 employes, and in many of our industries a cut-throat competition obtains which leads to extremes of wage-cutting and of long hours and of night work, a situation which, as Henry Kendall shows, can be remedied only by legislation. There are also industrial organizations so powerful as to be able to dictate terms to their workers and so huge as to have no sense of human responsibility toward the individuals in their employ.

The recent depression, tragic as it is, has had some salutary effects on the American mind. It has led us to question some of our most cherished principles and to look critically at our most revered financial leaders. It has made us ask whether the prosperity of the country does not depend more on the wide distribution of money, than on its concentration in a few hands, on the cultivation of a consuming class rather than on the increase of production. And it has brought to us a revelation of the long-continued poverty and over-exploitation in many fields of industry that existed even during the fat years when we were assuring ourselves that all was well in this best of all possible lands. It has led us to doubt the wholesomeness of unrestricted individualism in industry and to turn rather to co-operative agreements for the insuring of minimum standards. Perhaps some day, if the chastening hand of adversity continues to press on us, we may even come to believe that between nations also agreement is better than competition and that we also may profit by joining an international effort to control greed and to provide a better life for the unprivileged in all countries.

WEALTH ACCUMULATION BY FARMERS

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THE accumulation of wealth by farmers is usually a slow process. The farmer frequently starts out as a hired hand with little or no money and by continuous labor may accumulate a few thousands of dollars from his efforts during his working lifetime. However, in many instances a large part of the accumulation has been the result of an increase in land value, some of which may not have been the direct result of his own efforts. However, many farmers during their early farming experience may have made some sacrifice in their standard of living and endured hardships with the expectation that they would be repaid in increased land values sometime in the future. Increases in land values are not likely to contribute very much to farmers' wealth accumulations until there is an increase in the purchasing power of farm products. It is impossible to separate with any degree of accuracy the proportion of his accumulations which are the direct result of his own labor from that which is the result of other influences.

The farmer's wealth consists of his assets in his farm business and other forms of investments. The farm assets consist of farm real estate, livestock, machinery and equipment, and supplies of various kinds. The supplies may consist of feed, lumber, fencing, fertilizer, and so on. The amounts of these items vary with the type of farm and relatively are not a very important part of the farm capital.

The other wealth of farmers consists for the most part of stocks and bonds, although there may be other kinds of investments. City real estate, for example, is a kind of investment which many farmers have and is considered a part of their wealth. There is usually a certain amount of cash in banks which is a part of the farmers' wealth accumulation. According to the Federal Census reports in 1920, the total wealth in the form of farm capital in the United States was $77,923,651,599, not including supplies on hand, growing crops nor cash set aside to run the farm. Approximately 73 per cent of this capital was owned by farmers and the remainder by non-farmers. By 1925 the total value of farm property, excluding the same items before mentioned, had shrunk to $57,017,740,040. From 1920 to 1925 the land in farms had decreased 31,564,363 acres. There was a decline in all geographic divisions in the United States except one, the Mountain States. In this division there was an increase of 14,352,148 acres. Part of the shrinkage in farm capital was due to less land in farms and part was due to lower values in farm land as well as other kinds of farm investments. The average value per acre of land in farms in the United States in 1920 was $69.38 and five years later had declined to $53.52, a decrease of 23 per cent. During the nine-year period from 1912 to 1920, the price of land in the United States increased 73 per cent and during the nine-year period following decreased 63 per cent. Changes in land values may therefore be an important factor in determining the wealth accumulation of farmers in periods of rapidly changing prices.

The discussion here presented on wealth accumulation is based on data obtained from a survey made in an important potato producing section of Clay County, Minnesota in 1929. In Table 1 are presented data for 76 owners who began farming as tenants and 73 farmers who were tenants

at the time the survey was made. Among the remaining 112 farms included in the survey were some who inherited their farms and some who purchased farms from their earnings in some other capacity than that as farm operators.

Forty per cent of the owners in 1929 had been tenants at one time. They had averaged 8 years as tenants which was 3 less than the tenants in 1929 averaged. Some of the owners of farms went directly from some other business to farm ownership and so had no farming experience previous to ownership. Some inherited their farms and had no experience as tenants.

TABLE 1

NET WORTH OF FARMERS IN CLAY COUNTY, MINNESOTA

	PRESENT OWNERS STARTING AS TENANTS	PRESENT TENANTS	ALL FARMERS
Net worth in 1929	$16,042	$2,546	$13,756
Net when starting as:			
Tenant	2,115	1,398	1,777
Owner	4,509		4,878
Years as:			
Tenant	8	11	9
Owner	15		18
Years farmer	23	11	27
Number of farms	76	73	261

The owners who had been tenants had a net worth over six times as great as that of those who were tenants in 1929 although they had been in the farming business only about twice as long. This suggests that owners are more rapid accumulators of wealth than tenants. It should be noted here that during periods of increasing land values the wealth of the farmer who operates his own farm accumulates from increases in land values as well as from sales of his products while that of a tenant comes only from his share of the products. During periods of decreasing land values the farmer who operates his own farm accumulates wealth only from the sale of products which may be offset in part with decreasing land values while the source of income for wealth accumulation by the tenant is the same as during increasing land values. A part, and in some instances all of the advantages owner operators of farms have during periods of increasing land values, is wiped out during periods when land values are decreasing. The 1929 owners who had been tenants had a net worth when they started as tenants of $2,115 which was $717 more than the 1929 tenants started with. The owners had a net worth of $4,509 when they began as owners. These amounts do not represent the total amount of capital which these people had available for use in their farm business. They borrowed some capital as they became tenants and owners. The debt for the 1929 owners who started as tenants, averaged $143 and for the 1929 tenants $542, thus making a total of $2,258 and $1,940 available for each group, respectively, when they began operating farms for themselves.

The owners increased their net accumulation, during their years as tenants, from $2,115 to $4,509, an increase of $2,394. This amounted to $299 per year. The 1929 tenants increased their net worth, during their years as tenants from $1,398 to $2,546, an increase of $1,148. This amounted to $104 per year or $195 less annually than the owners accumulated during their years as tenants.

All of the 1929 owners did not accumulate the same amount of wealth nor did they accumulate what they had at the same rate. The farmers who had accumulated only small amounts had been farming about as long as those who accumulated large amounts. Table 2 gives the amount and rate of wealth accumula-

tion of 187 farm owners in Clay County, Minnesota.

The farmers who had the most wealth accumulated it at the fastest rate. The annual accumulation for the group of 18 farmers having over $40,000 was ten times as much as for the group of 52 farmers having less than $8,000. There was no definite indication of a longer time in the farming business nor as owners for those with larger accumulations. It cannot be said that the net accumulation was directly the result of the net equity of these farmers when they began as tenants for the variation in these equities was less than in present accumulation.

Some of the present owners inherited all or part of the farm they owned in 1929 and some purchased their farms from relatives, parents in most cases. Those who inherited farms had an advantage in the matter of wealth accumulation over those who purchased them as indicated in Table 3.

About 14 per cent of the 165 owners who supplied the information had inherited their farms, 22 per cent had purchased from relatives, and 64 per cent had purchased from others. The most common way of acquiring farms was by purchase. About three times as many had purchased from non-relatives as from relatives.

TABLE 2

Amount and Rate of Wealth Accumulation of Farm Owners in Clay County

Wealth accumulation		Number of farmers	Years		Average accumulation annually
Range	Average net		Tenant	Owner	
Under $8,000	$4,416	52	11	12	$192
8,001–16,000	11,612	56	7	19	447
16,001–24,000	19,656	36	6	19	786
24,001–32,000	27,258	17	5	18	1,185
32,001–40,000	34,295	8		25	1,372
Over 40,000	56,426	18	8	21	1,946
Average..........	17,866		8	17	715

TABLE 3

Wealth Accumulation of 1929 Owners Classified as to Inheritance, Purchase from Relatives and from Others

Item	Farm inherited	Farm purchased from	
		Relatives	Others
Number of farmers.........	23	37	105
Total capital..............	$29,634	$25,103	$25,326
Present worth.............	21,697	16,363	16,456
Debt......................	9,067	13,300	8,866

The owners who had inherited their farms had a net accumulation of $21,697, those who had purchased from their parents $16,363, and those who had purchased from other people $16,456. The data indicate that the farmer who inherited his farm had the greatest net accumulation; furthermore, that the chances for accumulation of wealth are as great when buying land from non-relatives as from relatives. All farms purchased from relatives were purchased from a parent or a brother or sister. Twenty per cent of the farmers who had a net accumulation of over $40,000 had inherited their farms, while only 12 per cent of those with a net accumulation of less than $8,000 had inherited their farms. In-

heritance has played an important part in the accumulation of wealth among farm owners in the area studied.[1]

A group of farmers who passed through the tenancy stage to farm ownership was studied for the purpose of determining the rate of wealth accumulation in relation to the term of ownership. Fifty-eight owners who had passed through the tenancy stage supplied information on this point. The results appear in Table 4.

The first group purchased their farms during the period from 1922 to 1927. The price of land in Minnesota took its first big slump in 1922 and has been on the decline since. This period was one of increasing farm taxes, increasing farm wages, and slight increases in prices of commodities used by farmers in production. Living costs of the farmer changed but little during the period. The second group purchased their farms during the period from 1917 to 1921. The price of land during this period was on the incline. This period was one of increasing farm taxes, increasing farm wages up to 1920 after which there was a sharp decline, and an increase in the price of commodities used by farmers in production up to 1920 after which there was a decline. Living costs of the farmer increased rapidly up to 1919 after which they declined. The third group purchased their farms during the period 1910 to 1916. The price of land during this period was rising at a slow rate. Taxes, farm wages, and the price of commodities paid by farmers for use in production and living slowly increased. The price of land in Minnesota in 1917 was practically the same as in 1928 and it has been the main basis for the division of the three periods.

The principal commodities sold by Clay County farmers have been potatoes, small grain, livestock, and dairy products. Potatoes have fluctuated in price, there having been about as many good years as poor years. Grain and livestock prices increased some between 1922 and 1929 while the price of dairy products remained practically unchanged. The prices of all products sold by these farmers were relatively high from 1917 to 1921. The prices of potatoes, small grains, meats, and dairy products increased slightly at the end of the period from 1910 to 1916 but otherwise changed but little.

The farmers who became owners from 1922 to 1927, although accumulating the least during their period as owners, accumulated at the fastest rate in spite of the seemingly adverse conditions during

TABLE 4

Wealth Accumulation of Farm Owners Who Were Tenants According to Period of Ownership

Period as Owners	Average Number of Years	Number of Farms	Net Accumulation: As owners	Net Accumulation: Annually	Net Accumulation: Deflated
7 years and less	3.8	25	$4,684	$1,233	$795
8 to 12 years	9.7	16	8,861	860	443
13 to 18 years	16.5	17	8,092	491	468

[1] A study made in southern Minnesota in 1930 indicated lower labor earnings for farmers who inherited some or all of their farms than for those who purchased them. This is not in contradiction with the conclusions arrived at here. The wealth accumulation of those inheriting may be greater even with lower labor earnings because those purchasing farms in most instances have to borrow money on which interest must be paid. This interest would be available for wealth accumulation for the farmer inheriting his farm.

this period. The farmers who became owners from 1910 to 1916 accumulated at the slowest rate. The average annual accumulations for the last, middle, and early periods were $1,233, $860 and $491, respectively. If these annual accumulations are deflated, the group averaging 3.8 years as owners had an annual accumulation of $795, the group averaging 9.7 years, $443, and the group averaging 16.5 years, $468.

The question, why the more rapid accumulation in the late years, at once arises, and particularly as the latest period was in the so-called agricultural depression.

The average size of these farms was 242 acres for the last period, 191 for the middle, and 254 for the early period. There was the greatest variation in size in the group for the last period. The coefficients of variability were 61, 42, and 47 for the last, middle, and early periods, respectively.

The education of these three groups of farmers averaged 6.9 grades for the last period, 8 grades for the middle period, and 7.8 grades for the early period. The average age of these farmers was 40.4 for the last group, 44.4 for the middle group, and 49.4 for the early group. There appears to be no direct relationship between either the size of farm or education of these farmers to their rate of accumulation during their periods as owners.

A larger percentage of income was derived from crops by the farmers in the last period. This group obtained 58.2 per cent of their income from crops while the group in the early period obtained but 42.6 per cent from that source.

A group of factors which measures efficiency offers some explanation for the difference in the rate of accumulation. Labor income is a general measure of the efficiency of farm operation. Crop index is a measure of yields, and cost of production may be accepted as a measure of efficiency in the use of production factors. The ratio of expenses to receipts is a measure of the economy of spending. The relationship of these factors for the three periods is given in Table 5.

The above data indicate better labor efficiency and management, higher crop yields, lower costs of potato production, and greater economy in spending for those farmers who purchased farms during the agricultural depression. Potatoes have constituted the main source of income in the area in which these farmers are located for many years and the cost of producing potatoes is considered a fair index of their costs of producing other commodities. It is very likely that those who purchased land during the depression period must have realized that with high taxes and wages it meant hard work and efficient management on their part as well as curtailment of expenditures to the lowest possible point. Furthermore, it is likely that only those who had confidence in their own ability would purchase farms during a period of depression.

TABLE 5

Efficiency Measures of Farmers for Different Periods as Owners

Period as owner	Labor income	Crop index	Cost of producing potatoes per bushel in 1928	Ratio of expenses to receipts
7 years and less	$−256	120	$.37	84
8 to 12 years	−516	113	.41	97
13 to 18 years	−531	111	.41	90

On the other hand, many who enter an occupation during prosperous periods are lead to do so because of the seemingly lucrative returns. The result is that many are wholly unfit for the occupation, and the wealth accumulation for such persons will be slow. Many in the United States entered farming during the period 1917 to 1921 without any knowledge of farming. A study made in the northern triangle of Montana[2] shows that 60 per cent of the farmers who were on farms in 1922 became owners of land without having had any previous farming experience. Forty-one per cent of the owners in the area studied in Clay County who began farming from 1917 to 1921 had no farming experience.

INFLUENCE OF SIZE OF FAMILY

It has often been stated that farmers with large families have an advantage over farmers with small families in getting ahead in a financial way. The argument advanced by some is that family labor is less expensive than hired labor, and that there are certain routine jobs about a farm that can be performed better by members of the family than with hired labor because of greater interest by members of the family. While it is perhaps true that certain routine jobs about a farm can be performed better with family than with hired labor, it has not been demonstrated that family labor is cheaper when the cost of rearing the labor is taken into consideration.

Large families are expensive to feed, clothe and educate. The cost of rearing a child to 18 years of age, when he should be able to earn as much as his cost of keep, varies under different conditions. Estimates of the cost of rearing a child made by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company place the cost at $7,238. It is slightly more for a girl and slightly less for a boy. Figures compiled by the Life Insurance Sales Research Bureau of Hartford indicate this cost to be $6,122, with slightly more for girls and slightly less for boys. These figures include the cost of being born, food, clothing, education, health, recreation, insurance, and proportionate cost of shelter, fuel, and light. No mortality cost is included. Out of each 100 children born, 88.3 reach 18 years of age which means that the 88.3 who reach 18 years of age must bear the mortality cost of the 12.7 who do not. This cost has been estimated at $185[3] per child reaching maturity. No figure is included for interest which might have been earned on the annual cash expenditure to rear a child. The estimate of this figure is $2,624 which with the mortality cost of $185 would bring the total cost of rearing a child to 18 years of age up to $10,047. If we accept $7,200 as a fair figure for the cost of rearing a child to 18 years of age, it means that to pay for its keep it would have to earn on the average of $400 per year from the time it was born until it was 18. A child's efforts would scarcely add anything to the farm income before it was 10 or 11 years of age. From then until he was 15, he might do half of a man's work and from 15 to 18 a whole man's work. On this assumption, his labor would have to be worth $450 annually during the period he is from 11 to 14 years of age and $1,350 annually during the period he is 15 to 18 years of age. This would be at the rate of $37.50 per month for the first period and $112.50 for the second, and an average of $75 per month for the entire 8 years of working age. In only one year has the average farm wage without board in Minnesota ever been over $75 per month. If the cost

[2] Montana Station Bulletin 66, p. 68.

[3] *Journal of Heredity*, 18, p. 46.

of rearing a child is figured at $6,000, the average monthly cost from the time the child is 11 until he is 18 will be $62.50. In only three years has the average monthly farm wage without board in Minnesota ever been over $62.50.

The foregoing costs on the rearing of a child are not based on actual farm conditions. The costs for rearing farm children may be less as most of the items used in determining the costs of rearing children are somewhat lower in the country than in cities. There are no data at hand which give the cost of rearing children to 18 years of age under farm conditions. It is the opinion of the writer of this article that when all costs are considered, that $6,000 is a fair estimate.

According to a study in Iowa conducted by J. F. Thaden,[4] the cost per consumption unit was just as great in families with a large number of children as in families with a few children. The cost was only $8 more per consumption unit in the families with no children than in the families with 6 or more. C. E. Lively[5] of Ohio State University found that the cash expenditure per adult equivalent in Ohio was no greater for families having children in college than for families not having children in college. The implication is that families who spend money for education spend less for something else. If a farmer gives his children the advantage of a high school education, he has the full use of their time only three or four years after finishing high school before they start out for themselves. During the time they are in high school he has their full time only about three months in the year. If the children go through college, the farmer has the full use of their time only three months in the year from the time they are old enough to work until they complete their college education when they are ready to start out for themselves. All of this time the farmer has to hire extra help besides paying for his childrens' education which in the case of large families will retard wealth accumulation more than with small families. It should be recognized that not all farm children go to college or even complete the eighth grade. Those who do not and remain on the farm may help to earn the income which pays the expense of those who go on for more education.

TABLE 6

Wealth Accumulation of Non-inheriting Owners According to Size of Family

Number of children		Number of farms	Accumulation during period as owners	
Range	Average		Total	Per year
None	0.0	12	$12,372	$703
1–2	1.6	35	9,014	798
3–4	3.5	29	12,290	600
5–6	5.5	21	9,524	554
Over 6	8.3	15	21,313	836
Average....	3.5		11,966	684

The data in Table 6 do not indicate any definite relationship between the accumulation of wealth by the farmers in this study and the number of children in their families. The group of owners with over six children per family had the largest accumulation, $21,313, during their period as owners and also the largest annual accumulation, $836, per year. On the other hand, the group of owners with no children, had the second largest accumulation, $12,372, during their period as owners and an average annual accumulation of $703. The group with over six children per family averaged 17.5 years as owners and the group with no children

[4] Iowa State Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 238, Revised, p. 94.

[5] Doctor's Thesis, University of Minnesota Library.

averaged 17.6 years as owners. The group of owners with from 1 to 2 children per family averaged $9,014 during their period as owners, the group with 3 to 4 children, $12,290, and the group with 5 to 6 children, $9,524. The periods of ownership for these three groups were 11.3, 20.5, and 17.2 years, respectively. The average annual accumulations for the groups with 1 to 2 children, 3 to 4 children, 5 to 6 children, were $798, $600, and $554, respectively.

SUMMARY

Farmers who remain as tenants are not likely to have a very large accumulation of wealth in the form of agricultural investments. Farm owners accumulate wealth at a more rapid rate than tenants. This undoubtedly is partly because farm owners have certain financial obligations to meet in the way of taxes, interest, and payment on mortgages, the last of which, of course, adds to their accumulation. With such definite obligations, one is more likely to make plans to meet them than the one with no such obligations. The average annual accumulation of 149 farmers who were tenants was $203. The average annual accumulation of 76 owners during their period of ownership, who were tenants at one time, was $1,442.

The old axiom, "It takes money to make money" is as true in farming as in anything else. In this study the group of farmers with the largest amount of wealth, accumulated wealth at the fastest rate, and the group with the least amount at the slowest rate. Except for the group with the largest accumulation, there was little difference in the length of time these farmers had been farming. As a farmer's equity increases, the interest on his mortgage becomes less, which permits an increase in the amount he can apply on his mortgage. This permits a more rapid increase in wealth accumulation with large equities than with small ones. Farmers who inherited their farms had an advantage over those who purchased them. There appeared to be no particular advantage in purchasing farms from relatives. The farmers who purchases their land between 1922 and 1927 had a greater annual accumulation of wealth than those who purchased between 1917 and 1922 or between 1910 and 1917 in spite of the apparent unfavorable conditions for agriculture in the latest period. Farmers who purchased during the latest period gave the most attention to efficiency in production as measured by crop yields, cost of production, and ratio of expenses to receipts. People who enter the farming business during a period favorable for agriculture are more likely to be unsuited for that business than those entering during unfavorable times.

Farmers with large families had no apparent advantage in the matter of wealth accumulation over those with small families or no children at all. If all items of cost are taken into account, farmers with large families are probably at a disadvantage since when this is done it may be cheaper to hire labor than it is to rear it.[6]

[6] In the study referred to on page 123 a similar relationship was found to exist between size of family and operator's labor earnings.

LIBRARY AND WORKSHOP

Special Book Reviews by L. L. Bernard, Ernest R. Groves, Frank H. Hankins, Clark Wissler, Rupert B. Vance, Floyd N. House, Malcolm Willey, and others

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AN INTERNATIONAL SPECTRUM

PHILLIPS BRADLEY

Amherst College

Ten Years of World Cooperation. By the Secretariat of the League of Nations. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1930. xi + 467 pp.

The International Labour Organization: The First Decade. By the Staff of the International Labour Office. Foreword by Albert Thomas. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931. 382 pp.

International Labor Standards and American Legislation. By Alice S. Cheyney. Geneva: Geneva Research Information Committee, 1931. 62 pp. $.50.

Problems of Peace: Fourth Series. By various authors. London: Oxford University Press, 1930. xii + 224 pp.

Post-War Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. By Max Habicht. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931. xxvi + 1109 pp.

The International Mandates. By A. M. Margalith. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1930. ix + 242 pp.

A Collection of Nationality Laws. Edited by R. W. Flournoy, Jr. and M. O. Hudson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929. xxiii + 776 pp.

The International Conferences of American States, 1889–1928. Edited by J. B. Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, 1931. xliv + 551 pp.

Tacna and Arica. By W. J. Dennis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931. xviii + 332 pp. $4.00.

Survey of International Affairs, 1930. Edited by A. J. Toynbee, assisted by V. M. Boulter. New York: Oxford University Press, 1931. ix + 604 pp. Maps.

Survey of American Foreign Relations, 1931. Prepared under the direction of C. P. Howland. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931. xiv + 504 pp.

War and Diplomacy in the French Republic. By F. L. Schuman. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill, 1931. xvii + 452 pp.

French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870–1914. By E. M. Carroll. New York: The Century Company, 1931. ix + 348 pp.

European Financial Control of the Ottoman Empire. By D. C. Blaisdell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1929. x + 243 pp.

Europe: The World's Banker. By Herbert Feis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930. xxiii + 469 pp.

The International City of Tangier. By G. H. Stuart. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1931. xii + 323 pp. $4.00

The International Institute of Agriculture. By Asher Hobson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1931. vii + 356 pp.

The International Joint Commission between the United States and Canada. By C. J. Chacko. New York: Columbia University Press, 1932. 431 pp. $5.50.

Schemes for the Federation of the British Empire. By S. C-Y. Cheng. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931. 313 pp.

The United States and Disarmament. By B. H. Williams. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill, 1931. xi + 361 pp.

The Suez Canal. By C. W. Hallberg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931. 434 pp. $5.25.

Le Reglement Judicaire du Conflit de L'Alabama. By Egidio Reale. Geneva: Payot et Cie., 1929. 143 pp.

Any discussion of post-war international developments sooner or later comes around to the problem of international organization. The organizations centered in Geneva are the most important nucleus for the development of technic and the proliferation of activity. Undoubtedly the world as viewed from Geneva gives the observer a survey of the widest range of interests and the most varied set of political and administrative problems. For more than a decade now, over one thousand men and women have been employed on the staffs of the two major organizations in Geneva, the League of Nations and the International Labor Office, in penetrating the intricacies of these problems and developing their experimental solution. It is particularly interesting, therefore, to have a review of the activities in these two organizations brought together as has been done in the first two books, the *Ten Years of World Cooperation* and *The International Labour Organization*. Although both are

written in that "blue book anonymity" of the government official, it is none the less possible to feel the touch of the active administrator behind the formal phraseology of the text. As the League is the more political and the International Labor Office the more administrative organ, it is perhaps natural that the former volume should be more restrained in expression. A number of the problems discussed are still matters of debate among the League's members. Problems like mandates and minorities, opium and slavery control, and the like are not finished problems, completed projects. Here the reader can see the progress made toward the solution of those prickly post-war problems which the authors of the peace treaties found too delicate and difficult and so passed them on to this new agency of international cooperation. If any one doubts the value or the efficacy of the League in many of those issues which never get into the front page headlines, here are the facts, objectively and concisely set forth.

Observers at Geneva are not slow to sense the vitality which Albert Thomas has brought to his Directorship of the International Labor Office. His vivid personality and an unflagging zeal for improving labor conditions throughout the world he has somehow infused into the whole staff of the Office, and some of that moral enthusiasm pushes out through the pages of the summary which members of the Office have written. As he puts it himself, "Even if its tone is uniform and intentionally subdued it is vibrant with memory, with hopes, with emotion. We cay say with joy and pride that in these ten years the conviction and enthusiasm of the staff of the International Labor Office have never failed or weakened." If the problems confronting the International Labor Organization are more technical and administrative than some of those which engage the League of Nations there is no less contact with the powerful forces of economic self-interest in the industrial sphere. The very organization and structure of the International Labor Organization have been devised to take account of these forces by providing representation of both employers and workers as well as governments in the Governing Body and Conference. Here indeed is the first experiment with functional representation in international affairs, and, if the Organization had no other jurisdiction, it would have proved its value in bringing these interests into cooperative if not always unanimous discussion of their common problems. Certainly any one interested in the field of labor and industry will find this account of the first decade of progress toward the internationalization of uniform and progressively more advanced working conditions of first rate interest.

For Americans particularly, the study of *International Labor Standards and American Legislation will be of special pertinence.* (See Social Industrial Relationships in this number.) In a series of comparative charts the status of each of the American states with respect to the standards of working conditions set up by the thirty-one conventions of the International Labor Organizations are portrayed. The resident of North Carolina or Utah, New Hampshire or New Mexico can tell at a glance whether these particular conventions are above or below or equivalent to the standards of his own state on the questions involved. It is not an altogether happy commentary on industrial conditions in the United States that in most cases American state standards are below those in force in many foreign countries. Parenthetically the problem of Federalism is becoming an increasingly important one in international relations because of the division of authority which

exists in matters of social legislation between national governments and states. Only Germany and Austria have apparently solved the problem satisfactorily through constitutional authority conferred upon the national government in matters of state jurisdiction when they are the subject of international treaties.

If the foregoing volumes are necessarily restricted to factual accounts by reason of their more or less official character, the same is emphatically not true of *Problems of Peace*. This fourth collection of the lectures delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations includes four by members of the staffs of the League of Nations and the International Labor Office, who here speak in an unofficial capacity, and are therefore able to bring that quality of personal conviction and point of view to the discussion of the problems with which as experts they are immediately familiar. This year's lectures cover problems in the organization of the League and of the Office, with the peaceful settlement of disputes, and with such widely varied topics of general international significance as the "Unpreparedness of Public Opinion" and the "Economic Causes of War" by Professor C. Delisle Burnes, "International Relations in Manchuria" by Professor W. J. Hinton, "The Freedom of the Seas" by Mr. Alec Wilson, and, perhaps most interesting to American readers, "The Monroe Doctrine and The League of Nations" by the present Ambassador of Spain to the United States, M. de Madariag, who was formerly Chief of the Disarmament section of the League of Nations Secretariat. While the topics in any one of these volumes are not closely connected, any one who desires to follow a first hand account by persons intimately connected with activities centering in Geneva will find this annual series of great interest and value as a running commentary on Geneva developments.

Of all the original purposes ascribed to the League, certainly the most important was the prevention of war. That result was to be accomplished through many agencies and by various routes. Not the least important was the development of treaties for the peaceful settlement of disputes—a process which has gone on both within and without the immediate orbit of the League's activities. Besides the Covenant, the Statute of the Permanent Court, the Locarno Treaties, (the residual application of the Geneva Protocol), the General Act of 1928, are the major achievements of the League in this direction. Down to October, 1929, there were signed over 170 bilateral treaties between states, both members and non-members of the League, as well as the notable series of Pan-American Treaties of Conciliation and Arbitration (1923 and 1929). A member of the League of Nations Secretariat, Dr. Max Habicht has collected the texts, and provided the most important analysis of post-war treaties which has so far appeared in any language in his *Post-War Treaties and the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes*. This is an outstanding contribution to the progress of treaty-making toward a standard of inclusiveness and precision which will make possible the solution of every type of dispute which may arise. Dr. Habicht had the advantage of access to the unparalleled collection of treaties at Geneva, a collection produced by the operation of Article 18 of the Covenant requiring the registration of all treaties by states members of the League, and has used it to first rate advantage. His analysis of the types of treaties which have been developed and of draft treaty articles, is of outstanding importance. As nearly as a book can be definitive in a field so fluid as this, Dr. Habicht may be said to have contributed a final record of the achievements of the first post-war decade in treaty making. It

stands in fact as an index of accomplishment which indicates to the layman as well as the expert the extent of peace keeping machinery available today. It is no exaggeration to say that a combination of such expedients as have already been developed in these treaties—no one of them all inclusive to be sure—would cover every conceivable situation which might arise between states were the will to peace their guiding policy.

Of the making of books about the work of the League there appears to be no end. Certainly the mandates system has proved to be one of the most prolific sources of study. Dr. Margalith's *The International Mandates* is not exhaustive and is confined primarily to the juridical aspects of the problem, and even on this side leaves a good deal to be desired in view of much more systematic studies, such as those of Wright and Van Rees.

The first Codification Conference in 1930 elicited contributions from many countries, by individual legal experts and by scientific institutions, toward the elucidation of the problems which at the conference it was hoped might be reduced to conventional form. To the cooperative study of these problems the Harvard Law School contributed a number of significant monographs, among them *A Collection of Nationality Laws of Various Countries*. One of the authors is a member of the Department of State and the texts here reproduced have been collected from a wide variety of sources. The volume is a model of textual editing with valuable historical and bibliographical notes and an analytical index of 63 pages. As the one volume in any language covering the materials on nationality as contained in the constitutions, statutes, and treaties of some 100 states and colonies, it is an indispensable reference volume for a student of nationality problems.

If Geneva is one center of international organization, Washington may be said to be another hardly less significant. Indeed the Pan-American Union is older by 30 years than the League and, if it has not produced as intensive administrative organization and activity, the range of its formal interests and the variety of its activities are hardly less. It is of particular interest, therefore, to have for the first time in collected form in English the Treaties, Conventions, Recommendations, and Resolutions of the six conferences between 1889 and 1928. Moreover, Dr. James Brown Scott's introduction to *The International Conferences of American States, 1889–1928* offers a brief tribute to the significance of Bolivar in the development of a Pan-American sentiment and the interesting prophecy that "one day the dominion of Canada will join the impressive procession of American states and take its place in the governing board."

But if the formal activities of the Pan-American Union have remained somewhat circumscribed, the influence of the United States outside the Union upon its other members has been of outstanding importance. One example of this influence has been in the final settlement of many disputes between Latin American states. The most recent of Major disputes in which the United States has from time to time taken an active part is described in Dr. Dennis' *Tacna and Arica*. His study is of particular interest since he traces the dispute not only in legal terms but in the underlying national and economic interests which inevitably produce the clashes which have marred the development of the region. The rôle of the United States in the attempted plebiscite of 1925–26 was not a happy one, and the author does not minimize the difficulties on either side. The final settlement by direct negotiations was, however, brought about by the active

cooperation and advice of the United States. Thus the conflict was settled by the very means which previously had failed to resolve the dispute. Dr. Dennis suggests that responsibility (for settlement of disputes in which the United States is interested) should be either shared by the other republics or their advice should be secured. "It would be prostituting the general service of the Pan-American Union to make it a political organization but a council of American ambassadors similar to the one that functioned in Europe following the World War should participate at least in an advisory capacity in the interventions which the most casual observer knows are necessary and will be necessary for a decade in those sub-normal states (such as Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republics)." The procedure in the Chaco dispute is an alternative and perhaps an even more desirable means of mitigating the preponderence of our hegemony in the Americas.

The well known work of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in developing the cooperative study of contemporary international relations has been continued by the issue of the *Survey of International Affairs, 1930*. Under the general editorship of Arnold J. Toynbee, this year's volume includes a wide variety of subjects—from the Briand Plan, the Balkan Conference, and the Greco-Turkish settlement of 1930 in Europe to a variety of problems in the Middle East and in the Americas. There is a discussion of the Kuomingtang at Nanking and of the relations of the Nanking government to foreign powers. Finally there is a discussion of four problems of international economics—the rise of economic nationalism and the repercussions upon trade and price control policies of the fall of prices, the two League of Nations Tariff True Conferences, the more recent aspects of the reparations question, and the evolution of German internal economy as affected by reparations. As in previous volumes, there is full documentation and a careful index. The series has made an indispensable place for itself for any serious student of international affairs, and it is greatly to be hoped that the development of the work of the Royal Institute will continue under Professor Toynbee's fruitful supervision.

In this country the Council on Foreign Relations began four years ago a similar project with the more restricted aim of discussing current American-foreign relations. *American Foreign Relations*, 1931 includes three major topics;—Mexico and the United States, the limitation of armaments, and post-war financial relations,—a section which deals with the Bank for International Settlements, the Mixed Claims Commission United States and Germany, and the war claims of American nationals against Austria and Hungary. The American series has made an important place for itself in a more restricted field than the British survey has attempted to cover. The work of the Council under new direction will, it is hoped, continue the series with the same contemporaneity as the previous volumes. For the first time the student of International Affairs has been provided with materials, both authoritative and current, for an understanding of the changing world of political and economic interests about him. While the British and American services are in no sense substitutes for monographs on the problems which they discuss, it is nevertheless of enormous advantage to have these accurate and impartial analyses available for the study of major problems still in flux.

If the foregoing volumes have tended to give a conspectus of movements and tendencies in the sphere of contemporary inter-

national relations and to indicate the structure and work of international organs, the following volumes deal with particular problems or with special situations which offer no less varied an insight into the forces which motivate international action. Indeed, they may be divided into three broad groups indicative of the underlying influences in 19th and 20th century imperialism. The first and most dynamic influence is that of public opinion. It is not an altogether fortuitous coincidence that two books should appear simultaneously dealing with two aspects of the impact of public opinion upon diplomacy in a single country. Professor Schuman's *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic* is a brilliant study of the institutional arrangements and the practical operations of French diplomacy in the period from 1870 till the present. Carefully documented throughout, but written with an engaging and readable informality, the author traces the organization of the diplomatic services and their control in the Quai d'Orsay, and then proceeds to indicate their program and accomplishments in pre-war negotiations and in post-war consolidation of French influences. In a final section he analyzes the "dynamics" of foreign policy—the making of treaties, the initiation of war, and the formulation of foreign policy. In general he follows the accepted views of the revisionist historians as to the responsibility of France for the immediate outbreak of the war. Indeed, his chapter on the cabinet meetings during the crisis of 1914 is a brilliant description of the interplay of motives (both conscious and unconscious) among men some of whom knew exactly what they wanted and some of whom were only dimly conscious of the momentus decisions which they were helping to frame.

Professor Carroll's *French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs* proceeds further, along a narrower path, that of an analysis of the French press with respect to diplomatic issues, some created by and some thrust upon, the Third Republic. If anybody doubts the deliberate manufacture of public opinion by the press, here is evidence enough to convince the most skeptical. In every issue, from the Franco-Prussian War to the fateful days of July, 1914, the press played an overwhelmingly important part in stimulating and then feeding the public appetite for a strong foreign policy. Taken together, these two books on French diplomacy represent perhaps the most inclusive picture available today for any country.

If nationalistic feeling is more explosive, the influence of finance upon international relations is probably more continuous and in the long run more decisive. Two recent studies illustrate both aspects of the international relations of finance. Professor Blaisdell's *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire* is a model of careful historical research and a penetrating analysis of the technic of financial imperialism in an area where it has arrived at considerable maturity. For earlier intervention and penetration was substituted the apparently more objective mechanism of international control. While ostensibly a matter between the bankers and the Turkish government in which the European governments took no formal part, Professor Blaisdell brings out pretty clearly the actual if not official control exercised over the Public Debt Council by the governments concerned. Hardly less interesting, however, is the international administrative experiment which emerges from Professor Blaisdell's study. For here is at least one experiment in international financial control which has worked fairly successfully

and may, therefore, be looked upon as of significance in the development of international administration.

Professor Feis' *Europe: The World's Banker* covers a much wider field both geographically and analytically. The study is divided into three parts. The first is a record of capital movements of the three leading powers, England, France, and Germany. The second deals with the relations between the governments of these countries and the financial interests which increasingly came to depend on government intervention in the furtherance of their financial enterprise. The third part, more than half the entire volume, is concerned with an analysis of actual financial ventures both in and out of Europe, and the interweaving influences of governments, investors, and financiers in the enterprises which all too infrequently turned out to be thin cloaks for actual imperialism. As the author points out, "the uses which the capital of western Europe found were often determined by political circumstances rather than by economic and financial calculation. . . . . In the leading countries international financial transactions were supervised in accord with calculations of national advantage which were often unrelated to the direct financial inducement offered to the owners of capital." Here the story has been carefully traced so that he who runs may read. It is fortunate that we have materials such as these for judging the course and the methods of imperialism. Persistence in the old course can no longer be laid to a want of any evidence of its inevitable results.

International administration as it developed during the 19th century may be looked upon as one formula devised to mitigate the extremes of nationalism and imperialism and as the forerunner of the "Geneva experiment." It has taken various forms. Professor Stuart's *The International City of Tangier* is a study primarily of the internationalization of a city around which were centered many ambitions and hopes. Their cancellation required some sort of joint control and he has traced its evolution both before and since the war. The final solution came only in 1928. While the United States does not participate in the present international administration set up by the Convention of 1923 and the Statute of 1928, the study brings out clearly enough our intimate association with the problem since its 19th century emergence. Were it not for our non-membership in the League of Nations, a convenient solution would be to turn Tangier over to the League for administration along the same lines as Danzig and the Saar, where similar experiments in territorial government are under way. Professor Stuart's study is of first rate importance to an understanding of the complexity of this significant experiment in international administration.

A second form of international administration is to be found in the pre-war unions. Dr. Hobson's *The International Institute of Agriculture* is the first comprehensive study of one of the most important of the pre-war unions. Its organization may, in fact, be taken as an embryonic stage in the development of the League of Nations—as it is itself now in the process of becoming the League's agency, with somewhat the same relation to it as that of the International Labor Organization, for the cooperative solution of agricultural problems. The study is particularly interesting for it was an American, David Lubin, who just over a quarter of a century ago so interested the King of Italy that the Institute was established at Rome under his patronage. It has grown to have the largest international staff outside of Geneva and comprehends within

its activities a very wide variety of agricultural interests and cooperative agencies. Momentarily the United States is not actively cooperating and Dr. Hobson's study indicates some of the reasons which have been put forward for present American policy toward the Institute. But it is a good deal more than an ex-party brief and provides not only the most comprehensive account in English of the Institute but an incisive analysis of the difficulties of providing the basis of real international administration.

Dr. Chacko's *The International Joint Commission* is a careful study of still another form of international administration—the most important example on this continent (on a limited scale) of the type represented by the European river commissions. It was established in 1909 to inaugurate an ordered regime for the use of the international waters between Canada and the United States and is composed of six members, three representing each country. The Commission has considerable powers, both administrative and judicial, and acts as a fact-finding agency for both governments in matters of dispute relating to a variety of problems from shipping to power development. The extent of its powers is considerably greater than knowledge of its activities. Dr. Chacko's conclusion that it is an important "pillar" in the edifice of Anglo-American peace is amply borne out by the conciliatory procedure on various disputes submitted to it. The work of the International Joint Commission is significant in two ways. First as an indication of the effectiveness of administration itself and secondly as a prophecy of the expanding area within which administrative can be substituted for political and nationalistic considerations.

It is not impossible to term the British Empire the greatest experiment of international administration which has yet been attempted. Two recent studies of the Empire illustrate the changing aspects of imperial political and administrative problems. Dr. Chang in his *Schemes for the Federation of the British Empire* traces the movement for imperial unity down to and through the War and then proceeds to analyze in detail the various schemes which have been put forward in two periods before and since 1910. In the earlier period some sort of imperial parliament lay at the root of most schemes, while since 1910, both in theory and practice, development has been toward a rapidly evolving equality and partnership among the self-governing parts of the Empire.

It is with this second period particularly that Professor Elliott's *The New British Empire* deals. It is a most important contribution to an understanding of the present rapidly changing and flexible ties which hold the Empire together. Like the British constitution, the "conventions" of imperial unity are largely unwritten, and the author has succeeded in elucidating and clarifying these conventions in their emergent phase. Since Professor Simmern's *The Third British Empire*, no volume has yielded so well-rounded a picture of the evolution of this remarkable political and administrative unit.

If public opinion is the dynamic, international finance one of the ties, and international administration the mechanism of international coöperation—or discord,—then armaments and their mobility have certainly—and too frequently—been the expression of that continuing mistrust of coöperation which ultimately deteriorates into the discord of war. Three recent volumes deal with the various aspects of

armaments. Professor Williams' *The United States in Disarmament* is a well documented account of our present policy in the field of disarmament. Our naval needs, the naval conferences from 1921 to 1930, and our coöperation with the League of Nations are here traced in clear and objective terms. No book will give the reader so adequate a conception of the aims, possibilities, and problems of the Disarmament Conference now meeting in Geneva, and our relation thereto.

Professor Hallberg's *The Suez Canal* is the first complete account of the history and diplomatic importance of the Canal. Despite all the changes of condition, of politics, and of finance, British policy has been insistent on conserving British control in the Canal. Without the Canal, British defense, both imperial and local, would be jeopardized. Perhaps no one has ever estimated the number of battleships or battalions which the Canal is worth to England, but this account indicates clearly enough that the strategic importance of the Canal still dominates British policy both in defense and in imperial administration in Egypt.

Finally, Professor Reale's study of the Alabama claims arbitration at Geneva, while it offers nothing new as to the legal aspects of the conflict between the United States and Great Britain, is significant as a clear indication of the effects of illegal, or what is claimed to be illegal, action in the use of armaments. The importance of the Alabama arbitration lies in its contribution to the movement for pacific settlement. And so our spectrum is comlete. *Inter arma silent leges.* But after the smoke of battle has cleared away, law reasserts its jurisdiction, and somehow seems to advance into new hinterlands of hitherto unregulated political, economic, and social problems. To an understanding of this process these books make distinct but none the less inclusive contributions. They are a challenge to the validity of the old Machtpolitik, *si vis pacem para bellum*, and a test of the variety and extent of the applications of the new faith, *si vis pacam para pacem.*

THE GIDDINGS SOCIOLOGY

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The book speaks. Franklin H. Giddings is lecturing in his inimitable way. The theme is that of the famous Friday afternoon lectures in Kent Hall. It so happens that the book is written from transcripts of a two year lecture course given at Teachers College of Columbia University at the request of Dean Russell. Into these lectures the Dean of American Sociologists put the best of everything that he had. They were based on manuscripts ripened through a score of years of meticulous recasting and revision. If former students find unusual emphasis on education this should not be ascribed to the mere fact that these lectures were given at Teachers College. *The Great Medicine* shows that this interest was something more fundamental. In his latter years Giddings was thoroughly convinced that the way out, the hope of better things, the increase of human adequacy and happiness was to be attained not so much by law and control as by education and inspiration. Giddings always was a sociologist and an educator.

"How did they get that way" and "where do we go from here?" This was what was on the mind of Giddings the poet, philosopher, and sociologist who delighted in thinking of life as an adventure filled with romance. These simple

phrases of a passing vernacular helped to set the theme for *Civilization and Society*. In a more formal phrase (p. 386) Giddings gives us the definition of sociology which he finally preferred. "Sociology is the study of the behavior of human beings with, to, and for one another, and of the resulting arrangement of relationships and activities which we call human society."

Giddings was one of those rare geniuses who collected great masses of material, scrutinized them most critically, and then, with recurrent flashes of insight, arranged and presented them in meaningful perspective. He possessed that unusual guiding wisdom or judgment which can interpret facts and findings. With superb literary ability he communicated his interpretations,—sometimes in terms of generalizations or as fundamental principles of collective behavior, sometimes in terms of continuities and trends and anon in portrayals of interacting human behavior. This most recent work is found in a well ordered *Principles of Sociology* set forth over thirty years ago, but purged and enriched by every truth that his indefatigable search could bring to task. Through all these years "consciousness of kind" remained in his thought as a pre-eminent factor in human group behavior. For more than a score of years the study of "interstimulation and response" statistically and in terms of patterns was his favorite method of inductive approach. Observing multi-individual human behavior with an open mind, seriously endeavoring to make a genetic and functional interpretation of his observations, he always needed human purposefulness to complete the store of co-individual behavior. For him, society at its best includes a societal telesis operating for the achievement of adequacy in man and for man. *Civilization and Society* thus fittingly closes with the thought,—"Facing the facts that the social sciences are making known to us, and will make better known, should enable us to diminish human misery and to live more wisely than the human race has lived hitherto."

May I, even in this brief review, inject one fairly long quotation (p. 176), selected, first, because it is so characteristically the philosophy of Giddings the man, and second, because it is such a trenchant commentary on our present social order by Giddings the sociologist. It is the theme of a book which he had long hoped to write under the title of *Men and Things*, "It is perfectly clear that happiness does not depend—as the philosophers have insisted and as the religious leaders have maintained—on the abundance of the things which we have, as the Scriptures put it, but on ourselves and our attitude towards things and the way we adapt ourselves to the world we live in. Happiness is an art, and does not come without some skill in getting it, and the most fruitless way is trying to get it through possessions. You cannot get it through having things or what we call pleasures or amusements; that will not bring happiness. You are happy if you are interested in something worth while and working at it in such a way that you feel you are achieving something. That is the chief thing."

Any attempt to digest a compact work of such artistic integrity as *Civilization and Society* would be presumptuous. It is better merely to say that it was written with a fourfold purpose and by Giddings, permitting the author to tell us in his own words (p. 385) why he wrote it. "The first purpose is to present an elementary account of the dynamics and the psychology and of the development and functioning of human society, which may serve also as a sort of introduction to the history and theory of civilization. A second purpose is to present a number of impor-

tant elementary aspects of the continuing development of modern society as they are reflected in certain social processes and problems. A third purpose is to point out certain practical applications of sociology to our education, public policy and entire cultural development. And a fourth purpose is to indicate the importance of sociology as a scientific study of human society, and to stimulate more rigorius scientific methods and attitudes and more effective applications to the end that society may attain a better selection, preservation, and development of a superior mankind."

The editor, Howard W. Odum, has rendered an invaluable service in aiding and encouraging the author and in expeditiously bringing forth the publication. Notwithstanding the condensation and reorganization necessary to reduce the elaborate manuscript to the limits of a single volume there is an excellent continuity and most of the chapters are well organized. Some of the elisions and curtailments are so evident that we wish that the volume might have been somewhat expanded. Footnote references to other writings of Giddings would have been especially helpful at those points where the original manuscript has been most condensed or cut. As it stands, the book should be an excellent text for an introductory course in sociology although it contains none of the usual teaching aids, such as references, additional readings, subdivision analyses of chapter contents. There are a few weak spots in the editing of which a single instance will suffice. It is rather difficult to tell what is meant by the "lowest population" referred to on page 177. But the weak spots are minor, few and far between, and it would be most ungracious to dwell on them. The work as Dr. Odum has given it to us is worthy of Giddings at his best.

THE HISTORICAL APPROACH

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Economic and Social History of Europe in the Later Middle Ages (1300–1530). By James Westfall Thompson. New York: The Century Company, 1931. viii, 545 pp. Maps. $5.00.

Proponents of Limited Monarchy in Sixteenth Century France: Francis Hotman and Jean Bodin. By Beatrice Reynolds. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931. 210 pp. $3.50.

French Mercantilist Doctrines before Colbert. By Charles Woolsey Cole. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1931. xiv, 243 pp. $2.50.

A Cultural History of the Modern Age. The Crisis of the European Soul from the Black Death to the World War. Vol. II. Baroque and Rococo. Enlightenment and Revolution. By Egon Friedell. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931. ix, 457 pp. $5.00.

France under the Bourbon Restoration, 1814–1830. By Frederick B. Artz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931. xi, 443 pp. Illustrated. $4.50.

Readings in European History since 1814. By Jonathan F. Scott and Alexander Baltzly. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1930. xxv, 689 pp. $3.50.

Modern English Reform. From Individualism to Socialism. By Edward P. Cheyney. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931. vii, 223 pp. $2.00.

Social Politics and Modern Democracies. By Charles W. Pipkin. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931. 2 vols., xxxiv, 317 pp.; vii, 417 pp. $7.50.

Nationalism in Modern Finland. By John H. Wuorinen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931. x, 302 pp. $3.75.

The Prohibition Experiment in Finland. By John H. Wuorinen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931. x, 251 pp. $3.50.

Bulgaria's Economic Position. By Leo Pasvolsky. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1930. xiii, 409 pp. $3.00.

Soviet Russia. A Living Record and a History. By William Henry Chamberlin. Revised edition. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1931. xiii, 486 pp. $3.50.

Germany not Guilty in 1914 (examining a Much Prized Book). By M. H. Cochran. Boston: The Stratford Co., 1931. xiv, 233 pp. $2.00.

Not the least significant consequence of the Peace has been the steady broadening of the time-space interests of American scholars. There has been a significant increase in the number of publications in this country devoted to historical sequences which have been important for the various traits of Euro-American culture. And there has been an increase in publications which by way of translation or commentary provide wider diffusion for interpretative concepts of a European origin which have been familiar chiefly to specialists. It is not too much to expect that the coming generation of American scholars in the social sciences will be much less nationally circumscribed in their intellectual trends than the last.

In his volume on the Later Middle Ages, Professor Thompson completes one of the most notable publications in this country in the field of general economic history. Possibly less original material has gone into this volume than into the earlier one on the period from the fall of Rome to about 1300. However, like its predecessor this book will diffuse an appreciation of the complexity and diversity of the lines of economic development in Europe. It will do much to dispel the over-simplified concepts of stages which have prevailed in sociology and economics. It is through the rise of commerce and industry in European towns that our modern economic patterns are to be traced, not through agrarian transformations in England, the activity of the Jews, or ground rents. The chapters on "Town Leagues in Germany," "The Florentine Woolen Industry," "The Fiscal and Economic Policy of the Papacy" and "The Origin of Modern Business Methods" make available materials hitherto familiar chiefly to specialists. The latter might wish that the scope of this series had made possible more adequate documentation.

Dr. Reynolds' monograph renders more accessible the ideas of two significant political thinkers of the period of the religious wars in France. Bodin is ordinarily set out merely as a pioneer of the conception of absolute sovereignty. As Dr. Reynolds emphatically shows, his position was not so simple. She suggests that he developed his absolute concept under the stress of political pressure, but she does not consider the alternative view of Allen in *Political Theories of the Sixteenth Century*, that Bodin's absolutism was theoretical and ideal, while his constitutionalism was a considered view of the actual polity in France. The explanation of the failure of these ideas to find fruition in seventeenth century France would profit from a more searching appraisal of contemporary trends in social and political behavior.

Dr. Cole's study recalls an even less familiar aspect of Bodin—as a precursor of mercantilism. Dr. Cole does not find mercantilism as a system of thought before 1600, after which date Laffemas and Montchrétien published comprehensive analyses of the economic position of France. But he assembles interesting traces of earlier formulations of most of the essential mercantilist concepts, running back in some instances to the close of the Hundred Years' War. A concluding chapter synthesizes the socio-economic outlook which prevailed about 1629 when Richelieu was launching his measures for economic development of France.

Egon Friedell uses the term "culture" in the current German sense, in contra-

distinction to "civilisation." Culture refers to what seem to be the less institutionalized aspects of life—the fine arts, philosophy, science. These and the activities of "great men" are approached in the manner of an aesthetic critic. Friedell seeks to find a significant unity between them all for a given period or culture type, and to formulate its essential spirit without reference to institutional or extra-social factors. He does not have a far-reaching formula to expound, as Spengler; nor does he insist upon isolating his culture types within specific periods of time. Thus Spinoza can be taken as the symbol of the early Baroque spirit, and Descartes of the later High Baroque. Enlightenment, Classicism, and Revolution can later be compared to geological "dikes" as distinct from "strata." Friedell adheres closely to socially "visible" culture, the activities of the social and intellectual aristrocracy. "Great men" are forces. Wars on a large scale are "gigantic metabolisms which take place in the world-body" (p. 4). "The voices of his blood" (p. 75) illustrates a tendency to animistic thinking. Friedell writes vividly, and at times arrestingly, but his chief value seems to be in suggesting many relationships between scattered fields of behavior, and in aligning them with reference to significant—not final or exclusive—concepts.

Professor Artz' admirable volume upon the period succeeding Friedell's illustrates the wider scope given to culture history by newer trends in American scholarship. Artz does not neglect the fine arts or ideas, as most institutional historians of the last generation were wont to do. Nor does he interpret them in terms of provincial morality, despite his "middle-class liberalism." But the substance of his book is institutional—government, press, church, education, economic behavior, social classes, and rural-urban differences. The style is clear and agreeable; the ideas developed in terms of concrete allusion more frequently than in terms of verbal abstraction. It is a book infused with scholarship; not a monograph forced to become a book. If Artz has a thesis it is to demonstrate conclusively that the sun of France had not set with Waterloo, but that she was able to put forth a prodigious amount of creative energy. Otherwise he does not seek for a significant unity in his period, or for an inner relatedness between constitutional monarchy, the romantic movement, the clerical reaction and the bourgeoisie. It would be possible, without sinking into mysticism, to probe more closely than Artz does the relationship between groups of coincident phenomena. But it would be necessary to attach more importance to the critical analyses of Bonald and Saint-Simon.

The book of *Readings* is primarily an undergraduate tool, devised to supplement such texts as Schapiro, Hayes or Flick in sources in Nineteenth Century Europe. However, the choice of readings gives the volume something more than pedagogical usefulness. By far the greater proportion of selections is contemporary or later interpretations of significant event-sequences. There is much which illumines patterns of nationalistic and social thinking during the century. The excerpt translated from Sombart's *Deutsche Volkswirtschaft* on the principles of modern economic technology almost justifies the work. When is Sombart's work to be presented at full-length to American readers?

Professor Cheyney's pleasant lectures upon *Modern English Reform* summarize in highly selective fashion some trends of English social history since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The central thread he finds in "hundreds of laws of a certain characteristic type. They are

laws intended each to remove some particular abuse or to introduce some general improvement in the condition of the people" (p. vii). He believes that this process is a constant and stable one, which will continue. "The work of getting rid of barbarism, of injustice, of incapacity, of human weakness and suffering the triumphs over our ignorance, may be scarcely yet begun" (p. 223). The account of reforms brought about in the hey-day of individualism is more complete than the discussion of developments in the more recent collectivist period. But one would never guess from this version of English history that there ever were any Tory humanitarians or that men who agitated corn law reform strove against meddling with their factories.

Professor Cheyney's melioristic approach is echoed with more balanced scholarship in *Social Politics and Modern Democracies*. But a greater contrast in style could scarcely be found than between the verbal felicities of the veteran historian and the involved unrhythmic phrases of the political scientist. Professor Pipkin has provided in these two volumes an exhaustive revision of his useful *Idea of Social Justice*, which incorporates the post-war developments in France and England. His book is an indispensable work of reference for inquiry into the fields of social legislation and of politically organized social movements since 1900. These matters are treated almost purely as political phenomena. There is little awareness of England's economic position, for instance, or premonition of last summer's crisis. However, attention is directed to trends in the direction of extra-parliamentary adjustment of social problems (e.g., I, 57, 167, 191, 254).

Dr. Wuorinen has found material in the recent history of Finland to illustrate two of the most contentious modern political problems. As in many other countries, nationalism was sponsored in Finland by middle class zealots who coöperated with philologists and historians in creating ancient glories to be proud of, in converting popular idiom into literary language, in collecting folk-lore, and in promoting public education in the vernacular. But here two nationality movements developed. The Finnish movement, commencing shortly after the transfer from Sweden to Russia in 1809, seems to have been facilitated by the relatively short length of time that Swedish rather than Latin had been the language of the intellectual classes. The Swede-Finn movement, which united with the Finnish in resistance to Russification, arose in defense of certain upper class interests in the Swedish tongue, but has found its basis for continuance in the fact that a tenth of the peasant population speaks a Swedish idiom as its vernacular. Bilingualism is spreading; the two languages are both official; and the divergences between the linguistic groups have not been sharpened by coincident economic, religious, or class fissures.

Finland's temperance and prohibition movements find their analogue in the United States, whose behavior they have closely echoed. The earliest tract (1843) was translated from an American pamphlet. One of the earliest acts of a Finnish diet (1865) was to forbid home distillation; the Gothenburg system was tried; beer was encouraged to combat spirits; traffic in spirits was restricted to the cities in the late eighties; and comprehensive rural local option went into effect in 1895. The consumption of liquor declined steadily before and during the war, and at its close the time seemed opportune to make a definite social stand. Prohibition advocates declared that they had found the key to solve numerous vexing social problems. The results of

complete prohibition (1919) have paralleled those in the United States. Dr. Wuorinen displays commendable caution in handling statistics of crime, alcoholism, insanity, confiscation, liquor cases, and smuggling. It is clear, however, that the promised millenium with respect to many social evils has not arrived; liquor consumption through illicit channels is back nearly to the pre-war level, law enforcement costs have had a meteoric rise, and fresh patterns of anti-social behavior have been stimulated. At the time of gathering material (1929) the dominant political parties resting upon farmer and artisan votes were firm for a continuance of the experiment.

Pasvolsky's study of Bulgaria is a competent analysis of the country from the standpoint chiefly of its ability to make remittances upon its international debts. This seems to be the great aim of League of Nations efforts at economic reconstruction. Pasvolsky hints, however, at the basic peasant pattern, with scattered strip holdings, and at the limited success of attempts at agrarian reform. The national per capita income of the country is $60 a year, of which national and local budgets absorb a fifth. The remaining average net income is regarded as below the minimum of existence.

The revised edition of Chamberlin's *Soviet Russia*, containing discussions of farming developments and of the Five-Year Plan, renders the work even more accessible than formerly for class-room use with courses making a comparative approach to institutions. There is no book so valuable as a starting-point for the examinining of any socialaspect of Soviet rule.

Professor Cochran's engrossing book is devoted not so much to the acquittal of Germany as to the impeachment of Bernadotte Schmitt's *The Coming of the War*, to which not only a Pulitzer prize but also the George Louis Beer prize of the American Historical Association has been awarded. Cochran writes with feeling, which can not arise from the need of defending a record of partisanship in the war-guilt controversy. As an exercise in applied historical criticism, Cochran's work is about the most devastating thing that has been published in the United States. The layman may find it helpful to turn from chapter 2 to chapter 8 before returning to chapters which analyze in cumulative detail and with fascinating patience the consequences to which errors of historical construction may lead. Professor Cochran regrettably employs too persistently as a datum his inference of Schmitt's pro-Ally prejudice—for which he presents evidence. A fellow-scholar deserves as much cautious respect in interpreting his mental processes as Bethmann-Hollweg, or even as Viscount Grey. Harry Elmer Barnes, in a more tactful introduction, suggests that the trend of events will precipitate early widespread assent to the revisionist position.

RUSSIA YESTERDAY AND TODAY

HELEN IRENE McCOBB
University of North Carolina

Russia. By Hans von Eckardt. Tr. by Catherine Alison Phillips. New York: Knopf, 1932. 711 pp. Illustrated. $7.50.

History of Russia—From the Earliest Times to the Rise of Commercial Capitalism. By M. N. Pokrovsky. Tr. and Ed. by J. D. Clarkson and M. R. M. Griffiths. New York: International Publishers, 1931. 374 pp. $3.50.

Protection of Women and Children in Soviet-Russia. By Alice Withrow Field. New York: Dutton, 1932. 241 pp. $3.00.

Dr. Hans von Eckardt has not merely written a history of Russia from documents and the usual historical materials (these, of course, are the basis of his facts) but has brought to bear as well his knowledge of Russian thought gained from his university student days in Moscow and his understanding of the Russian masses gained from his service as a statistician to a zemstvo. Delving into the past of Russia, the author presents its development from the earliest known periods of Russian history through the recent years of the U. S. S. R. The volume, *Russia*, a translation from the German, is New History in the fullest sense in which James Harvey Robinson defined it. All aspects, political, economic, cultural, religious, of the life of the Russian people are traced in such a manner as to show how their influences interwove to produce the Russia of the past and present. The author skillfully weaves into his presentation the numerous foreign influences which Russia has felt. It is here that one questions, without being able to find a satisfactory answer, whether there has not been an over-emphasis upon and an over-evaluation of the German influence. More than half of the volume describes the period of the Revolution of 1917 and following in such a way that a clear idea of the growth of the U. S. S. R. is gained. Throughout the first half of the volume, Dr. von Eckardt gives a prominent place to those factors which led to the growth of revolutionary sentiment and action. It is interesting to note that side excursions are made into the subjects of human geography and sociology. Chapter 2 of Part IV is an "analysis of sociological factors" in the 1905 Revolution. The discussion covers leaders: priests, officers, teachers, terrorists, demagogues; group antagonism between Proletariat and Bourgoisie, and the peasant question. Why the nationalist reaction should be regarded as a sociological rather than a political matter is a question. Chapter 1, "The People and the Land," of Part VI gives a discussion of human geographical factors, one so brief as to consist largely of broad generalization. The table of dates given at the end of the volume is useful for reference. Especially valuable are the two appendices one dealing with the significance of the Revolution, and the other including statistical tables and diagrams and maps. The text gains much in interest from the many illustrations scattered through it.

Until the publication of Clarkson's and Griffith's translation of Professor Pokrovsky's "History of Russia" in 1931, English readers had no means of discovering how Soviet historians were interpreting Russian history. Professor Pokrovsky is eminently fitted to write history for Soviet Russia because of his long association with the Russian revolutionary movement. Trained in history at the University of Moscow, he later wrote historical articles and lectured in Moscow until 1903 when he was forbidden by the police to give public lectures. He then became a contributor to *Pravda*, the Bolshevik newspaper, and joined the party in 1905. He was forced to migrate in 1908, but abroad he carried on his party activities and study of history. Since 1917, he has been active with the Revolution and has served as Vice-Commissar of Education since May, 1918. There is history and history. The interpretation of historical facts by various historians is different, and it may be that each generation must write history for itself. Professor Pokrovsky believes that the Soviets must write their own history not only of Russia since 1917, but also of Pre-revolutionary Russia. Perhaps there is no better method of presenting his philosophy of history than to quote from his introduction to the English translation.

"During this period (the Revolution) were manifested in sharp relief the root differences between Marxist Russian historiography and its predecessor, the historiography of the landlords. . . . . We (Marxist Russian historians) alone have properly appraised the significance of the *masses* in history . . . fully understood the state as a *class* state. We, alone, finally, have abandoned the idyllic picture of the unification of the mass of 'backward' people under the 'enlightened' guidance of the Russian stars—because it has become possible for these people to tell how the 'propagators of enlightenment' tortured, oppressed, and exploited them, and because the rule of the proletariat has at last opened the way for genuine enlightenment of the non-Russian majority of the population of the former 'Russian Empire'." Professor Pokrovsky says that there is nothing in the conceptions of the landlord historiographers which the Marxist historian can borrow. A few of their facts will be useful, but as the editing of documents goes on apace, the old histories will not be needed. The historiographers of the master class are gone and with them their works for "every new explanation of the Russian historical process will be more materialistic, more sustainedly Marxist than its predecessor." What a contrast with the scientific historian who searches zealously after historical facts and presents them with as little interpretation as possible! "The History of Russia" remains true to Pokrovsky's view of history. He stresses the rise of private right, the rise of the princes following the pattern of family authority, and the general taking over of these property rights by the princes which resulted finally in the enslavement of the serfs. Court life during the reign of Peter the Great is discussed in its poorest light and emphasized more than the reforms made during his reign. If there is such a thing as an objective history of a people, a history of Russia by a Russian still remains to be written. But if history is each generation's interpretation of its country's past, then Pokrovsky has written another history of Russia. One looks forward with interest to the publication of the second volume of the "History of Russia" in which Pokrovsky will complete the Soviet interpretation of Russian history.

Unless one reads carefully the introductory pages to correct the impression of the book's content he may have gained from the title, *Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia* will seem to fall short of what it should contain. The title leads one to expect a survey covering the U. S. S. R., but the author says that because she was limited in her use of language, in time, and in facilities for travel into the outlying Soviet states, her study will cover the status of women and children in the Moscow district during 1929–1931. The title could well be more accurately descriptive. Yet the author feels justified in using this title for the districts which do not provide this protection are not truly Soviet! Except for a necessary omission of descriptive material relating to abortion and birth control, the treatment of the Communist theories of protection for women and children and their methods of providing this protection through creches (day nurseries), special nurseries, and hostels for mothers and children is detailed and informative. A short chapter dealing with the treatment of prostitutes through the Prophelactorium of Prostitutes shows that Russia still has this problem, but that efforts are being made to deal with it. The descriptions of creche theory and practice should have particular interest for everyone who studies the development and care of the child. The discussion of women's legal

rights in Russia should prove to be of value to those who are concerned with the problem of women's legal status. Probably nowhere will one find a clearer statement of the marriage and divorce laws and the status of marriage and divorce in Russia than the one given in this book. Considerable insight into the actual status of women and children may be gained from a perusal of the last few chapters where these laws are given in translation and reprints of charts and forms used in the creches, hostels, clinics, and courts are included. The author emphasizes the experimental character of the Soviet's attempt to attain a just and socially desirable program for the treatment of women and children. But the reader should remember that the material in the book is descriptive of conditions in Moscow and that the generalizations apply not to the whole of the U. S. S. R. but only to the Moscow district.

Origin and History of Politics. By William Christie MacLeod. New York: Wiley, 1931. 504 pp.

There is vast disparity between the objectives of this ambitious suggestive book and its attainments. The author announces that he is about to redeem political science from its sterile reiteration of ethnocentric shibboleths and its limited field of inquiry, by making a comparative study, from the point of view of modern ethnology, of the origins and development of political aspects of human behavior in all times and areas, and that he intends "to consider constitutions as typifications of culture patterns." These are certainly commendable, if colossal, objectives which require not only stupendous scholarship but also a power to integrate and synthesize materials. These, the author, in spite of his manifest abilities, does not yet seem to possess. There is accordingly a tone of immaturity about the volume exaggerated by the exclamation points which pepper it and which attempt to transmit to the reader the author's enthusiasm when he believes that he has scored telling points.

The book begins with a discussion of the nature of politics which is painfully reminiscent of the very logomachies that have embalmed political science. In discussing the function of the state, MacLeod relegates to one brief paragraph its use as a means of control by dominant classes. One finds many naïve categorical solutions of fundamental problems such as, for example, the dictum: "Since the individual is the source of all cultural change there can be no conflict between the 'good' of society and of the individual." The illustrative treatment of peoples living without the state which follows this discussion will be new and significant data for political scientists nurtured in formal scholastic traditions; it is lacking, however, in that the author does not indicate the extent of the distribution of such "anarchies" as that of the Yurok and does not establish clear cut criteria for a gerontocracy as a political form. In his extensive criticism of the conquest theory of the origin of the state, which is too contentious and prolix to be conclusive, he leans heavily on extreme diffusionism. It is odd to find Boas classed among the anti-diffusionists and held responsible for introducing the "German view" of independent origins into America. MacLeod should know of the earlier work of the American anthropologist, Brinton, (he taught at the University of Pennsylvania at which institution the author also instructs), who outdid Bastian in his stress on the importance of independent origins, prior to the time when Boas became popular. Furthermore, Boas' opposition in this controversy is often con-

strued as supporting the diffusionists, as for example Malinowski's comments in his article "Culture" published recently in the *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences.* But Boas' approach to the question is an empirical one; he ascribes certain cultural similarities to diffusion and others to independent origin. The author's theory of the origin of the state is expressed in terms of the ascendancy of leaders due to individual differences in psychological powers among members of a group; he fails, however, to analyse adequately the most important aspect of such a theory—the manner in which such leadership becomes sufficiently institutionalized to develop into a state. The most effective presentation of evidence in the book is found in the critique of the stage theories of social evolution in which MacLeod contends that correlations of institutions are entirely fortuitous and due to historical coincidence through cultural contacts. His criticisms of economic determinism, which he believes form a critique of some fundamentals of communist political theory, reveal little knowledge of original communist sources. For communist theorists are not the pure and simple economic determinists which he attacks but are historical determinists who speak in terms of superstructures and who are cognizant of the fallacies of reducing all change directly and indiscriminately to economic causation.

The author's discussion of political forms, past and present, to which the major share of the book is devoted, displays all the limitations of the comparative method, for political forms are divorced from their larger cultural setting. To treat the development of feudalism in Japan as well as in Europe, to contrast the Chinese Empire with that of the Incas, and the Iroquois Federal Republic with the New England Confederation is indeed unusual for an American text and is laudable. But the treatment, especially of modern political forms, is scant and reveals little profundity; comments on the political life in the Soviet Union, for example, are supercilious and reflect shallow judgments derived from a limited number of misinformed sources.

BERNHARD J. STERN.
Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences.

THE POPULIST REVOLT. By John D. Hicks. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1931. 464 pp. $4.00.

This is the second outstanding monographic study of the Farmers' Movement in the United States. The first was Buck's, "The Granger Movement"—a study of the farmers' revolt in the seventies of the last century. It appeared in 1913. Since that time, and before, a number of careful studies have been made of the activities of different farmer organizations, their economic and political activities. During the period in which the two Farmers' Alliances, the Farmers' Mutual Benefit Association and some half dozen smaller organizations were in existence, a large body of literature—books, pamphlets, house organs of the associations, magazine articles, organization proceedings, etc.—appeared. Most of this literature is badly scattered and some of it probably lost forever. Dean Hicks has, therefore, done a distinct service in bringing together a large body of facts and opinions which appeared during this period—from about 1875 to 1905. The monograph is carefully written, exceptionally well documented, and objectively presented. It will without doubt be a lasting contribution in the field of agricultural historical research.

The Populist Revolt was in a very definite way the end product of a widespread farmer discontent and, while not entirely

rural, did sweep into its ranks a greater number of farm organizations and a far greater percentage of American farmers than any other movement of the whole national history. Dean Hicks spends the first three chapters in giving the economic background and antecedents of the revolt. The titles of these chapters are: "The Frontier Background," "Southern Agriculture After the Civil War," "The Grievances." The next four chapters give the most complete account of the Northern and Southern Alliance that has yet appeared—a contribution which in itself would have made the monograph more than worthwhile. The titles of these four chapters are: "The Farmers' Alliance," "Alliance Activities," "The Elections of 1890," and "The Sub-treasury Plan." Chapters VIII to XIV present a detailed account of the Populist or the People's Party, tracing in the most accurate fashion the conflict and fusion of the various and varied factions which finally came together in the Free Silver Campaign of 1896. Within this section of the book appear biographical sketches of the leaders of the Revolt—Weaver, Donnely, Simson, Peffer, McCune, Watson, Polk, and others. The history of the political activities of the two Alliances is presented here in greater detail and more authoritatively than in any other work yet to appear. The economic activities of these organizations is also slightly presented, especially in the description of the sub-treasury plan of the Southern Alliance. The spirit of the Revolt is depicted by quoting snatches from songs and poems and excerpts from speeches and articles which appeared during the period. The struggle in each southern and western state is analysed in detail. The history of third parties and fusion tickets is faithfully recorded. An interpretation of the silver issue is given. The struggle with the railroads and the fight against the national banks are told. Tables are given showing the location and distribution of the Populist vote in 1892 and 1894. Reproductions of cartoons and posters are presented. The book concludes with a chapter on, "The Populist Contributions."

While no one would accuse Dean Hicks of presenting a partisan view, the reader will recognize at all points that he does present a sympathetic interpretation of this titanic struggle of the farmers of the West and South for what they conceived to be their battle for freedom. He points out, and correctly we believe, that, while the Populist Party failed, its doctrines have been gradually accepted and its demands answered by the adoption of its theories of government and the enactment into law, in a modified way in many cases, of the things for which it contended.

The six appendices and an elaborate bibliography complete the document, a document that is destined to be a lasting contribution, and one which fairly well closes the book of information on this important epoch in American History.

CARL C. TAYLOR.

Raleigh, North Carolina

CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY. By Emory S. Bogardus. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1931. 483 pp.

This book, which has been issued as a companion volume to *History of Social Thought* by the same author, presents an analysis of some of the more important sociological concepts through a carefully arranged selection of excerpts from the published writings of a large group of sociologists. In view of the fact that the writers who contribute to this volume are with few exceptions Americans, a more appropriate title would have been *Contemporary American Sociology*. While the bulk of the book consists of quoted mate-

rial, it is by no means simply a book of readings compiled by an editor. All of the chapters and most of the sub-divisions are prefaced by introductory comments which bind together the various contributions into a connected whole.

The general classes of concepts around which the various contributions are organized are the following: ecological, cultural, societal, personal, social process, social organization, social change, and social research. Under these general chapter headings are arranged fifty concepts, various aspects of which are discussed by more than eighty writers. The orderly arrangement of the book with its wide range of topics representative of the whole field of social theory and the bringing together of the views of many writers set forth in their own words make the volume very useful for advanced students of sociology. Each chapter is followed by an appropriate list of readings and at the end of the volume there is a well selected list of recent sociological writings.

J. F. Steiner.

University of Washington

The Labor Problem in the United States. By E. E. Cummins. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1932. xiii, 857 pp. $3.50.

Professor Cummins attacks his subject bluntly and courageously. Here is no half-hearted attempt to show that after all the employer and his employees constitute one big family whose interests are identical, and wherein friction arises only because neither side fully realizes and appreciates the problems of the other. The central labor problem, as he sees it, is the fundamental conflict of interests between the wage earning group on the one hand, and the employing group on the other. This, in turn, rests upon the kind of economic system that we have developed—a system in which self interest as expressed in the desire to obtain money is the dominating motive. Granting that these two groups have some interests in common, the fact remains that the employer group has control of most of the wealth. The struggle of the wage-earning group to bring about a redistribution more desirable from its point of view brings the two groups into collision. The modern labor problem thus takes its shape largely as a conflict between these two groups.

In its efforts to improve its economic status, labor has fixed its attention upon certain definite evils which it is determined to reduce if not eradicate—unemployment, hours, industrial accidents, etc. These are the grievances of labor and the struggle centers around them. The government is necessarily drawn into the conflict if for no other purpose than to try to maintain law and order. But more and more it is feeling itself obligated to put forth definite efforts on its own account to alleviate these grievances. ". . . and so the labor problem takes shape as a problem of the several attitudes of these three parties toward the grievances of the wage-earner."

Viewing the problem in this light, Professor Cummins' organization follows more or less naturally. The volume is divided into six parts, Part I and Part VI consisting of a single chapter each. The former is in the nature of an introduction and contains a brief statement of the origin and development of the wage-earning class, together with the problems which accompanied this development. The author's conclusions are set forth in the latter. Part II sets forth the grievances which face the wage-earner today as a consequence of his position in a capitalistic economy—unemployment, low wages, industrial accidents, etc. Part III, entitled The Wage Earner, deals with the

effort which labor itself has made to meet these grievances. Organized labor and its activities are thus introduced much earlier than in most texts, and are given much more prominence. Part IV discusses the employer and the various methods which individual employers have worked out in attempting to meet the wage earners' grievances, and also to solve their own personnel problems, as well as employers' associations and their attitudes toward labor organizations. Part V deals with the attitude and activities of the government in connection with labor problems and with employer-employee relations.

The excellence of Professor Cummins' treatment lies in his logical organization, and in his clear and vigorous style of presentation. The parts dealing with the labor movement, the employer, and the government constitute the body of the book and here the author is at his best, which is very good indeed. Although fair in themselves, the chapters on "grievances" suffer somewhat in comparison. Fortunately, current material to supplement the treatment of these problems can be secured comparatively easily, and since constant changes in labor legislation, as well as in the magnitude and nature of the problems themselves render any factual statement quickly out of date, the loss is more apparent than real. Certain omissions, however, do not seem to be justified. For example, one is disappointed to find no reference to either Myers' or Lubin's studies of displacement and reabsorption of workers in connection with technological unemployment. The failure of the author to give the dates of his references, except in isolated instances, is a bibliographical detail, but an annoying one. This is entirely permissible if a bibliography is given, but none is.

These details of omission shade into insignificance in the light of the book as a whole. It is an excellent presentation of the labor problem in the United States, particularly with respect to the labor movement, and it is the reviewer's opinion that it deserves and will receive widespread adoption.

H. D. Wolf.

University of North Carolina

An Hypothesis of Population Growth. By Ezra Bowen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931. 238 pp.

This is a straightforward, more or less orthodox, discussion of population thought since Malthus. There are chapters on Malthus, A Revaluation, Critics of Malthus, The Theories of East and Pearl, Other Post-War Theories, The Biology of Population Growth, Death Rate, Birth Rate, Migration, and Dysgenic Trends. The book is rather elementary, presents little that is new, is none too critical, and commonly employs secondary sources. At least one of the articles the reviewer remembers having seen in the *Popular Science Monthly*, though he can find here no statement to the effect that any chapter or chapters have been previously published in popular journals.

There is a central thesis running through the book which is an attempt to prove the "simple and enlightening formula" (p. 8) that "in a capitalistic civilization, population size tends to vary directly with the aggregate supply of wealth and inversely with the height of the prevailing standard of living" (p. 198). There is, of course, nothing new in this thesis; it runs through all the orthodox classical and neo-classical economic literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, if there is any "simple and enlightening" proposition in sociology or economics that is also true it is that there is no "simple and enlightening formula" which will explain demographic phenomena—not even such

a relatively simple phenomenon as population growth.

Why limit the formula, if valid, to capitalistic civilization? With slight modification it would seem to be equally applicable to a socialistic or communistic society. The growth of population, in so far as it is dependent upon economic production, is *relatively* independent of political and economic organization provided the necessary subsistence (using the term in its broadest sense) is really produced. Even if the generalization is valid, one may well doubt whether it does not mask more significant facts than it illuminates.

There is an assumption throughout the book that the food factor (p. 17) has been the controlling one in population growth. McFall, to mention only one, seems successfully to have shown otherwise, at least so far as the last century or two are concerned. Recent research into the probable future trend of population growth in the United States suggests that not food supply but birth restriction is likely to be the limiting factor in future growth. If anything, we have not pressure of population on food, but of food on population. The foot limit is only an ultimate, and at present, a non-operative limit.

Though there is much discussion here of birth control, there seems to be an assumption throughout the book that a mere *desire* for a higher standard of living will *automatically and necessarily* check the birth rate. Though widely held by economists and sociologists, this proposition is quite possibly an error. We know much less about the effects on the birth rate of an improved standard of living than commonly supposed. I am well aware of the fact that hundreds of economists and sociologists *think* they have a *certain* answer to this question. But I suspect that it is a generalization based on nineteenth century experience in western industrialized societies. For it was under these circumstances that classical political economy developed. Diffused contraceptive knowedge may be the "catalytic agent" here; for no writer in any language has ever succeeded in demonstrating that a higher standard of living automatically and necessarily, in the absence of knowledge of the prevention of conception, reduces the birth rate.

Though the book under review is occasionally verbose, and to the specialist hardly very informing, it ought to find a place in undergraduate sociology and population courses. The book has a certain fearless courage in the discussion of certain points which seem to the reviewer altogether admirable. One confesses to the wish, however, that there had been more exactness of phraseology, and fewer typographical errors. There is a useful, general bibliography.

NORMAN E. HIMES.

Somerville, Massachusetts

LEWIS HENRY MORGAN, SOCIAL EVOLUTIONIST. By Bernhard J. Stern. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. 221 pp. $2.50.

This book is a very readable and competent account of the life and work of an American who stands out as one of the founders of anthropology. Mr. Stern is to be congratulated upon a work which maintains a sane balance between admiration and criticism, brevity and detail.

The first sixty pages of the work sketch the life of Morgan. He was a grave, serious-minded youth, who took the Mosaic account of creation rather seriously and was apt to have very strong opinions. He denounced Demon Rum. In 1862 he believed that the Southern people were traitors and rebels and should be "expelled by the strong arm from every inch of American soil." When he visited the Pope, he refused to kiss the hand of that

august person, saying that in America it was the custom merely to shake hands with a distinguished man. Numerous intimate details of this sort make Morgan the man and Morgan the scientist stand out vividly.

Chapters on "The League of the Iroquois," "Systems of Consanguinity," "Animal Psychology," "Critique of the Mexican Annalists," and "Ancient Society," present ably and clearly the various aspects of Morgan's anthropological contributions. Mr. Stern has used liberally letters and other manuscripts hitherto unpublished to very good effect in recreating the atmosphere of anthropological scholarship in the days of Darwin, Tylor, Lubbock, Spencer, McLennan, and Morgan. One feels upon putting the book down that one has had a pretty good course in social anthropology.

As the author says: "Morgan was not the 'discoverer of the law of social progress,' as he is boldly characterized on his commemorative tablet at Wells College in Aurora, New York. But he stands among the notable founders of anthropology, as one who, in spite of limited scientific equipment, a meager library, and a scanty factual foundation upon which to build, through his own persistent efforts was able to contribute much to the methodology and source material of that science."

Guy B. Johnson.

University of North Carolina

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee. A Study in Frontier Democracy. By Thomas Perkins Abernethy. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1932. 392 pp. $3.50.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, der Philosoph, der Erzieher, der Mensch, im Gericht seiner französischen Ankläger. By Paul Andersson. Bochum: Tretloh, 1931. 97 pp.

Philanthropy for the Future. A Long Range Look at Economic Policies in the Field of Charity. Papers Presented at the Fourth Conference on Financial and Fiduciary Matters, March 17–19, 1931. Edited by Alfred Williams Anthony. New York: Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, 1931. 148 pp.

Interrelations in the Behavior of Young Children. By Ruth E. Arrington. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1932. 156 pp.

Thomas Jefferson and Education in a Republic. Edited by Charles Flinn Arrowood. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1930. 184 pp.

Local Taxation of the Insurance Business in the United States. By Lloyd B. Averett. University of Kentucky: Bureau of Business Research. Reprinted from The Tax Magazine, Dec., 1931–Jan., 1932. 17 pp.

Can Man Be Civilized? By Harry Elmer Barnes. New York: Brentano's, 1932. 307 pp. $2.50.

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The Delinquent Child. Report of the Committee on Socially Handicapped—Delinquency, Frederick P. Cabot, Chairman. The White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. New York: Century, 1932. 499 pp. $3.50.

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Milk Production and Control. Communicable Diseases, Public Health Supervision, Nutritional Aspects; Economic Aspects. Report of the Committee on Milk Production and Control, H. A. Whittaker, Chairman. White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. New York: Century, 1932. 392 pp. $3.00.

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Obstetric Education. Report of the Subcommittee on Obstetric Teaching and Education, Fred Lyman Adair, Chairman. White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. New York: Century, 1932. 302 pp. $3.00.

Organization for the Care of Handicapped Children. Report of the Committee on National, State and Local Organization for the Handicapped, Kate Burr Johnson, Chairman. White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. New York: Century, 1932. 365 pp. $2.75.

Parent Education. Report of the Subcommittee on Types of Parent Education, Content and Method. Sidonie M. Gruenberg, Chairman. White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. New York: Century, 1932. 354 pp. $2.50.

Safety Education in Schools. Report of the Subcommittee on Safety Education in Schools. White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. New York: Century, 1932. 61 pp. Paper.

The School Health Program. Report of the Committee on the School Child, Thomas D. Wood, Chairman. White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. New York: Century, 1932. 400 pp. $2.75.

Social Hygiene in Schools. Report of the Subcommittee on Social Hygiene in Schools. White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. New York: Century, 1932. 59 pp. Paper.

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Communication. Stories of Man's Achievements. By David O. Woodbury. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1931. 280 p. Illustrated. $2.50.

Educational Views of Benjamin Franklin. Edited by Thomas Woody. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1931. 270 pp.

Southern Literature. Selections and Biographies. Selected and edited by William T. Wynn. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1932. 534 pp. $2.75.

Psychological Racketeers. By Dorothy Hazeltine Yates. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1932. 231 pp. $2.00.

American Minority Peoples. A Study in Racial and Cultural Conflicts in the United States. By Donald Young. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932. 621 pp. $3.50.

The Modern American Family. Edited by Donald Young. Philadelphia: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1932. 256 pp. $2.00 paper; $2.50 cloth.

The Pilgrims of Russian-Town. The Community of Spiritual Christian Jumpers in America. By Pauline V. Young. Introduction by Robert E. Park. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932. 296 pp. Illustrated. $3.00.

The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes. By S. Zuckerman. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932. 356 pp. Illustrated.

EASTERN SOCIOLOGICAL CONFERENCE

The Eastern Sociological Conference held its third annual series of meetings at the Town Hall Club in New York City, April 23 and 24, 1932. The general theme of the Conference was outlined by Dr. H. P. Fairchild in his presidential address on the topic, "The Possibility, Character, and Functions of Applied Sociology." Other papers on related subjects were read by Dr. J. H. S. Bossard, Dr. Neva R. Deardorff, and Dr. Maurice Parmelee. It is planned to have this symposium appear in an early issue of Social Forces. Dr. L. L. Bernard outlined to the Conference, the plans, now under consideration, for the program of the American Sociological Society.

Officers for the coming year are: Dr. M. C. Elmer, President; Dr. S. A. Rice, Vice President; Dr. H. A. Phelps, Secretary-Treasurer; and an executive committee of three, Dr. R. M. MacIver, Dr. J. H. S. Bossard, and Dr. C. G. Dittmer.

The next annual conference will be held in Philadelphia, April 22nd and 23rd, 1933.